@article{OrlandRostamAfschar2021,
  author    = {Orland, Andreas and Rostam-Afschar, Davud},
  title     = {Flexible work arrangements and precautionary behavior},
  series = {Journal of economic behavior \& organization},
  volume    = {191},
  journal   = {Journal of economic behavior \& organization},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {Amsterdam},
  issn      = {0167-2681},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.jebo.2021.09.015},
  pages     = {442 -- 481},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {In the past years, work-time in many industries has become more flexible, opening up a new channel for intertemporal substitution: workers might, instead of saving, adjust their work-time to smooth consumption. To study this channel, we set up a two-period consumption/saving model with wage uncertainty. This extends the standard saving model by also allowing a worker to allocate a fixed time budget between two work-shifts. To test the comparative statics implied by these two different channels, we conduct a laboratory experiment. A novel feature of our experiments is that we tie income to a real-effort style task. In four treatments, we turn on and off the two channels for consumption smoothing: saving and time allocation. Our main finding is that savings are strictly positive for at least 85 percent of subjects. We find that a majority of subjects also uses time allocation to smooth consumption and use saving and time shifting as substitutes, though not perfect substitutes. Part of the observed heterogeneity of precautionary behavior can be explained by risk preferences and motivations different from expected utility maximization. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{BruttelGuethNithammeretal.2022,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and G{\"u}th, Werner and Nithammer, Juri and Orland, Andreas},
  title     = {Inefficient cooperation under stochastic and strategic uncertainty},
  series = {Conflict resolution},
  volume    = {66},
  journal   = {Conflict resolution},
  number    = {4-5},
  publisher = {Sage Publ.},
  address   = {Thousand Oaks},
  issn      = {0022-0027},
  doi       = {10.1177/00220027211066614},
  pages     = {755 -- 782},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {Stochastic uncertainty can cause coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can increase efficiency. To test this transfer mechanism, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeated Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not lead to an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two major reasons for this failure: first, stochastic uncertainty forces proposers intending to cooperate to accept high strategic uncertainty, which many proposers avoid; second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperatively, which hinders cooperation in future periods.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{OrlandPadubrin2022,
  author    = {Orland, Andreas and Padubrin, Max},
  title     = {Is there a gender hiring gap in academic economics?},
  series = {Royal Society Open Science},
  volume    = {9},
  journal   = {Royal Society Open Science},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Royal Society},
  address   = {London},
  issn      = {2054-5703},
  doi       = {10.1098/rsos.210717},
  pages     = {9},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {We collect a network dataset of tenured economics faculty in Austria, Germany and Switzerland. We rank the 100 institutions included with a minimum violation ranking. This ranking is positively and significantly correlated with the Times Higher Education ranking of economics institutions. According to the network ranking, individuals on average go down about 23 ranks from their doctoral institution to their employing institution. While the share of females in our dataset is only 15\%, we do not observe a significant gender hiring gap (a difference in rank changes between male and female faculty). We conduct a robustness check with the Handelsblatt and the Times Higher Education ranking. According to these rankings, individuals on average go down only about two ranks. We do not observe a significant gender hiring gap using these two rankings (although the dataset underlying this analysis is small and these estimates are likely to be noisy). Finally, we discuss the limitations of the network ranking in our context.},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{OrlandPadubrin2022,
  author    = {Orland, Andreas and Padubrin, Max},
  title     = {Is there a gender hiring gap in academic economics? Evidence from a network analysis},
  series = {Zweitver{\"o}ffentlichungen der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  volume    = {9},
  journal   = {Zweitver{\"o}ffentlichungen der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  edition   = {2},
  publisher = {Universit{\"a}tsverlag Potsdam},
  address   = {Potsdam},
  issn      = {1867-5808},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-55884},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-558844},
  pages     = {1 -- 9},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {We collect a network dataset of tenured economics faculty in Austria, Germany and Switzerland. We rank the 100 institutions included with a minimum violation ranking. This ranking is positively and significantly correlated with the Times Higher Education ranking of economics institutions. According to the network ranking, individuals on average go down about 23 ranks from their doctoral institution to their employing institution. While the share of females in our dataset is only 15\%, we do not observe a significant gender hiring gap (a difference in rank changes between male and female faculty). We conduct a robustness check with the Handelsblatt and the Times Higher Education ranking. According to these rankings, individuals on average go down only about two ranks. We do not observe a significant gender hiring gap using these two rankings (although the dataset underlying this analysis is small and these estimates are likely to be noisy). Finally, we discuss the limitations of the network ranking in our context.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{OrlandPadubrin2022,
  author    = {Orland, Andreas and Padubrin, Max},
  title     = {Is there a gender hiring gap in academic economics? Evidence from a network analysis},
  series = {Royal Society Open Science},
  volume    = {9},
  journal   = {Royal Society Open Science},
  edition   = {2},
  publisher = {Royal Society of London},
  address   = {London},
  issn      = {2054-5703},
  doi       = {10.1098/rsos.210717},
