@article{KadukElsnerReid2013,
  author    = {Kaduk, Katharina and Elsner, Birgit and Reid, Vincent M.},
  title     = {Discrimination of animate and inanimate motion in 9-month-old infants - An ERP study},
  series = {Developmental cognitive neuroscience : a journal for cognitive, affective and social developmental neuroscience},
  volume    = {6},
  journal   = {Developmental cognitive neuroscience : a journal for cognitive, affective and social developmental neuroscience},
  number    = {5},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {Oxford},
  issn      = {1878-9293},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.dcn.2013.05.003},
  pages     = {14 -- 22},
  year      = {2013},
  abstract  = {Simple geometric shapes moving in a self-propelled manner, and violating Newtonian laws of motion by acting against gravitational forces tend to induce a judgement that an object is animate. Objects that change their motion only due to external causes are more likely judged as inanimate. How the developing brain is employed in the perception of animacy in early ontogeny is currently unknown. The aim of this study was to use ERP techniques to determine if the negative central component (Nc), a waveform related to attention allocation, was differentially affected when an infant observed animate or inanimate motion. Short animated movies comprising a marble moving along a marble run either in an animate or an inanimate manner were presented to 15 infants who were 9 months of age. The ERPs were time-locked to a still frame representing animate or inanimate motion that was displayed following each movie. We found that 9-month-olds are able to discriminate between animate and inanimate motion based on motion cues alone and most likely allocate more attentional resources to the inanimate motion. The present data contribute to our understanding of the animate-inanimate distinction and the Nc as a correlate of infant cognitive processing.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{SchindlerWolffKissleretal.2015,
  author    = {Schindler, Sebastian and Wolff, Wanja and Kissler, Johanna M. and Brand, Ralf},
  title     = {Cerebral correlates of faking},
  series = {Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience},
  volume    = {9},
  journal   = {Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience},
  publisher = {Frontiers Research Foundation},
  address   = {Lausanne},
  issn      = {1662-5153},
  doi       = {10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00139},
  pages     = {1 -- 13},
  year      = {2015},
  abstract  = {Direct assessment of attitudes toward socially sensitive topics can be affected by deception attempts. Reaction-time based indirect measures, such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT), are less susceptible to such biases. Neuroscientific evidence shows that deception can evoke characteristic ERP differences. However, the cerebral processes involved in faking an IAT are still unknown. We randomly assigned 20 university students (15 females, 24.65 +/- 3.50 years of age) to a counterbalanced repeated-measurements design, requesting them to complete a Brief-IAT (BIAT) on attitudes toward doping without deception instruction, and with the instruction to fake positive and negative doping attitudes. Cerebral activity during BIAT completion was assessed using high-density EEG. Event-related potentials during faking revealed enhanced frontal and reduced occipital negativity, starting around 150 ms after stimulus presentation. Further, a decrease in the P300 and LPP components was observed. Source analyses showed enhanced activity in the right inferior frontal gyrus between 150 and 200 ms during faking, thought to reflect the suppression of automatic responses. Further, more activity was found for faking in the bilateral middle occipital gyri and the bilateral temporoparietal junction. Results indicate that faking reaction-time based tests alter brain processes from early stages of processing and reveal the cortical sources of the effects. Analyzing the EEG helps to uncover response patterns in indirect attitude tests and broadens our understanding of the neural processes involved in such faking. This knowledge might be useful for uncovering faking in socially sensitive contexts, where attitudes are likely to be concealed.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{WolffSchindlerEnglertetal.2016,
  author    = {Wolff, Wanja and Schindler, Sebastian and Englert, Christoph and Brand, Ralf and Kissler, Johanna},
  title     = {Uninstructed BIAT faking when ego depleted or in normal state: differential effect on brain and behavior},
  series = {BMC neuroscience},
  volume    = {17},
  journal   = {BMC neuroscience},
  publisher = {BioMed Central},
  address   = {London},
  issn      = {1471-2202},
  doi       = {10.1186/s12868-016-0249-8},
  pages     = {12},
  year      = {2016},
  abstract  = {Background: Deception can distort psychological tests on socially sensitive topics. Understanding the cerebral processes that are involved in such faking can be useful in detection and prevention of deception. Previous research shows that faking a brief implicit association test (BIAT) evokes a characteristic ERP response. It is not yet known whether temporarily available self-control resources moderate this response. We randomly assigned 22 participants (15 females, 24.23 +/- 2.91 years old) to a counterbalanced repeated-measurements design. Participants first completed a Brief-IAT (BIAT) on doping attitudes as a baseline measure and were then instructed to fake a negative doping attitude both when self-control resources were depleted and non-depleted. Cerebral activity during BIAT performance was assessed using high-density EEG. Conclusions: Results indicate that temporarily available self-control resources do not affect overt faking success on a BIAT. However, differences were found on an electrophysiological level. This indicates that while on a phenotypical level self-control resources play a negligible role in deliberate test faking the underlying cerebral processes are markedly different.},
  language  = {en}
}