@article{WeaverHeinzelJorgensenetal.2022,
  author    = {Weaver, Catherine and Heinzel, Mirko and Jorgensen, Samantha and Flores, Joseph},
  title     = {Bureaucratic representation in the IMF and the World Bank},
  series = {Global perspectives},
  volume    = {3},
  journal   = {Global perspectives},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {University of California Press},
  address   = {Oakland, CA},
  issn      = {2575-7350},
  doi       = {10.1525/gp.2022.39684},
  pages     = {18},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {The legitimacy and effectiveness of international organizations are often linked directly to issues of representation—not only on their high-level governing boards and in top leadership but also within their staff. This article explores two key questions of bureaucratic representation in the critical cases of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. First, we seek to unpack three essential dimensions of staff representation—nationality, education, and gender—to explain how representation may matter for international organizations. Second, we aim to describe the multiple dimensions of representation in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank over the past twenty years by deploying a novel dataset on staff demographics, focusing on ranks with decision-making authority within the institutions. Our descriptive analysis reveals that the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have made considerable efforts to diversify their bureaucracies. Nonetheless, representation remains uneven; for example, nationals from middle- and low-income countries, women, and staff without economics degrees from prominent US- or UK-based universities are less present in key leadership positions. These results may be well explained by the particular needs of the institutions' technical mandates and limits in the supply of qualified staff and, as such, need not be seen as suboptimal. Nonetheless, perceived imbalances in representation may continue to pose external legitimation and operational challenges to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in a complex political environment where such multidimensional representation is important to sustaining the buy-in of donor and borrower countries alike. To this end, we recommend that the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank enhance their diversity and inclusion efforts by increasing transparency via reporting disaggregated data on workforce composition and introducing annual requirements to publish progress reports with management feedback to strengthen internal and external accountability.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Feil2021,
  author    = {Feil, Hauke},
  title     = {The cancer of corruption and World Bank project performance},
  series = {Development policy review / publ. for the Overseas Development Institute},
  volume    = {39},
  journal   = {Development policy review / publ. for the Overseas Development Institute},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Blackwell Publ.},
  address   = {Oxford},
  issn      = {1467-7679},
  doi       = {10.1111/dpr.12503},
  pages     = {381 -- 397},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Motivation: Corruption is often cited as a central reason why development projects fail. The article tests this claim by assessing whether World Bank projects perform worse in implementation environments with a higher corruption level. The article focuses specifically on bribery between public officials and firms during the procurement of needed goods and services. Approach and Methods: I use data from the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys to avoid the often-criticized corruption perception indices and to allow for an assessment of effects at the subnational level. The analysis builds on an assessment of the performance ratings of 1,228 World Bank projects and covers 87 different countries. Finding: Overall, the article finds a small but statistically significant correlation between the corruption level and project performance. This result indicates that the corruption level of recipient countries should be considered during the design and implementation of projects. Policy Implications: Nonetheless, the relatively small correlation and the low pseudo R-squareds advise not overestimating the relevance of corruption for project performance. At least for the project level, the article finds no indication that corruption is a primary obstacle to aid effectiveness.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{HeckeFuhrWolfs2021,
  author    = {Hecke, Steven van and Fuhr, Harald and Wolfs, Wouter},
  title     = {The politics of crisis management by regional and international organizations in fighting against a global pandemic},
  series = {International review of administrative sciences : an international journal of comparative public administration},
  volume    = {87},
  journal   = {International review of administrative sciences : an international journal of comparative public administration},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Sage},
  address   = {Los Angeles, Calif. [u.a.]},
  issn      = {0020-8523},
  doi       = {10.1177/0020852320984516},
  pages     = {672 -- 690},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Despite new challenges like climate change and digitalization, global and regional organizations recently went through turbulent times due to a lack of support from several of their member states. Next to this crisis of multilateralism, the COVID-19 pandemic now seems to question the added value of international organizations for addressing global governance issues more specifically. This article analyses this double challenge that several organizations are facing and compares their ways of managing the crisis by looking at their institutional and political context, their governance structure, and their behaviour during the pandemic until June 2020. More specifically, it will explain the different and fragmented responses of the World Health Organization, the European Union and the International Monetary Fund/World Bank. With the aim of understanding the old and new problems that these international organizations are trying to solve, this article argues that the level of autonomy vis-a-vis the member states is crucial for understanding the politics of crisis management. <br /> Points for practitioners <br /> As intergovernmental bodies, international organizations require authorization by their member states. Since they also need funding for their operations, different degrees of autonomy also matter for reacting to emerging challenges, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The potential for international organizations is limited, though through proactive and bold initiatives, they can seize the opportunity of the crisis and partly overcome institutional and political constraints.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{HeinzelLiese2021,
