@article{Ganghof2010, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Review article: Democratic inclusiveness : a reinterpretation of Lijphart's patterns of democracy}, issn = {0007-1234}, doi = {10.1017/S0007123410000128}, year = {2010}, abstract = {This contribution to the study or democratic inclusiveness advances three main claims, based on Lijphart's original data First, his measurement of executive inclusiveness is incoherent and invalid. Secondly, executive inclusiveness is best explained by the interaction of many parties and strong legislative veto points. This implies that executive inclusiveness should not be contained in either of Lijphart's two dimensions of democracy. Thirdly, parties have incentives to economize on the costs of inclusive coalitions by avoiding strong legislative veto points, and these incentives are greater in parliamentary than in presidential systems. Hence. Lijphart's favourite version of consensus democracy - characterized by a parliamentary system and a high degree of executive inclusiveness - is unlikely to be a behavioural-institutional equilibrium.}, language = {en} } @article{Ganghof2013, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Equality-based comparison how to justify democratic institutions in the Real World}, series = {Politics}, volume = {33}, journal = {Politics}, number = {2}, publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell}, address = {Hoboken}, issn = {0263-3957}, doi = {10.1111/1467-9256.12002}, pages = {101 -- 111}, year = {2013}, abstract = {Political scientists regularly justify particular democratic institutions. This article explores two desiderata for such justifications. The first is a formal equality baseline which puts the burden of justification on those who favour more unequal institutions. This baseline is seen as an implication of the rule of law. The second desideratum, the comparison requirement, builds on the first: adequate justifications of particular institutions must compare them to the best alternative, and this comparison must consider the costs for political equality. The two desiderata are applied to political science debates about the proportionality of the electoral system and bicameral systems of legislative decision-making.}, language = {en} } @article{Ganghof2013, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Does public reason require super-majoritarian democracy? Liberty, equality, and history in the justification of political institutions}, series = {Politics, philosophy \& economics}, volume = {12}, journal = {Politics, philosophy \& economics}, number = {2}, publisher = {Sage Publ.}, address = {Thousand Oaks}, issn = {1470-594X}, doi = {10.1177/1470594X12447786}, pages = {179 -- 196}, year = {2013}, abstract = {The project of public-reason liberalism faces a basic problem: publicly justified principles are typically too abstract and vague to be directly applied to practical political disputes, whereas applicable specifications of these principles are not uniquely publicly justified. One solution could be a legislative procedure that selects one member from the eligible set of inconclusively justified proposals. Yet if liberal principles are too vague to select sufficiently specific legislative proposals, can they, nevertheless, select specific legislative procedures? Based on the work of Gerald Gaus, this article argues that the only candidate for a conclusively justified decision procedure is a majoritarian or otherwise 'neutral' democracy. If the justification of democracy requires an equality baseline in the design of political regimes and if justifications for departure from this baseline are subject to reasonable disagreement, a majoritarian design is justified by default. Gaus's own preference for super-majoritarian procedures is based on disputable specifications of justified liberal principles. These procedures can only be defended as a sectarian preference if the equality baseline is rejected, but then it is not clear how the set of justifiable political regimes can be restricted to full democracies.}, language = {en} } @article{Ganghof2014, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Bicameralism as a form of government (Or: Why Australia and Japan do not have a parliamentary system)}, series = {Parliamentary affairs : a journal of representative politics}, volume = {67}, journal = {Parliamentary affairs : a journal of representative politics}, number = {3}, publisher = {Oxford Univ. Press}, address = {Oxford}, issn = {0031-2290}, doi = {10.1093/pa/gss081}, pages = {647 -- 663}, year = {2014}, abstract = {The article analyses a certain type of bicameralism not merely as a form of legislative organisation, but as a form of government-as a hybrid between parliamentarism and presidentialism. A new typology of pure and hybrid forms of government is proposed, which classifies bicameralism in Australia and Japan as chamber-independent government. This type is systematically compared with other forms of government, including hybrids like semi-presidentialism, elected prime-ministerial government in Israel (from 1996 to 2002) and assembly-independent government in Switzerland. The article highlights how chamber-independent government has the potential to combine different visions of democracy without leading to presidentialisation of political parties.