  pages     = {1 -- 9},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {We collect a network dataset of tenured economics faculty in Austria, Germany and Switzerland. We rank the 100 institutions included with a minimum violation ranking. This ranking is positively and significantly correlated with the Times Higher Education ranking of economics institutions. According to the network ranking, individuals on average go down about 23 ranks from their doctoral institution to their employing institution. While the share of females in our dataset is only 15\%, we do not observe a significant gender hiring gap (a difference in rank changes between male and female faculty). We conduct a robustness check with the Handelsblatt and the Times Higher Education ranking. According to these rankings, individuals on average go down only about two ranks. We do not observe a significant gender hiring gap using these two rankings (although the dataset underlying this analysis is small and these estimates are likely to be noisy). Finally, we discuss the limitations of the network ranking in our context.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Orland2016,
  author    = {Orland, Andreas},
  title     = {Personality traits and the perception of macroeconomic indicators},
  series = {Bulletin of Economic Research},
  volume    = {69},
  journal   = {Bulletin of Economic Research},
  number    = {4},
  publisher = {Wiley},
  address   = {Hoboken},
  issn      = {0307-3378},
  doi       = {10.1111/boer.12110},
  pages     = {E150 -- E172},
  year      = {2016},
  abstract  = {I examine the determinants of both perceived inflation and unemployment in one single survey and include Big Five traits in the analysis. This is the first survey on this topic in Germany. My sample consists of 1771 students from different fields and levels. Using PhD students' estimates as a reference, I create categories for underestimation and overestimation of both variables. Multinomial logit regressions show that females overestimate both variables. Education and news consumption reduce misestimation. A higher level of Neuroticism is related with a higher probability to overestimate unemployment. Overstating (understating) one indicator is associated with overstating (understating) the other.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{KurzOrlandPosadzy2018,
  author    = {Kurz, Verena and Orland, Andreas and Posadzy, Kinga},
  title     = {Fairness versus efficiency},
  series = {Experimental Economics},
  volume    = {21},
  journal   = {Experimental Economics},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Dordrecht},
  issn      = {1386-4157},
  doi       = {10.1007/s10683-017-9540-5},
  pages     = {601 -- 626},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {We investigate in a laboratory experiment whether procedural fairness concerns affect how well individuals are able to solve a coordination problem in a two-player Volunteer's Dilemma. Subjects receive external action recommendations, either to volunteer or to abstain from it, in order to facilitate coordination and improve efficiency. We manipulate the fairness of the recommendation procedure by varying the probabilities of receiving the disadvantageous recommendation to volunteer between players. We find evidence that while recommendations improve overall efficiency regardless of their implications for expected payoffs, there are behavioural asymmetries depending on the recommendation: advantageous recommendations are followed less frequently than disadvantageous ones and beliefs about others' actions are more pessimistic in the treatment with recommendations inducing unequal expected payoffs.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{OrlandRoos2019,
  author    = {Orland, Andreas and Roos, Michael W. M.},
  title     = {Price-setting with quadratic adjustment costs},
  series = {Journal of economic behavior \& organization},
  volume    = {163},
  journal   = {Journal of economic behavior \& organization},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {Amsterdam},
  issn      = {0167-2681},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.jebo.2019.05.010},
  pages     = {88 -- 116},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {We test the price-setting behavior of firms using the Rotemberg (1982) model in order to explain puzzles in the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC). For our tests, we conducted experiments that adapt the model into an individual decision-making problem. We find systematic deviations in price-setting according to the subjects' degree of information acquisition. Subjects rarely make use of past information. On the other hand, subjects that decide to acquire relatively little information about future desired prices tend to overweight their own past set price when they set prices. We study the impact of this heterogeneous price-setting behavior for theoretically derived forward-looking Phillips curves. Our estimated NKPCs are in line with the empirical literature. The deviations from theoretical predictions in our NKPCs are driven by the less-informed subjects.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{BruttelGuethNithammeretal.2020,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and G{\"u}th, Werner and Nithammer, Juri and Orland, Andreas},
  title     = {Inefficient Cooperation under Stochastic and Strategic Uncertainty},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {20},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-47550},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-475500},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {Stochastic uncertainty can cause difficult coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can do so. To test this, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeatedly played Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not entail an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two main reasons for this finding: First, the stochastic uncertainty forces proposers to accept high strategic uncertainty if they intend to cooperate by claiming a low amount (which many proposers do not). Second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperative by transferring too little (which hinders cooperation in future periods).},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{OrlandSelten2016,
  author    = {Orland, Andreas and Selten, Reinhard},
  title     = {Buyer power in bilateral oligopolies with advance production: Experimental evidence},
  series = {Applied surface science : a journal devoted to applied physics and chemistry of surfaces and interfaces},
  volume    = {122},
  journal   = {Applied surface science : a journal devoted to applied physics and chemistry of surfaces and interfaces},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {Amsterdam},
  issn      = {0167-2681},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.jebo.2015.11.016},
  pages     = {31 -- 42},
  year      = {2016},
