@article{GodessRiccitelli2017,
  author    = {Godess-Riccitelli, Moran},
  title     = {The final end of imagination},
  series = {Filosofia unisinos},
  volume    = {18},
  journal   = {Filosofia unisinos},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos},
  address   = {S{\~a}o Leopoldo},
  issn      = {1519-5023},
  doi       = {10.4013/fsu.2017.182.05},
  pages     = {107 -- 115},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {One main quandary that emerges in the context of Immanuel Kant's moral ideal, The Highest Good, is that on the one hand Kant sets it as a moral demand, that is, as a principle that must be comprehended as an attainable end for man in practice while, on the other hand, it is set as a moral ideal, i.e. as something that cannot be concretized and realized within the empirical world. The main goal of this paper is to argue for the realizability of the moral ideal by means of the principle of reflective judgment as a form of judgment that in fact clarifies human limitation. I assert that the very recognition of this limitation constitutes the possibility for hope in that ideal, or for striving towards it, and that this striving is the only way that the moral ideal can be concretized. I examine man's recognition of self-limitation as a response to the moral demand to realize the moral ideal and the necessity of the power of imagination for this, used reflectively.},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Menting2020,
  author    = {Menting, Thijs},
  title     = {Purposiveness of nature in Kant's third critique},
  publisher = {Universit{\"a}tsverlag Potsdam},
  address   = {Potsdam},
  isbn      = {978-3-86956-484-5},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-44433},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-444336},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {xii, 304},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {This dissertation aims to deliver a transcendental interpretation of Immanuel Kant's Kritik der Urteilskraft, considering both its coherence with other critical works as well as the internal coherence of the work itself. This interpretation is called transcendental insofar as special emphasis is placed on the newly introduced cognitive power, namely the reflective power of judgement, guided by the a priori principle of purposiveness. In this way the seeming manifold of themes, varying from judgements of taste through culture to teleological judgements about natural purposes, are discussed exclusively in regard of their dependence on this faculty and its transcendental principle. In contrast, in contemporary scholarship the book is often treated as a fragmented work, consisting of different independent parts, while my focus lies on the continuity comprised primarily of the activity of the power of judgement. Going back to certain central yet silently presupposed concepts, adopted from previous critical works, the main contribution of this study is to integrate the KU within the overarching critical project. More specifically, I have argue how the need for the presupposition by the reflective power of judgement follows from the peculiar character of our sense-dependent discursive mind. Because we are sense-dependent discursive minds, we do not and cannot have immediate insight into all of nature's features. The particular constitution of our mind rather demands conceptually informed representations which mediately refer to objects. Having said that, the principle of purposiveness, namely the presupposition that nature is organized in concert with the particular constitution of our mind, is a necessary condition for the possibility of reflection on nature's empirical features. Reflection refers on my account to a process of selecting features in order to allow a classification, including reflection on the method, means and selection criteria. Rather than directly contributing to cognition, like the categories, reflective judgements thus express our ignorance when it comes to the motivation behind nature's design, and this is most forcefully expressed by judgements of taste and teleological judgements about organized matter. In this way, reflection, regardless whether it is manifested in concept acquisition, scientific systematization, judgements of taste or judgements about organized matter, relies on a principle of the power of judgement which is revealed and justified in this transcendental inquiry.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Albertini2012,
