@article{Gruene2013, author = {Gr{\"u}ne, Stefanie}, title = {Sartre on mistaken sincerity ('Being and Nothingness')}, issn = {0966-8373}, year = {2013}, language = {en} } @article{Gruene2011, author = {Gr{\"u}ne, Stefanie}, title = {Is there a Gap in Kant's B Deduction?}, issn = {0967-2559}, year = {2011}, language = {en} } @article{Gruene2011, author = {Gr{\"u}ne, Stefanie}, title = {Brandom {\"u}ber Kants Konzeption der Intentionalit{\"a}t}, isbn = {978-3-89785-705-6}, year = {2011}, language = {de} } @article{Gruene2011, author = {Gr{\"u}ne, Stefanie}, title = {Is there a Gap in Kant's B Deduction?}, series = {International journal of philosophical studies}, volume = {19}, journal = {International journal of philosophical studies}, number = {3}, publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group}, address = {Abingdon}, issn = {0967-2559}, doi = {10.1080/09672559.2011.595196}, pages = {465 -- 490}, year = {2011}, abstract = {In 'Beyond the Myth of the Myth: A Kantian Theory of Non-Conceptual Content', Robert Hanna argues for a very strong kind of non-conceptualism, and claims that this kind of non-conceptualism originally has been developed by Kant. But according to 'Kant's Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects and the Gap in the B Deduction', Kant's non-conceptualism poses a serious problem for his argument for the objective validity of the categories, namely the problem that there is a gap in the B Deduction. This gap is that the B Deduction goes through only if conceptualism is true, but Kant is a non-conceptualist. In this paper, I will argue, contrary to what Hanna claims, that there is not a gap in the B Deduction.}, language = {en} } @misc{Gruene2016, author = {Gr{\"u}ne, Stefanie}, title = {Allais on Intuitions and the Objective Reality of the Categories}, series = {European journal of philosophy}, volume = {24}, journal = {European journal of philosophy}, publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell}, address = {Hoboken}, issn = {0966-8373}, doi = {10.1111/ejop.12139}, pages = {241 -- 252}, year = {2016}, language = {en} }