  author    = {Heinzel, Mirko Noa and Liese, Andrea},
  title     = {Managing performance and winning trust},
  series = {The review of international organizations},
  journal   = {The review of international organizations},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Boston},
  issn      = {1559-744X},
  doi       = {10.1007/s11558-021-09414-4},
  pages     = {625 -- 653},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {World Bank evaluations show that recipient performance varies substantially between different projects. Extant research has focused on country-level variables when explaining these variations. This article goes beyond country-level explanations and highlights the role of World Bank staff. We extend established arguments in the literature on compliance with the demands of International Organizations (IOs) and hypothesize that IO staff can shape recipient performance in three ways. First, recipient performance may be influenced by the quality of IO staff monitoring and supervision. Second, the leniency and stringency with which IO staff apply the aid agreement could improve recipient performance. Third, recipient performance may depend on whether IO staff can identify and mobilize supportive interlocutors through their networks in the recipient country. We test these arguments by linking a novel database on the tenure of World Bank task team leaders to projects evaluated between 1986 and 2020. The findings are consistent with the expectation that World Bank staff play an important role, but only in investment projects. There is substantial evidence that World Bank staff supervisory ability and country experience are linked to recipient performance in those projects. Less consistent evidence indicates that leniency could matter. These findings imply that World Bank staff play an important role in facilitating implementation of investment projects.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{HeldtDoerfler2021,
  author    = {Heldt, Eugenia C. and D{\"o}rfler, Thomas},
  title     = {Orchestrating private investors for development},
  series = {Regulation \& governance},
  volume    = {16},
  journal   = {Regulation \& governance},
  number    = {4},
  publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
  address   = {Hoboken, NJ},
  issn      = {1748-5983},
  doi       = {10.1111/rego.12432},
  pages     = {1382 -- 1398},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Confronted with a new wave of criticism on the in effectiveness of its development programs, the World Bank embarked on a revitalization process, turning to private investors to finance International Development Association projects and widening its mandate. To explain these adaptation strategies of the World Bank to regain relevance, this piece draws on organizational ecology and orchestration scholarship. We contend that international organizations rely on two adaptation mechanisms, orchestration and scope expansion, when they lose their role as focal actors in an issue area. We find that the World Bank has indeed lost market share and has relied on these two mechanisms to revitalize itself. We show that the World Bank responded to changes in the environment by orchestrating a private sector-oriented capital increase, prioritizing private funding for development through a "cascade approach," and expanding the scope of its mandate into adjacent domains of transnational governance, including climate change and global health.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{HeinzelRichterBuschetal.2020,
  author    = {Heinzel, Mirko Noa and Richter, Jonas and Busch, Per-Olof and Feil, Hauke and Herold, Jana and Liese, Andrea},
  title     = {Birds of a feather?},
  series = {Review of international political economy},
  volume    = {28},
  journal   = {Review of international political economy},
  number    = {5},
  publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group},
  address   = {Abingdon},
  issn      = {0969-2290},
  doi       = {10.1080/09692290.2020.1749711},
  pages     = {1249 -- 1273},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank ascribe to impartiality in their mandates. At the same time, scholarship indicates that their decisions are disproportionately influenced by powerful member states. Impartiality is seen as crucial in determining International Organizations' (IOs) effectiveness and legitimacy in the literature. However, we know little about whether key interlocutors in national governments perceive the International Financial Institutions as biased actors who do the bidding for powerful member states or as impartial executors of policy. In order to better understand these perceptions, we surveyed high-level civil servants who are chiefly responsible for four policy areas from more than 100 countries. We found substantial variations in impartiality perceptions. What explains these variations? By developing an argument of selective awareness, we extend rationalist and ideational perspectives on IO impartiality to explain domestic perceptions. Using novel survey data, we test whether staffing underrepresentation, voting underrepresentation, alignment to the major shareholders and overlapping economic policy paradigms are associated with impartiality perceptions. We find substantial evidence that shared economic policy paradigms influence impartiality perceptions. The findings imply that by diversifying their ideational culture, IOs can increase the likelihood that domestic stakeholders view them as impartial.},
  language  = {en}
}