  author    = {Albertini, Francesca Yardenit},
  title     = {Peace and war in Moses Maimonides and Immanuel Kant a comparative study},
  series = {The journal of Jewish thought \& philosophy},
  volume    = {20},
  journal   = {The journal of Jewish thought \& philosophy},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Brill},
  address   = {Leiden},
  issn      = {1053-699X},
  doi       = {10.1163/1477285X-12341238},
  pages     = {183 -- 198},
  year      = {2012},
  abstract  = {Francesca Y. Albertini (1974-2011) compares Maimonides' idea of peace, as developed in MT Sefer shofetim (Book of Judges), with Kant's work on the notion of "eternal peace" (Zum ewigen Frieden). Both authors develop a historical vision pointed against the use of force and war in light of a framework not limited by historical time (messianic age, eternity). Despite all differences in method and historical context, the authors agree on the notion that universal ethics provides the basis of a determination of right grounded in the will. Maimonides' universal messianism as well as Kant's universal history emphasize the pivotal role and decisive responsibility of the human being in realizing, through reason, the reign of peace and prosperity on earth first envisioned by the biblical prophets. These utopias continue to challenge us, especially in this day and age.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Gruene2011,
  author    = {Gr{\"u}ne, Stefanie},
  title     = {Is there a Gap in Kant's B Deduction?},
  series = {International journal of philosophical studies},
  volume    = {19},
  journal   = {International journal of philosophical studies},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group},
  address   = {Abingdon},
  issn      = {0967-2559},
  doi       = {10.1080/09672559.2011.595196},
  pages     = {465 -- 490},
  year      = {2011},
  abstract  = {In 'Beyond the Myth of the Myth: A Kantian Theory of Non-Conceptual Content', Robert Hanna argues for a very strong kind of non-conceptualism, and claims that this kind of non-conceptualism originally has been developed by Kant. But according to 'Kant's Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects and the Gap in the B Deduction', Kant's non-conceptualism poses a serious problem for his argument for the objective validity of the categories, namely the problem that there is a gap in the B Deduction. This gap is that the B Deduction goes through only if conceptualism is true, but Kant is a non-conceptualist. In this paper, I will argue, contrary to what Hanna claims, that there is not a gap in the B Deduction.},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{SchulzDepetrisEtteetal.2010,
  author    = {Schulz, Carolin and Depetris, Carolina and Ette, Ottmar and Knobloch, Eberhard and Puig-Samper, Miguel {\´A}ngel and Rebok, Sandra and Schifko, Georg and Vitte, Antonio Carlos and Wittgenstein Dias da Silveira, Roberison and Schwarz, Ingo and Werther, Romy and Jahn, Ilse},
  title     = {HiN : Alexander von Humboldt im Netz},
  volume    = {XI},
  number    = {21},
  editor    = {Ette, Ottmar and Knobloch, Eberhard},
  publisher = {Universit{\"a}tsverlag Potsdam},
  address   = {Potsdam},
  issn      = {1617-5239},
  doi       = {10.18443/hinvol11iss212010},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-49217},
  pages     = {101},
  year      = {2010},
  abstract  = {Inhalt: Carolin Schulz: „Ein scharfsinniger Kopf aus Berlin!" Ein unver{\"o}ffentlichtes Empfehlungsschreiben f{\"u}r Leopold von Buch - Carolina Depetris: El orientalismo como episteme: Fr{\´e}d{\´e}ric de Waldeck y las ruinas mayas - Ottmar Ette: R{\´e}flexions europ{\´e}ennes sur deux phases de mondialisation acc{\´e}l{\´e}r{\´e}e chez Cornelius de Pauw, Georg Forster, Guillaume-Thomas Raynal et Alexandre de Humboldt - Eberhard Knobloch: Nomos und physis - Alexander von Humboldt und die Tradition antiker Denkweisen und Vorstellungen Miguel-{\´A}ngel Puig-Samper, Sandra Rebok: Charles Darwin and Alexander von Humboldt: An exchange of looks between two famous naturalists - Georg Schifko: Jules Vernes literarische Thematisierung der Kanarischen Inseln als Hommage an Alexander v. Humboldt - Antonio Carlos Vitte, Roberison Wittgenstein Dias de Silveira: Alexander von Humboldt y la g{\´e}nesis de la geograf{\´i}a f{\´i}sica moderna - Ingo Schwarz: Eine Alexander-von-Humboldt-Forscherin mit Profil: Ilse Jahn (1922-2010) - Romy Werther, Ingo Schwarz: Ilse Jahn: Schriften zur Alexander-von-Humboldt-Forschung - Eine Auswahlbibliographie - Ilse Jahn: Die anatomischen Studien der Br{\"u}der Humboldt unter Justus Christian Loder in Jena},
