@phdthesis{Tan2023,
  author    = {Tan, Jing},
  title     = {Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning for Interactive Decision-Making},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-60700},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-607000},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {xii, 135},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {Distributed decision-making studies the choices made among a group of interactive and self-interested agents. Specifically, this thesis is concerned with the optimal sequence of choices an agent makes as it tries to maximize its achievement on one or multiple objectives in the dynamic environment. The optimization of distributed decision-making is important in many real-life applications, e.g., resource allocation (of products, energy, bandwidth, computing power, etc.) and robotics (heterogeneous agent cooperation on games or tasks), in various fields such as vehicular network, Internet of Things, smart grid, etc. This thesis proposes three multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms combined with game-theoretic tools to study strategic interaction between decision makers, using resource allocation in vehicular network as an example. Specifically, the thesis designs an interaction mechanism based on second-price auction, incentivizes the agents to maximize multiple short-term and long-term, individual and system objectives, and simulates a dynamic environment with realistic mobility data to evaluate algorithm performance and study agent behavior. Theoretical results show that the mechanism has Nash equilibria, is a maximization of social welfare and Pareto optimal allocation of resources in a stationary environment. Empirical results show that in the dynamic environment, our proposed learning algorithms outperform state-of-the-art algorithms in single and multi-objective optimization, and demonstrate very good generalization property in significantly different environments. Specifically, with the long-term multi-objective learning algorithm, we demonstrate that by considering the long-term impact of decisions, as well as by incentivizing the agents with a system fairness reward, the agents achieve better results in both individual and system objectives, even when their objectives are private, randomized, and changing over time. Moreover, the agents show competitive behavior to maximize individual payoff when resource is scarce, and cooperative behavior in achieving a system objective when resource is abundant; they also learn the rules of the game, without prior knowledge, to overcome disadvantages in initial parameters (e.g., a lower budget). To address practicality concerns, the thesis also provides several computational performance improvement methods, and tests the algorithm in a single-board computer. Results show the feasibility of online training and inference in milliseconds. There are many potential future topics following this work. 1) The interaction mechanism can be modified into a double-auction, eliminating the auctioneer, resembling a completely distributed, ad hoc network; 2) the objectives are assumed to be independent in this thesis, there may be a more realistic assumption regarding correlation between objectives, such as a hierarchy of objectives; 3) current work limits information-sharing between agents, the setup befits applications with privacy requirements or sparse signaling; by allowing more information-sharing between the agents, the algorithms can be modified for more cooperative scenarios such as robotics.},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Ruehling2008,
  author    = {R{\"u}hling, Markus},
  title     = {Substitution effect through fiscal transfers?! : incidence of the Peruvian property tax},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-42100},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  year      = {2008},
  abstract  = {Whether the results of fiscal transfers have positive or negative implications depends upon the incentives that transfer systems create for both central and local governments. The complexity and ambiguity of the relationship between fiscal transfers and tax revenues of local governments is one of the main causes why research projects, even in the same country, come to different results. This investigation is seriously questioning the often stated substitution effect based only on an analysis of aggregated data and finally rejects in the qualitative part of this research (using survey techniques) a substitution effect in the majority of the assessed municipalities. While most theories are modeling governments as tax-maximizers (Leviathan) or as being prone to fiscal laziness, this investigation shows that mayors react to a whole set of incentives. Most mayors react rational and rather pragmatically in respect to the incentives and constraints which are established by the particular context of a municipality, the central government and their own personality/identity/interests. While the yield on property tax in Peru is low, there are no signs that increases in transfers have had, on average, a negative impact on their revenue generation. On an individual basis there exist mayors who are revenue maximizers, others who are substituting revenues and others who show apathy. Many engage in property tax. While rural or small municipalities have limited potential, property taxes are the main revenue sources for the Peruvian urban municipalities, rising on average 10\% during the last five years. The property tax in Peru accounts for less than 0.2\% of GDP, which compared to the Latin American average, is extremely low. In 2002, property tax was collecting nationwide about 10\% of the overall budget of local governments. In 2006, the share was closer to 6\% due to windfall transfers. The property tax can enhance accountability at the local level and has important impacts on urban spatial development. It is also important considering that most charges or transfers are earmarked such that property tax yields can cover discretionary finances. The intergovernmental fiscal transfers can be described as a patchwork of political liabilities of the past rather than connected with thorough compensation or service improvement functions. The fiscal base of local governments in Peru remains small for the municipalities and the incentive structure to enhance property tax revenues is far from optimal. The central government and sector institutions, which are in the Peruvian institutional design of the property tax responsible for the enablement environment, can reinforce local tax efforts. In the past the central government permanently changed the rules of the game, giving municipalities reduced predictability of policy choices. There are no relevant signs that a stronger property tax is captured by Peruvian interest groups. Since the central government has responsibility for tax regulation and partly valuation there has been little debate about financial issues on the local political agenda. Most council members are therefore not familiar with tax issues. If the central government did not set the tax rate and valuation then there would probably be a more vigorous public debate and an electorate that was better informed about local politics. Elected mayors (as political and administrative leaders) are not counterbalanced and held in check by an active council and/or by vigorous local political parties. Local politics are concentrated on the mayor, electoral rules, the institutional design and political culture - all of which are not helpful in increasing the degree of influence that citizens and associations have upon collective decision-making at the local level. The many alternations between democracy and autocracy have not been helpful in building strong institutions at the local level. Property tax revenues react slowly and the institutional context matters because an effective tax system as a public good can only be created if actors have long time horizons. The property tax has a substantial revenue potential, however, since municipalities are going through a transfer bonanza, it is especially difficult to make a plea for increasing their own revenue base. Local governments should be the proponents of property tax reform, but they have, in Peru, little policy clout because the municipal associations are dispersed and there exists little relevant information concerning important local policy issues.},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Negri2014,
  author    = {Negri, Michael},
  title     = {How coaches influence referee decisions},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-72247},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {132},
  year      = {2014},
  abstract  = {The work elaborates on the question if coaches in non-professional soccer can influence referee decisions. Modeled from a principal-agent perspective, the managing referee boards can be seen as the principal. They aim at facilitating a fair competition which is in accordance with the existing rules and regulations. In doing so, the referees are assigned as impartial agents on the pitch. The coaches take over a non-legitimate principal-like role trying to influence the referees even though they do not have the formal right to do so. Separate questionnaires were set up for referees and coaches. The coach questionnaire aimed at identifying the extent and the forms of influencing attempts by coaches. The referee questionnaire tried to elaborate on the questions if referees take notice of possible influencing attempts and how they react accordingly. The results were put into relation with official match data in order to identify significant influences on personal sanctions (yellow cards, second yellow cards, red cards) and the match result. It is found that there is a slight effect on the referee's decisions. However, this effect is rather disadvantageous for the influencing coach and there is no evidence for an impact on the match result itself.},
  language  = {en}
}