@article{Ganghof2019,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen},
  title     = {Designing Democratic Constitutions},
  series = {Politics and Governance},
  volume    = {7},
  journal   = {Politics and Governance},
  number    = {4},
  publisher = {Cogitatio Press},
  address   = {Lisbon},
  issn      = {2183-2463},
  doi       = {10.17645/pag.v7i4.2239},
  pages     = {243 -- 253},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {This article analyses salient trade-offs in the design of democracy. It grounds this analysis in a distinction between two basic models of democracy: simple and complex majoritarianism. These models differ not only in their electoral and party systems, but also in the style of coalition-building. Simple majoritarianism concentrates executive power in a single majority party; complex majoritarianism envisions the formation of shifting, issue-specific coalitions among multiple parties whose programs differ across multiple conflict dimensions. The latter pattern of coalition formation is very difficult to create and sustain under pure parliamentary government. A separation of powers between executive and legislature can facilitate such a pattern, while also achieving central goals of simple majoritarianism: identifiable cabinet alternatives before the election and stable cabinets afterward. The separation of powers can thus balance simple and complex majoritarianism in ways that are unavailable under parliamentarism. The article also compares the presidential and semi-parliamentary versions of the separation of powers. It argues that the latter has important advantages, e.g., when it comes to resolving inter-branch deadlock, as it avoids the concentration of executive power in a single human being.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Ganghof2013,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen},
  title     = {Equality-based comparison how to justify democratic institutions in the Real World},
  series = {Politics},
  volume    = {33},
  journal   = {Politics},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
  address   = {Hoboken},
  issn      = {0263-3957},
  doi       = {10.1111/1467-9256.12002},
  pages     = {101 -- 111},
  year      = {2013},
  abstract  = {Political scientists regularly justify particular democratic institutions. This article explores two desiderata for such justifications. The first is a formal equality baseline which puts the burden of justification on those who favour more unequal institutions. This baseline is seen as an implication of the rule of law. The second desideratum, the comparison requirement, builds on the first: adequate justifications of particular institutions must compare them to the best alternative, and this comparison must consider the costs for political equality. The two desiderata are applied to political science debates about the proportionality of the electoral system and bicameral systems of legislative decision-making.},
  language  = {en}
}