@article{Ganghof2023, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Justifying types of representative democracy}, series = {Critical review of international social and political philosophy}, journal = {Critical review of international social and political philosophy}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London}, issn = {1369-8230}, doi = {10.1080/13698230.2022.2159665}, pages = {1 -- 12}, year = {2023}, abstract = {This article responds to critical reflections on my Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism by Sarah Birch, Kevin J. Elliott, Claudia Landwehr and James L. Wilson. It discusses how different types of representative democracy, especially different forms of government (presidential, parliamentary or hybrid), can be justified. It clarifies, among other things, the distinction between procedural and process equality, the strengths of semi-parliamentary government, the potential instability of constitutional designs, and the difference that theories can make in actual processes of constitutional reform.}, language = {en} } @article{TsebelisThiesCheibubetal.2023, author = {Tsebelis, George and Thies, Michael and Cheibub, Jos{\´e} Antonio and Dixon, Rosalind and Bog{\´e}a, Daniel and Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Review symposium}, series = {European political science}, journal = {European political science}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, address = {Basingstoke}, issn = {1680-4333}, doi = {10.1057/s41304-023-00426-9}, pages = {20}, year = {2023}, abstract = {Steffen Ganghof's Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: Democratic Design and the Separation of Powers (Oxford University Press, 2021) posits that "in a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not" (Ganghof, 2021). To consider, examine and theorise about this, Ganghof urges engagement with semi-parliamentarism. As explained by Ganghof, legislative power is shared between two democratically legitimate sections of parliament in a semi-parliamentary system, but only one of those sections selects the government and can remove it in a no-confidence vote. Consequently, power is dispersed and not concentrated in the hands of any one person, which, Ganghof argues, can lead to an enhanced form of parliamentary democracy. In this book review symposium, George Tsebelis, Michael Thies, Jos{\´e} Antonio Cheibub, Rosalind Dixon and Daniel Bog{\´e}a review Steffen Ganghof's book and engage with the author about aspects of research design, case selection and theoretical argument. This symposium arose from an engaging and constructive discussion of the book at a seminar hosted by Texas A\&M University in 2022. We thank Prof Jos{\´e} Cheibub (Texas A\&M) for organising that seminar and Dr Anna Fruhstorfer (University of Potsdam) for initiating this book review symposium.}, language = {en} } @incollection{GanghofSchulze2023, author = {Ganghof, Steffen and Schulze, Kai}, title = {Vetospieler und Institutionen}, series = {Handbuch Policy-Forschung}, booktitle = {Handbuch Policy-Forschung}, editor = {Wenzelburger, Georg and Zohlnh{\"o}fer, Reimut}, edition = {2., aktualisierte und erweiterte}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Wiesbaden}, isbn = {978-3-658-34559-4}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-658-34560-0_4}, pages = {101 -- 125}, year = {2023}, abstract = {Der Beitrag widmet sich zwei {\"u}beraus fruchtbaren theoretischen Ans{\"a}tzen in der Policy-Forschung und dar{\"u}ber hinaus: der Vetospielertheorie und Vetopunkt-Ans{\"a}tzen. Neben den Grundz{\"u}gen beider Ans{\"a}tze stellen wir grundlegende Entwicklungslinien und Probleme dieser Literaturen anhand beispielhafter Studien dar. Es zeigt sich, dass beide Ans{\"a}tze teils kontroverse Annahmen treffen, zu denen es plausible Alternativen gibt. Zum Beispiel kann das Verhalten von Koalitionsparteien im Policy-Prozess anders als von der Vetospielertheorie angenommen modelliert werden. Die kausalen Effekte bestimmter Institutionen oder Vetopunkte k{\"o}nnen zudem je nach Kontext variieren. Diesem Kontext sollte gr{\"o}ßere Beachtung geschenkt werden.