@article{Doerfler2023,
  author    = {D{\"o}rfler, Thomas},
  title     = {Why rules matter: shaping security council sanctions policy in counterterrorism and beyond},
  series = {Journal of global security studies},
  volume    = {8},
  journal   = {Journal of global security studies},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  address   = {Oxford},
  issn      = {2057-3170},
  doi       = {10.1093/jogss/ogac041},
  pages     = {19},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {Sanctions are critical to the Security Council's efforts to fight terrorism. What is striking is that the Council's sanctions regimes are subject to detailed sets of rules and decision criteria. The scholarship on human rights in counterterrorism assumes that rights advocacy and court litigation have prompted this development. The article complements this literature by highlighting an unexplored internal driver of legal-regulatory decision-making and explores how mixed-motive interest constellations among Security Council members have affected the extent of committee regulations and the content of decisions taken by sanctions committees. Based on internal documents and diplomatic cables, a comparative analysis of the Iraq sanctions regime and the counterterrorism sanctions regime demonstrates that mixed-motive interest constellations among Security Council members provide incentives to elaborate rules to guide decision-making resulting in legal-regulatory sanctions governance, even if the human rights of targeted individuals are not at stake. For comparative leverage and to assess the limits of the proposed mechanism, the analysis is briefly extended to other sanctions regimes targeting individuals (Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan). The findings have implications for this essential tool of the Security Council to react to threats to peace as diverse as counterterrorism, nonproliferation, and internal armed conflict.},
  language  = {en}
}