@techreport{AndresBruttelFriedrichsen2020,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Andres, Maximilian and Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Friedrichsen, Jana},
  title     = {Choosing between explicit cartel formation and tacit collusion - An experiment},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {19},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-47388},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-473885},
  pages     = {55},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {Numerous studies investigate which sanctioning institutions prevent cartel formation but little is known as to how these sanctions work. We contribute to understanding the inner workings of cartels by studying experimentally the effect of sanctioning institutions on firms' communication. Using machine learning to organize the chat communication into topics, we find that firms are significantly less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing when sanctioning institutions are present. At the same time, average prices are lower when communication is less explicit. A mediation analysis suggests that sanctions are effective in hindering cartel formation not only because they introduce a risk of being fined but also by reducing the prevalence of explicit price communication.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{deHaasPaha2020,
  author    = {de Haas, Samuel and Paha, Johannes},
  title     = {Non-controlling minority shareholdings and collusion},
  series = {Review of industrial organization},
  volume    = {58},
  journal   = {Review of industrial organization},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Dordrecht},
  issn      = {0889-938X},
  doi       = {10.1007/s11151-020-09758-y},
  pages     = {431 -- 454},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {This article merges theoretical literature on non-controlling minority shareholdings (NCMS) in a coherent model to study the effects of NCMS on competition and collusion. The model encompasses both the case of a common owner holding shares of rival firms as well as the case of cross ownership among rivals. We find that by softening competition, NCMS weaken the sustainability of collusion under a greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. Such effects exist, in particular, in the presence of an effective competition authority.},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{deHaasPaha2020,
  author    = {de Haas, Samuel and Paha, Johannes},
  title     = {Non-controlling minority shareholdings and collusion},
  series = {Zweitver{\"o}ffentlichungen der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  journal   = {Zweitver{\"o}ffentlichungen der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  number    = {3},
  issn      = {0889-938X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-59599},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-595993},
  pages     = {26},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {This article merges theoretical literature on non-controlling minority shareholdings (NCMS) in a coherent model to study the effects of NCMS on competition and collusion. The model encompasses both the case of a common owner holding shares of rival firms as well as the case of cross ownership among rivals. We find that by softening competition, NCMS weaken the sustainability of collusion under a greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. Such effects exist, in particular, in the presence of an effective competition authority.},
  language  = {en}
}