  abstract  = {We conduct experiments based on the oligopoly model by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to assess the impact of demand side concentration on market outcomes. Both buyers and sellers in our markets are humans. The number of firms is fixed at three in all treatments. Only the number of buyers is varied and total demand is split equally among them. We observe that firms set lower prices in markets with only few buyers, namely one or two. Price dispersion is higher in markets with few buyers. Aggregate demand withholding decreases with the number of buyers. This results in lower profits for firms and higher profits for buyers in markets with few buyers. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{BruttelGuethHertwigetal.2020,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and G{\"u}th, Werner and Hertwig, Ralph and Orland, Andreas},
  title     = {Do people harness deliberate ignorance to avoid envy and its detrimental effects?},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {17},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-44446},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-444463},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {Envy is an unpleasant emotion. If individuals anticipate that comparing their payoff with the (potentially higher) payoff of others will make them envious, they may want to actively avoid information about other people's payoffs. Given the opportunity to reduce another person's payoff, an individual's envy may trigger behavior that is detrimental to welfare. In this case, if individuals anticipate that they will react in a welfare-reducing way, they may also avoid information about other people's payoffs from the outset. We investigated these two hypotheses using three experiments. We found that 13\% of our potentially envious subjects avoided information when they did not have the opportunity to reduce another participant's payoff. Psychological scales do not explain this behavior. We also found that voluntarily uninformed subjects did neither deduct less of the payoff nor less frequently than subjects who could not avoid the information.},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{KurzOrlandPosadzy2018,
  author    = {Kurz, Verena and Orland, Andreas and Posadzy, Kinga},
  title     = {Fairness versus efficiency},
  series = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  journal   = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  number    = {117},
  issn      = {1867-5808},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-43261},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-432611},
  pages     = {601 -- 626},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {We investigate in a laboratory experiment whether procedural fairness concerns affect how well individuals are able to solve a coordination problem in a two-player Volunteer's Dilemma. Subjects receive external action recommendations, either to volunteer or to abstain from it, in order to facilitate coordination and improve efficiency. We manipulate the fairness of the recommendation procedure by varying the probabilities of receiving the disadvantageous recommendation to volunteer between players. We find evidence that while recommendations improve overall efficiency regardless of their implications for expected payoffs, there are behavioural asymmetries depending on the recommendation: advantageous recommendations are followed less frequently than disadvantageous ones and beliefs about others' actions are more pessimistic in the treatment with recommendations inducing unequal expected payoffs.},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{HeuerOrland2019,
  author    = {Heuer, Leonie and Orland, Andreas},
  title     = {Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma},
  series = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  journal   = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  number    = {107},
  issn      = {1867-5808},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-43592},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-435929},
  pages     = {9},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {Cooperation is — despite not being predicted by game theory — a widely documented aspect of human behaviour in Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) situations. This article presents a comparison between subjects restricted to playing pure strategies and subjects allowed to play mixed strategies in a one-shot symmetric PD laboratory experiment. Subjects interact with 10 other subjects and take their decisions all at once. Because subjects in the mixed-strategy treatment group are allowed to condition their level of cooperation more precisely on their beliefs about their counterparts' level of cooperation, we predicted the cooperation rate in the mixed-strategy treatment group to be higher than in the pure-strategy control group. The results of our experiment reject our prediction: even after controlling for beliefs about the other subjects' level of cooperation, we find that cooperation in the mixed-strategy group is lower than in the pure-strategy group. We also find, however, that subjects in the mixedstrategy group condition their cooperative behaviour more closely on their beliefs than in the pure-strategy group. In the mixed-strategy group, most subjects choose intermediate levels of cooperation.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{HeuerOrland2019,
  author    = {Heuer, Leonie and Orland, Andreas},
  title     = {Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma},
  series = {Royal Society Open Science},
  volume    = {6},
  journal   = {Royal Society Open Science},
  publisher = {Royal Soc. Publ.},
  address   = {London},
  issn      = {2054-5703},
  doi       = {10.1098/rsos.182142},
  pages     = {9},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {Cooperation is — despite not being predicted by game theory — a widely documented aspect of human behaviour in Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) situations. This article presents a comparison between subjects restricted to playing pure strategies and subjects allowed to play mixed strategies in a one-shot symmetric PD laboratory experiment. Subjects interact with 10 other subjects and take their decisions all at once. Because subjects in the mixed-strategy treatment group are allowed to condition their level of cooperation more precisely on their beliefs about their counterparts' level of cooperation, we predicted the cooperation rate in the mixed-strategy treatment group to be higher than in the pure-strategy control group. The results of our experiment reject our prediction: even after controlling for beliefs about the other subjects' level of cooperation, we find that cooperation in the mixed-strategy group is lower than in the pure-strategy group. We also find, however, that subjects in the mixedstrategy group condition their cooperative behaviour more closely on their beliefs than in the pure-strategy group. In the mixed-strategy group, most subjects choose intermediate levels of cooperation.},
  language  = {en}
}