@article{WuKaiserVasishth2017,
  author    = {Wu, Fuyun and Kaiser, Elsi and Vasishth, Shravan},
  title     = {Effects of early cues on the processing of chinese relative clauses},
  series = {Cognitive science : a multidisciplinary journal of anthropology, artificial intelligence, education, linguistics, neuroscience, philosophy, psychology ; journal of the Cognitive Science Society},
  volume    = {42},
  journal   = {Cognitive science : a multidisciplinary journal of anthropology, artificial intelligence, education, linguistics, neuroscience, philosophy, psychology ; journal of the Cognitive Science Society},
  publisher = {Wiley},
  address   = {Hoboken},
  issn      = {0364-0213},
  doi       = {10.1111/cogs.12551},
  pages     = {1101 -- 1133},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {We used Chinese prenominal relative clauses (RCs) to test the predictions of two competing accounts of sentence comprehension difficulty: the experience-based account of Levy () and the Dependency Locality Theory (DLT; Gibson, ). Given that in Chinese RCs, a classifier and/or a passive marker BEI can be added to the sentence-initial position, we manipulated the presence/absence of classifiers and the presence/absence of BEI, such that BEI sentences were passivized subject-extracted RCs, and no-BEI sentences were standard object-extracted RCs. We conducted two self-paced reading experiments, using the same critical stimuli but somewhat different filler items. Reading time patterns from both experiments showed facilitative effects of BEI within and beyond RC regions, and delayed facilitative effects of classifiers, suggesting that cues that occur before a clear signal of an upcoming RC can help Chinese comprehenders to anticipate RC structures. The data patterns are not predicted by the DLT, but they are consistent with the predictions of experience-based theories.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Schneider2017,
  author    = {Schneider, Hans Julius},
  title     = {Buddhist Meditation as a Mystical Practice},
  series = {Philosophia : philosophical quarterly of Israel},
  volume    = {45},
  journal   = {Philosophia : philosophical quarterly of Israel},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Dordrecht},
  issn      = {0048-3893},
  doi       = {10.1007/s11406-017-9925-x},
  pages     = {1621 -- 1622},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {On the basis of many years of personal experience the paper describes Buddhist meditation (Zazen, Vipassanā) as a mystical practice. After a short discussion of the role of some central concepts (longing, suffering, and love) in Buddhism, William James' concept of religious experience is used to explain the goal of meditators as the achievement of a special kind of an experience of this kind. Systematically, its main point is to explain the difference between (on the one hand) a craving for pleasant 'mental events' in the sense of short-term moods, and (on the other) the long-term project of achieving a deep change in one's attitude to life as a whole, a change that allows the acceptance of suffering and death. The last part argues that there is no reason to call the discussed practice irrational in a negative sense. Changes of attitude of the discussed kind cannot be brought about by argument alone. Therefore, a considered use of age-old practices like meditation should be seen as an addition, not as an undermining of reason.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Schneider2017,
  author    = {Schneider, Hans Julius},
  title     = {Buddhist Meditation as a Mystical Practice},
  series = {Philosophia},
  volume    = {45},
  journal   = {Philosophia},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Dordrecht},
  issn      = {0048-3893},
  doi       = {10.1007/s11406-016-9783-y},
  pages     = {773 -- 787},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {On the basis of many years of personal experience the paper describes Buddhist meditation (Zazen, Vipassanā) as a mystical practice. After a short discussion of the role of some central concepts (longing, suffering, and love) in Buddhism, William James' concept of religious experience is used to explain the goal of meditators as the achievement of a special kind of an experience of this kind. Systematically, its main point is to explain the difference between (on the one hand) a craving for pleasant 'mental events' in the sense of short-term moods, and (on the other) the long-term project of achieving a deep change in one's attitude to life as a whole, a change that allows the acceptance of suffering and death. The last part argues that there is no reason to call the discussed practice irrational in a negative sense. Changes of attitude of the discussed kind cannot be brought about by argument alone. Therefore, a considered use of age-old practices like meditation should be seen as an addition, not as an undermining of reason.},
  language  = {en}
}