@article{LilliestamPattBersalli2022,
  author    = {Lilliestam, Johan and Patt, Anthony and Bersalli, Germ{\´a}n},
  title     = {On the quality of emission reductions},
  series = {Environmental and Resource Economics},
  volume    = {83},
  journal   = {Environmental and Resource Economics},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Dordrecht},
  issn      = {0924-6460},
  doi       = {10.1007/s10640-022-00708-8},
  pages     = {733 -- 758},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {To meet the Paris Agreement targets, carbon emissions from the energy system must be eliminated by mid-century, implying vast investment and systemic change challenges ahead. In an article in WIREs Climate Change, we reviewed the empirical evidence for effects of carbon pricing systems on technological change towards full decarbonisation, finding weak or no effects. In response, van den Bergh and Savin (2021) criticised our review in an article in this journal, claiming that it is "unfair", incomplete and flawed in various ways. Here, we respond to this critique by elaborating on the conceptual roots of our argumentation based on the importance of short-term emission reductions and longer-term technological change, and by expanding the review. This verifies our original findings: existing carbon pricing schemes have sometimes reduced emissions, mainly through switching to lower-carbon fossil fuels and efficiency increases, and have triggered weak innovation increases. There is no evidence that carbon pricing systems have triggered zero-carbon investments, and scarce but consistent evidence that they have not. Our findings highlight the importance of adapting and improving climate policy assessment metrics beyond short-term emissions by also assessing the quality of emission reductions and the progress of underlying technological change.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{DiluisoAnnicchiaricoKalkuhletal.2021,
  author    = {Diluiso, Francesca and Annicchiarico, Barbara and Kalkuhl, Matthias and Minx, Jan Christoph},
  title     = {Climate actions and macro-financial stability},
  series = {Journal of environmental economics and management},
  volume    = {110},
  journal   = {Journal of environmental economics and management},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {Amsterdam},
  issn      = {0095-0696},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.jeem.2021.102548},
  pages     = {22},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Limiting global warming to well below 2 degrees C may pose threats to macroeconomic and financial stability. In an estimated Euro Area New Keynesian model with financial frictions and climate policy, we study the possible perils of a low-carbon transition and evaluate the role of monetary policy and financial regulation. We show that, even for very ambitious climate targets, transition costs are moderate along a timely and gradual mitigation pathway. Inflation volatility strongly increases for disorderly climate policy, demanding a strong monetary response by central banks. In reaction to an adverse financial shock originating in the fossil sector, a green quantitative easing policy can provide an effective stimulus to the economy, but its stabilizing properties do not significantly differ from those of market neutral asset purchase programs. A financial regulation, encouraging the decarbonization of the banks' balance sheets via ad hoc capital requirements, can significantly reduce the severity of a financial crisis, but prolongs the recovery phase. Our results suggest that the involvement of central banks in climate actions must be carefully designed to be in compliance with their mandate and to avoid unintended trade-offs.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{KalkuhlSteckelEdenhofer2020,
  author    = {Kalkuhl, Matthias and Steckel, Jan Christoph and Edenhofer, Ottmar},
  title     = {All or nothing},
  series = {Journal of environmental economics and management},
  volume    = {100},
  journal   = {Journal of environmental economics and management},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {San Diego},
  issn      = {0095-0696},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.jeem.2019.01.012},
  pages     = {21},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {This paper develops a new perspective on stranded assets in climate policy using a partial equilibrium model of the energy sector. Political-economy related aspects are considered in the government's objective function. Lobbying power of firms or fiscal considerations by the government lead to time inconsistency: The government will deviate from a previously announced carbon tax which creates stranded assets. Under rational expectations, we show that a time-consistent policy outcome exists with either a zero carbon tax or a prohibitive carbon tax that leads to zero fossil investments - an "all-or-nothing" policy. Although stranded assets are crucial to such a bipolar outcome, they disappear again under time-consistent policy. Which of the two outcomes (all or nothing) prevails depends on the lobbying power of owners of fixed factors (land and fossil resources) but not on fiscal revenue considerations or on the lobbying power of renewable or fossil energy firms.},
  language  = {en}
}