}, language = {en} } @article{Ganghof2015, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Four Visions of Democracy: Powell's Elections as Instruments of Democracy and beyond}, series = {Political studies review}, volume = {13}, journal = {Political studies review}, number = {1}, publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell}, address = {Hoboken}, issn = {1478-9299}, doi = {10.1111/1478-9302.12069}, pages = {69 -- 79}, year = {2015}, abstract = {The article critically reviews the conceptual ideas of G. Bingham Powell's Elections as Instruments of Democracy and explores ways to develop them further. Powell's conceptual alternative to the Westminster model - the 'proportional' vision of democracy - comes in two variants, one focusing on proportional representation ( PR) and the other on proportional legislative influence. If one focuses on the former, it is possible to distinguish four visions of parliamentary democracy based on the main stage at which majorities are formed. The four stages are: party, alliance, cabinet, and law formation. The corresponding normative visions can be placed on a conceptual continuum between 'simple' and 'complex' majoritarianism. This article discusses the goals and trade-offs associated with them as well as their underlying institutional designs. It also re-emphasises Powell's insight that the congruence between policy makers and the median voter in a unidimensional policy space is a more appropriate normative standard for some visions of democracy than for others.}, language = {en} } @article{Ganghof2016, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {The Regime-Trilemma: On the Relationship between the Executive and Legislature in advanced Democracies}, series = {Politische Vierteljahresschrift : Zeitschrift der Deutschen Vereinigung f{\~A}¼r Politische Wissenschaft}, volume = {57}, journal = {Politische Vierteljahresschrift : Zeitschrift der Deutschen Vereinigung f{\~A}¼r Politische Wissenschaft}, publisher = {Nomos}, address = {Hannover}, issn = {0032-3470}, doi = {10.5771/0032-3470-2016-1-27}, pages = {27 -- +}, year = {2016}, abstract = {A comprehensive typology of basic executive formats is presented and linked to a discussion of tradeoffs in the design of executive-legislative relations. The focus is on the tradeoffs between three goals: (1) programmatic parties, (2) identifiable cabinets and (3) issue -specific legislative coalitions. To include semi-presidentialism into the typology in a logically consistent manner, a heretofore neglected executive format has to be defined, which is labelled semi-parliamentarism. Based on a discussion of Australian states, it is argued that semi-parliamentarism has the potential to mitigate the trilemma.}, language = {de} } @article{Ganghof2016, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Research Design in Political Science - Causal perspectives versus contrastive theory testing}, series = {Austrian journal of political science}, volume = {45}, journal = {Austrian journal of political science}, publisher = {{\~A}-sterreichische Gesellschaft f{\~A}¼r Politikwissenschaft}, address = {Wien}, issn = {2313-5433}, doi = {10.15203/ozp.1037.vol45iss1}, pages = {1 -- 12}, year = {2016}, abstract = {Die politikwissenschaftliche Literatur unterscheidet zwei Grundtypen von Forschungsdesigns: x- und y-zentriert. Dieser Beitrag argumentiert, dass ein „kontrastives" Forschungsdesign als dritter Grundtyp abgegrenzt werden sollte. Die drei Designs unterscheiden sich durch die Anzahl der betrachteten Theorien und dadurch, ob mehrere Theorien konkurrierend oder komplement{\"a}r sind. Die typologische Abgrenzung des kontrastiven Designs verdeutlicht auch die Vor- und Nachteile x- und y-zentrierter Designs. Anhand verschiedener Beispielstudien (experimentell und nicht-experimentell, quantitativ und qualitativ) werden die Charakteristika der drei Designs sowie ihre Kombinationsm{\"o}glichkeiten herausgearbeitet. Dar{\"u}ber hinaus wird das kontrastive Design als verbindendes Element zwischen den quantitativen und qualitativen Forschungs-„Kulturen" hervorgehoben. The political science literature distinguishes two basic types of research designs: x- and y-centered. The article argues for the distinction of a third basic type: the "contrastive" design. The three designs differ in the number of relevant theories and in whether they see theories as competing or complementary. The typological differentiation of the contrastive research design helps to clarify the pros and cons of x- and y-centered designs. The article uses exemplary studies (experimental and observational, quantitative and qualitative) to illustrate the characteristics of the three designs as well as the possibilities of combining them. The contrastive design also constitutes a common element of the quantitative and qualitative research, "cultures".}, language = {de} } @article{Ganghof2016, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Reconciling Representation and Accountability: Three Visions of Democracy Compared}, series = {Government \& opposition : an international journal of comparative politics}, volume = {51}, journal = {Government \& opposition : an international journal of comparative politics}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ. Press}, address = {Cambridge}, issn = {0017-257X}, doi = {10.1017/gov.2015.15}, pages = {209 -- 233}, year = {2016}, abstract = {An egalitarian approach to the fair representation of voters specifies three main institutional requirements: proportional representation, legislative majority rule and a parliamentary system of government. This approach faces two challenges: the under-determination of the resulting democratic process and the idea of a trade-off between equal voter representation and government accountability. Linking conceptual with comparative analysis, the article argues that we can distinguish three ideal-typical varieties of the egalitarian vision of democracy, based on the stages at which majorities are formed. These varieties do not put different relative normative weight onto equality and accountability, but have different conceptions of both values and their reconciliation. The view that accountability is necessarily linked to 'clarity of responsibility', widespread in the comparative literature, is questioned - as is the idea of a general trade-off between representation and accountability. Depending on the vision of democracy, the two values need not be in conflict.