@article{SalenHoviSprinzetal.2020,
  author    = {S{\ae}len, H{\aa}kon and Hovi, Jon and Sprinz, Detlef F. and Underdal, Arild},
  title     = {How US withdrawal might influence cooperation under the Paris climate agreement},
  series = {Environmental science \& policy},
  volume    = {108},
  journal   = {Environmental science \& policy},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {Oxford},
  issn      = {1462-9011},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.envsci.2020.03.011},
  pages     = {121 -- 132},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {Using a novel agent-based model, we study how US withdrawal might influence the political process established by the Paris Agreement, and hence the prospects for reaching the collective goal to limit warming below 2 degrees C. Our model enables us to analyze to what extent reaching this goal despite US withdrawal would place more stringent requirements on other core elements of the Paris cooperation process. We find, first, that the effect of a US withdrawal depends critically on the extent to which member countries reciprocate others' promises and contributions. Second, while the 2 degrees C goal will likely be reached only under a very small set of conditions in any event, even temporary US withdrawal will further narrow this set significantly. Reaching this goal will then require other countries to step up their ambition at the first opportunity and to comply nearly 100\% with their pledges, while maintaining high confidence in the Paris Agreements institutions. Third, although a US withdrawal will first primarily affect the United States' own emissions, it will eventually prove even more detrimental to other countries' emissions.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{HoviSprinzSaelenetal.2019,
  author    = {Hovi, Jon and Sprinz, Detlef F. and Saelen, H{\aa}kon and Underdal, Arild},
  title     = {The Club Approach: A Gateway to Effective Climate Co-operation?},
  series = {British Journal of Political Science},
  volume    = {49},
  journal   = {British Journal of Political Science},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
  address   = {New York},
  issn      = {0007-1234},
  doi       = {10.1017/S0007123416000788},
  pages     = {1071 -- 1096},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {Although the Paris Agreement arguably made some progress, interest in supplementary approaches to climate change co-operation persist. This article examines the conditions under which a climate club might emerge and grow. Using agent-based simulations, it shows that even with less than a handful of major actors as initial members, a club can eventually reduce global emissions effectively. To succeed, a club must be initiated by the 'right' constellation of enthusiastic actors, offer sufficiently large incentives for reluctant countries and be reasonably unconstrained by conflicts between members over issues beyond climate change. A climate club is particularly likely to persist and grow if initiated by the United States and the European Union. The combination of club-good benefits and conditional commitments can produce broad participation under many conditions.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{BangHoviSprinz2012,
  author    = {Bang, Guri and Hovi, Jon and Sprinz, Detlef F.},
  title     = {US presidents and the failure to ratify multilateral environmental agreements},
  series = {Climate policy},
  volume    = {12},
  journal   = {Climate policy},
  number    = {6},
  publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group},
  address   = {Abingdon},
  issn      = {1469-3062},
  doi       = {10.1080/14693062.2012.699788},
  pages     = {755 -- 763},
  year      = {2012},
  abstract  = {Whereas the US President signed the Kyoto Protocol, the failure of the US Congress to ratify it seriously hampered subsequent international climate cooperation. This recent US trend, of signing environmental treaties but failing to ratify them, could thwart attempts to come to a future climate agreement. Two complementary explanations of this trend are proposed. First, the political system of the US has distinct institutional features that make it difficult for presidents to predict whether the Senate will give its advice and consent to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and whether Congress will pass the required enabling legislation. Second, elected for a fixed term, US presidents might benefit politically from supporting MEAs even when knowing that legislative support is not forthcoming. Four policy implications are explored, concerning the scope for unilateral presidential action, the potential for bipartisan congressional support, the effectiveness of a treaty without the US, and the prospects for a deep, new climate treaty. Policy relevance Why does the failure of US ratification of multilateral environmental treaties occur? This article analyses the domestic political mechanisms involved in cases of failed US ratification. US non-participation in global environmental institutions often has serious ramifications. For example, it sharply limited Kyoto's effectiveness and seriously hampered international climate negotiations for years. Although at COP 17 in Durban the parties agreed to negotiate a new agreement by 2015, a new global climate treaty may well trigger a situation resembling the one President Clinton faced in 1997 when he signed Kyoto but never obtained support for it in the Senate. US failure to ratify could thwart future climate agreements.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{HoviHusebySprinz2005,
  author    = {Hovi, Jon and Huseby, R and Sprinz, Detlef F.},
  title     = {When do (imposed) economic sanctions work?},
  year      = {2005},
  abstract  = {Previous research has documented only a modest success rate for imposed sanctions. By contrast, the success rate is higher in cases that are settled at the threat stage. In this article, the authors provide new insights about the circumstances under which sanctions cause behavioral change only after being imposed. First, the target must initially underestimate the impact of sanctions, miscalculate the sender's determination to impose them, or wrongly believe that sanctions will be imposed and maintained whether it yields or not. Second, the target's misperceptions must be corrected after sanctions are imposed. A game-theoretical model with incomplete information is used to develop and clarify the argument},
  language  = {en}
}