  language  = {mul}
}
@misc{PaesslerAndressDuranCasasetal.2018,
  author    = {P{\"a}ßler, Ulrich and Andress, Reinhard and Dur{\´a}n Casas, Vicente and Ette, Ottmar and H{\"u}lsenberg, Dagmar and Schmuck, Thomas and Sundermann, Werner},
  title     = {HiN : Alexander von Humboldt im Netz},
  series = {HIN : Alexander von Humboldt im Netz ; international review for Humboldtian studies},
  volume    = {XIX},
  journal   = {HIN : Alexander von Humboldt im Netz ; international review for Humboldtian studies},
  number    = {36},
  editor    = {Ette, Ottmar and Knobloch, Eberhard},
  publisher = {Universit{\"a}tsverlag Potsdam},
  address   = {Potsdam},
  issn      = {2568-3543},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-410919},
  pages     = {109},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {Inhalt: -Ulrich P{\"a}ßler: Die edition humboldt digital. Dokumente zur Neuausgabe der Ideen zu einer Geographie der Pflanzen (1825-1826) -Reinhard Andress: Eduard Dorsch and his unpublished poem on the occasion of Humboldt's 100th birthday -Vicente Dur{\´a}n Casas: Immanuel Kant, Alexander von Humboldt and the Tequendama Fall. Two Prussians linked by Geography -Ottmar Ette: Languages about Languages: Two Brothers and one Humboldtian Science -Dagmar H{\"u}lsenberg: Alexander von Humboldts Erl{\"a}uterungen zu {\"O}fen f{\"u}r die Herstellung von Keramik- und Glaserzeugnissen -Thomas Schmuck: Missgl{\"u}ckte Begegnung. Der kurze Briefwechsel zwischen Leopold von Buch und Goethe -Werner Sundermann: Alexander von Humboldt und das Persische},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{HaagHoeppner2019,
  author    = {Haag, Johannes and Hoeppner, Till},
  title     = {Denken und Welt - Wege kritischer Metaphysik},
  series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung},
  volume    = {67},
  journal   = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {De Gruyter},
  address   = {Berlin},
  issn      = {0012-1045},
  doi       = {10.1515/dzph-2019-0006},
  pages     = {76 -- 97},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {Wird Metaphysik realistisch verstanden, so ist sie mit dem Anspruch verbunden, in objektiver Weise von der grundlegenden Beschaffenheit und Ordnung der Welt (oder Realit{\"a}t, Wirklichkeit etc.) zu handeln. Damit beansprucht sie die M{\"o}glichkeit von Objektivit{\"a}t, d. h. die M{\"o}glichkeit der Repr{\"a}sentation der grundlegenden Beschaffenheit und Ordnung einer Welt, die von uns und unserer Repr{\"a}sentation verschieden ist. Realistisch verstandene Metaphysik verf{\"a}hrt dogmatisch, wenn sie ihre eigene M{\"o}glichkeit einfach voraussetzt. Eine dogmatische Metaphysik ist unkritisch, weil sie ohne eine Untersuchung der Frage betrieben wird, wie eine objektive und ad{\"a}quate Repr{\"a}sentation der grundlegenden Beschaffenheit und Ordnung der Welt {\"u}berhaupt m{\"o}glich ist. Im Unterschied dazu nennen wir eine realistische Metaphysik in einem vorl{\"a}ufigen Sinne kritisch, sofern sie ihren Ausgang von einer Untersuchung dieser M{\"o}glichkeit nimmt und erst auf der Grundlage positiver Ergebnisse dieser Untersuchung einen - vor diesem Hintergrund nunmehr gerechtfertigten - Objektivit{\"a}tsanspruch erhebt.},
  language  = {de}
}
@misc{Mockert2017,
  type      = {Master Thesis},
  author    = {Mockert, Julian},
  title     = {Besonderung und Immanenz},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-415858},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {99},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {Zentrales Anliegen dieser Arbeit ist ein historisch-systematisches Verst{\"a}ndnis der Philosophischen Anthropologie Helmuth Plessners im Zusammenhang mit zentralen theoretischen Entwicklungen der klassischen deutschen Philosophie. Im philosophischen Problemrahmen von Besonderung und Immanenz werden verschiedene historische Modelle untersucht. Die Arbeit geht von der Philosophie Immanuel Kants und Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegels aus und konzentriert sich auf das f{\"u}r die klassisch-deutsche Philosophie und ihre {\"U}berwindung der traditionellen Metaphysik entscheidende Methodenprinzip der Grenzbestimmung. Die Untersuchung beginnt im Kapitel Ausgangspunkt mit Kants Definition der Grenzbestimmung