}, language = {en} } @article{EppnerGanghof2017, author = {Eppner, Sebastian and Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Institutional veto players and cabinet formation}, series = {European journal of political research : official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research}, volume = {56}, journal = {European journal of political research : official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research}, number = {1}, publisher = {Wiley}, address = {Hoboken}, issn = {0304-4130}, doi = {10.1111/1475-6765.12172}, pages = {169 -- 186}, year = {2017}, abstract = {Are potential cabinets more likely to form when they control institutional veto players such as symmetric second chambers or minority vetoes? Existing evidence for a causal effect of veto control has been weak. This article presents evidence for this effect on the basis of conditional and mixed logit analyses of government formations in 21 parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies between 1955 and 2012. It also shows that the size of the effect varies systematically across political-institutional contexts. The estimated causal effect was greater in countries that eventually abolished the relevant veto institutions. It is suggested that the incidence of constitutional reform is a proxy for context-specific factors that increased the incentives for veto control and simultaneously provided a stimulus for the weakening of institutional veto power.}, language = {en} } @article{Ganghof2017, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {The Empirical Uses of Theoretical Models}, series = {Political studies review}, volume = {15}, journal = {Political studies review}, publisher = {Sage Publ.}, address = {London}, issn = {1478-9299}, doi = {10.1111/1478-9302.12098}, pages = {49 -- 59}, year = {2017}, abstract = {Veto player theory is a powerful approach to comparative politics. This article argues that the debate about its explanatory success would benefit from more systematic distinctions. The theory not only comes in different theoretical variants, it is also used in radically different ways empirically. Starting from recent debates about the 'testing' of theoretical models, the article distinguishes five ways in which theoretical models can be used empirically: contrastive, axiomatic, exploratory, presumptive and modular. The typology is applied to veto player theory and illustrated with exemplary studies and debates. The article concludes that each type raises different questions that should be answered in individual studies. Moreover, while veto player theory has an excellent track record on four empirical uses, the picture on its contrastive use is far more nuanced. More explicitly contrastive testing of the theory is desirable.}, language = {en} } @article{Ganghof2018, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {A new political system model}, series = {European Journal for Political Research}, volume = {57}, journal = {European Journal for Political Research}, number = {2}, publisher = {Wiley}, address = {Hoboken}, issn = {0304-4130}, doi = {10.1111/1475-6765.12224}, pages = {261 -- 281}, year = {2018}, abstract = {Semi-parliamentary government is a distinct executive-legislative system that mirrors semi-presidentialism. It exists when the legislature is divided into two equally legitimate parts, only one of which can dismiss the prime minister in a no-confidence vote. This system has distinct advantages over pure parliamentary and presidential systems: it establishes a branch-based separation of powers and can balance the 'majoritarian' and 'proportional' visions of democracy without concentrating executive power in a single individual. This article analyses bicameral versions of semi-parliamentary government in Australia and Japan, and compares empirical patterns of democracy in the Australian Commonwealth as well as New South Wales to 20 advanced parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. It discusses new semi-parliamentary designs, some of which do not require formal bicameralism, and pays special attention to semi-parliamentary options for democratising the European Union.}, language = {en} } @article{GanghofEppnerPoerschke2018, author = {Ganghof, Steffen and Eppner, Sebastian and P{\"o}rschke, Alexander}, title = {Semi-parliamentary government in perspective}, series = {Australian Journal of Political Science}, volume = {53}, journal = {Australian Journal of Political Science}, number = {2}, publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group}, address = {Abingdon}, issn = {1036-1146}, doi = {10.1080/10361146.2018.1451488}, pages = {264 -- 269}, year = {2018}, abstract = {The article responds to four commentaries on the concept of semi-parliamentary government and its application to Australian bicameralism. It highlights four main points: (1) Our preferred typology is not more 'normative' than existing approaches, but applies the criterion of 'direct election' equally to executive and legislature; (2) While the evolution of semi-parliamentary government had contingent elements, it plausibly also reflects the 'equilibrium' nature of certain institutional configurations; (3) The idea that a pure parliamentary system with pure proportional representation has absolute normative priority over 'instrumentalist' concerns about cabinet stability, identifiability and responsibility is questionable; and (4) The reforms we discuss may be unlikely to occur in Australia, but deserve consideration by scholars and institutional reformers in other democratic systems.