}, language = {de} } @incollection{Ganghof2022, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Typen von Forschungsdesigns}, series = {Forschungsstrategien in den Sozialwissenschaften}, booktitle = {Forschungsstrategien in den Sozialwissenschaften}, editor = {Tausendpfund, Markus}, publisher = {Springer VS}, address = {Wiesbaden}, isbn = {978-3-658-36971-2}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-658-36972-9_11}, pages = {257 -- 286}, year = {2022}, abstract = {Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungsdesigns umfassen alle wesentlichen Entscheidungen, die im Forschungsprozess getroffen werden m{\"u}ssen. Der Beitrag unterscheidet drei rundlegende Typen von Forschungsdesigns: x-zentriert, y-zentriert und kontrastiv. Das x-zentrierte Design versucht einen theoretisch spezifizierten kausalen Effekt zu identifizieren und dessen Gr{\"o}ße m{\"o}glichst genau und ohne Verzerrungen zu sch{\"a}tzen. Das y-zentrierte Design versucht mehrere komplement{\"a}re Theorien {\"u}ber kausale Effekte so zu kombinieren, dass bestimmte Ph{\"a}nomene m{\"o}glichst gut erkl{\"a}rt werden. Das kontrastive Design vergleicht die Erkl{\"a}rungskraft von zwei oder mehr konkurrierenden Theorien. Die Unterscheidung der drei Typen ist f{\"u}r qualitative Fallstudien ebenso relevant wie f{\"u}r Experimente oder statistische Studien mit Beobachtungsdaten. Der Beitrag grenzt die drei Typen voneinander ab, erkl{\"a}rt ihre jeweiligen Annahmen und diskutiert ihre Vor- und Nachteile sowie die M{\"o}glichkeiten und Grenzen ihrer Kombination. Daneben diskutiert er den Unterschied zwischen Modellen und Theorien sowie die Bedeutung des Sparsamkeitsprinzips bei der Entwicklung und Bewertung wissenschaftlicher Theorien und Erkl{\"a}rungen.}, language = {de} } @book{Ganghof2021, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, address = {Oxford}, isbn = {978-0-19-289714-5}, doi = {10.1093/oso/9780192897145.001.0001}, pages = {1 -- 199}, year = {2021}, abstract = {In a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not. The book defends this thesis and explores 'semi-parliamentary government' as an alternative to presidential government. Semi-parliamentarism avoids power concentration in one person by shifting the separation of powers into the democratic assembly. The executive becomes fused with only one part of the assembly, even though the other part has at least equal democratic legitimacy and robust veto power on ordinary legislation. The book identifies the Australian Commonwealth and Japan, as well as the Australian states of New South Wales, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia, as semi-parliamentary systems. Using data from 23 countries and 6 Australian states, it maps how parliamentary and semi-parliamentary systems balance competing visions of democracy; it analyzes patterns of electoral and party systems, cabinet formation, legislative coalition-building, and constitutional reforms; it systematically compares the semi-parliamentary and presidential separation of powers; and it develops new and innovative semi-parliamentary designs, some of which do not require two separate chambers.}, language = {en} } @misc{Ganghof2021, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism}, series = {Zweitver{\"o}ffentlichungen der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe}, journal = {Zweitver{\"o}ffentlichungen der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe}, isbn = {978-0-19-289714-5}, issn = {1867-5808}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-53783}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-537839}, pages = {199}, year = {2021}, abstract = {In a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not. The book defends this thesis and explores 'semi-parliamentary government' as an alternative to presidential government. Semi-parliamentarism avoids power concentration in one person by shifting the separation of powers into the democratic assembly. The executive becomes fused with only one part of the assembly, even though the other part has at least equal democratic legitimacy and robust veto power on ordinary legislation. The book identifies the Australian Commonwealth and Japan, as well as the Australian states of New South Wales, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia, as semi-parliamentary systems. Using data from 23 countries and 6 Australian states, it maps how parliamentary and semi-parliamentary systems balance competing visions of democracy; it analyzes patterns of electoral and party systems, cabinet formation, legislative coalition-building, and constitutional reforms; it systematically compares the semi-parliamentary and presidential separation of powers; and it develops new and innovative semi-parliamentary designs, some of which do not require two separate chambers.