in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft als transzendental-philosophische Grundoperation und damit mit den Begriffen Grenze, Schranke und Zweckm{\"a}ßigkeit. Anschließend wird Hegels grundlegende Antwort auf Kants Problem in der Dialektik der Grenze untersucht: In der Wissenschaft der Logik, der Logik des Seins, entwickelt Hegel ein erweitertes Konzept von Besonderung gegen Kant. Im Kern kritisiert Hegel Kants Begriff der Grenze im Sinne einer abstrakten Schranke, die einem begrifflich entwickelten Ansatz der Grenze als Funktionsbestimmung und damit der sich aus der Methode der Dialektik ergebenden Anforderung transzendentaler Individuation widerspricht. Die systematische zentrale Bedeutung der Dialektik der Grenze wird in der Begriffslogik im Abschnitt Teleologie weiter untersucht, da Grenze hier besonders mit dem Problem der Immanenz bzw. Vermittlung verkn{\"u}pft ist. Im Gegensatz zu Kant entwickelt Hegel die Idee der Vermittlung begrifflich {\"u}ber den Begriff der Zweckm{\"a}ßigkeit, beantwortet sie aber in der Wissenschaft der Logik innerhalb eines geschlossenen Modells. An diese Ergebnisse anschließend wird die Transformation des philosophischen Problemrahmens von Besonderung und Immanenz in der von Plessner im fr{\"u}hen 20. Jahrhundert gegr{\"u}ndeten Philosophischen Anthropologie untersucht. Plessner greift in seinem Hauptwerk Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch auf diesen Rahmen quasi-transzendental zu und begr{\"u}ndet eine moderne Natur- und Kulturphilosophie in einer performativ-philosophischen Wendung neu. Auf diese Weise kann Plessner Hegels geschlossenes philosophisches Modell von Besonderung und Immanenz aufbrechen und einen nicht-dualistischen dritten Weg moderner Philosophie jenseits von Neukantianismus und Existenzialismus vorzeichnen.},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{Haag2017,
  author    = {Haag, Johannes},
  title     = {Analytic Kantianism},
  series = {Con-textos kantianos : international journal of philosophy},
  journal   = {Con-textos kantianos : international journal of philosophy},
  publisher = {Instituto de Filosof{\´i}a del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cient{\´i}ficas},
  address   = {Madrid},
  issn      = {2386-7655},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.1092766},
  pages     = {18 -- 41},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell can both be read as proponents of Analytic Kantianism. However, their accounts differ in important detail. In particular, McDowell has criticized Sellars's account of sensory consciousness in a number of papers (most notably in LFI and SC), both as a reading of Kant and on its systematic merits. The present paper offers a detailed analysis of this criticism and a defense of Sellars's position against the background of a methodology of transcendental philosophy.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{VitteWittgensteinDiasdeSilveira2010,
  author    = {Vitte, Antonio Carlos and Wittgenstein Dias de Silveira, Roberison},
  title     = {Alexander von Humboldt y la g{\´e}nesis de la geograf{\´i}a f{\´i}sica moderna},
  series = {Alexander von Humboldt im Netz ; international review for Humboldtian studies},
  volume    = {XI},
  journal   = {Alexander von Humboldt im Netz ; international review for Humboldtian studies},
  number    = {21},
  publisher = {Universit{\"a}tsverlag Potsdam},
  address   = {Potsdam},
  issn      = {2568-3543},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-51787},
  pages     = {72 -- 85},
  year      = {2010},
  abstract  = {El art{\´i}culo discute la formaci{\´o}n de los conceptos de la naturaleza, espacio y morfolog{\´i}a en la obra de Alexander von Humboldt y sus impactos en la constituci{\´o}n de la geograf{\´i}a f{\´i}sica moderna. Influido por las reflexiones de Kant en la Cr{\´i}tica del Juicio, por los trabajos de Goethe y de Schelling, Humboldt desarrollar{\´a} una nueva interpretaci{\´o}n y representaci{\´o}n de la naturaleza en la superficie terrestre, donde el concepto de espacialidad ser{\´a} fundamental para la explicaci{\´o}n de los fen{\´o}menos de la naturaleza. La geograf{\´i}a f{\´i}sica moderna se estructura a partir de un complejo entrecruzamiento de influencias, tanto est{\´e}ticas como instrumentales trabajadas por Humboldt, donde el principio de la conexi{\´o}n ser{\´a} importante para la invenci{\´o}n art{\´i}stica y cient{\´i}fica del concepto de paisaje geogr{\´a}fico.},
  language  = {es}
}