}, language = {en} } @article{GanghofEppnerPoerschke2018, author = {Ganghof, Steffen and Eppner, Sebastian and P{\"o}rschke, Alexander}, title = {Australian bicameralism as semi-parliamentarism}, series = {Australian Journal of Political Science}, volume = {53}, journal = {Australian Journal of Political Science}, number = {2}, publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group}, address = {Abingdon}, issn = {1036-1146}, doi = {10.1080/10361146.2018.1451487}, pages = {211 -- 233}, year = {2018}, abstract = {The article analyses the type of bicameralism we find in Australia as a distinct executive-legislative system - a hybrid between parliamentary and presidential government - which we call 'semi-parliamentary government'. We argue that this hybrid presents an important and underappreciated alternative to pure parliamentary government as well as presidential forms of the power-separation, and that it can achieve a certain balance between competing models or visions of democracy. We specify theoretically how the semi-parliamentary separation of powers contributes to the balancing of democratic visions and propose a conceptual framework for comparing democratic visions. We use this framework to locate the Australian Commonwealth, all Australian states and 22 advanced democratic nation-states on a two-dimensional empirical map of democratic patterns for the period from 1995 to 2015.}, language = {en} } @article{Ganghof2019, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Designing Democratic Constitutions}, series = {Politics and Governance}, volume = {7}, journal = {Politics and Governance}, number = {4}, publisher = {Cogitatio Press}, address = {Lisbon}, issn = {2183-2463}, doi = {10.17645/pag.v7i4.2239}, pages = {243 -- 253}, year = {2019}, abstract = {This article analyses salient trade-offs in the design of democracy. It grounds this analysis in a distinction between two basic models of democracy: simple and complex majoritarianism. These models differ not only in their electoral and party systems, but also in the style of coalition-building. Simple majoritarianism concentrates executive power in a single majority party; complex majoritarianism envisions the formation of shifting, issue-specific coalitions among multiple parties whose programs differ across multiple conflict dimensions. The latter pattern of coalition formation is very difficult to create and sustain under pure parliamentary government. A separation of powers between executive and legislature can facilitate such a pattern, while also achieving central goals of simple majoritarianism: identifiable cabinet alternatives before the election and stable cabinets afterward. The separation of powers can thus balance simple and complex majoritarianism in ways that are unavailable under parliamentarism. The article also compares the presidential and semi-parliamentary versions of the separation of powers. It argues that the latter has important advantages, e.g., when it comes to resolving inter-branch deadlock, as it avoids the concentration of executive power in a single human being.}, language = {en} } @article{Ganghof2023, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Justifying types of representative democracy}, series = {Critical review of international social and political philosophy}, journal = {Critical review of international social and political philosophy}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London}, issn = {1369-8230}, doi = {10.1080/13698230.2022.2159665}, pages = {1 -- 12}, year = {2023}, abstract = {This article responds to critical reflections on my Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism by Sarah Birch, Kevin J. Elliott, Claudia Landwehr and James L. Wilson. It discusses how different types of representative democracy, especially different forms of government (presidential, parliamentary or hybrid), can be justified. It clarifies, among other things, the distinction between procedural and process equality, the strengths of semi-parliamentary government, the potential instability of constitutional designs, and the difference that theories can make in actual processes of constitutional reform.}, language = {en} } @article{TsebelisThiesCheibubetal.2023, author = {Tsebelis, George and Thies, Michael and Cheibub, Jos{\´e} Antonio and Dixon, Rosalind and Bog{\´e}a, Daniel and Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Review symposium}, series = {European political science}, journal = {European political science}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, address = {Basingstoke}, issn = {1680-4333}, doi = {10.1057/s41304-023-00426-9}, pages = {20}, year = {2023}, abstract = {Steffen Ganghof's Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: Democratic Design and the Separation of Powers (Oxford University Press, 2021) posits that "in a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not" (Ganghof, 2021). To consider, examine and theorise about this, Ganghof urges engagement with semi-parliamentarism. As explained by Ganghof, legislative power is shared between two democratically legitimate sections of parliament in a semi-parliamentary system, but only one of those sections selects the government and can remove it in a no-confidence vote. Consequently, power is dispersed and not concentrated in the hands of any one person, which, Ganghof argues, can lead to an enhanced form of parliamentary democracy. In this book review symposium, George Tsebelis, Michael Thies, Jos{\´e} Antonio Cheibub, Rosalind Dixon and Daniel Bog{\´e}a review Steffen Ganghof's book and engage with the author about aspects of research design, case selection and theoretical argument. This symposium arose from an engaging and constructive discussion of the book at a seminar hosted by Texas A\&M University in 2022. We thank Prof Jos{\´e} Cheibub (Texas A\&M) for organising that seminar and Dr Anna Fruhstorfer (University of Potsdam) for initiating this book review symposium.}, language = {en} }