}, language = {en} } @article{GanghofEppner2019, author = {Ganghof, Steffen and Eppner, Sebastian}, title = {Faire Repr{\"a}sentation versus klare Richtungsentscheide? Zur Reform des Wahl- und Regierungssystems Fair representation versus clear decisions On the reform of the electoral system and form of government}, series = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft}, volume = {13}, journal = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft}, number = {3}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Wiesbaden}, issn = {1865-2646}, doi = {10.1007/s12286-019-00431-7}, pages = {375 -- 397}, year = {2019}, abstract = {The increased fragmentation of European party systems and the resulting difficulties of government formation have led to renewed debates about electoral systems. Some authors characterize certain electoral systems as optimal compromises between "proportional" and "majoritarian" conceptions of democracy. We argue that these optimality arguments are biased towards the majoritarian conception. Ambitious proportional conceptions embrace the goals of mechanical proportionality, multidimensional representation and flexible, issue-specific legislative coalitions. However, in parliamentary systems of government these goals cannot be reconciled with majoritarian goals. This is because in parliamentarism the same electoral threshold applies to parliamentary representation and to participation in the vote of non-confidence procedure. The first threshold is crucial for the proportional, the latter for the majoritarian conception of democracy. If we are willing to decouple the two thresholds - and hence change the form of government - new avenues for reform open up. We illustrate our arguments using data for 29 democratic systems between 1995 and 2015.}, language = {de} } @misc{Ganghof2019, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Designing Democratic Constitutions}, series = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe}, journal = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe}, number = {120}, issn = {1867-5808}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-44540}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-445408}, pages = {13}, year = {2019}, abstract = {This article analyses salient trade-offs in the design of democracy. It grounds this analysis in a distinction between two basic models of democracy: simple and complex majoritarianism. These models differ not only in their electoral and party systems, but also in the style of coalition-building. Simple majoritarianism concentrates executive power in a single majority party; complex majoritarianism envisions the formation of shifting, issue-specific coalitions among multiple parties whose programs differ across multiple conflict dimensions. The latter pattern of coalition formation is very difficult to create and sustain under pure parliamentary government. A separation of powers between executive and legislature can facilitate such a pattern, while also achieving central goals of simple majoritarianism: identifiable cabinet alternatives before the election and stable cabinets afterward. The separation of powers can thus balance simple and complex majoritarianism in ways that are unavailable under parliamentarism. The article also compares the presidential and semi-parliamentary versions of the separation of powers. It argues that the latter has important advantages, e.g., when it comes to resolving inter-branch deadlock, as it avoids the concentration of executive power in a single human being.}, language = {en} } @misc{GanghofEppnerSteckeretal.2019, author = {Ganghof, Steffen and Eppner, Sebastian and Stecker, Christian and Heeß, Katja and Schukraft, Stefan}, title = {Do minority cabinets govern more flexibly and inclusively?}, series = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe}, journal = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe}, number = {114}, issn = {1867-5808}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-43417}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-434175}, pages = {541 -- 561}, year = {2019}, abstract = {A widespread view in political science is that minority cabinets govern more flexibly and inclusively, more in line with a median-oriented and 'consensual' vision of democracy. Yet there is only little empirical evidence for it. We study legislative coalition-building in the German state of North-Rhine-Westphalia, which was ruled by a minority government between 2010 and 2012. We compare the inclusiveness of legislative coalitions under minority and majority cabinets, based on 1028 laws passed in the 1985-2017 period, and analyze in detail the flexibility of legislative coalition formation under the minority government. Both quantitative analyses are complemented with brief case studies of specific legislation. We find, first, that the minority cabinet did not rule more inclusively. Second, the minority cabinet's legislative flexibility was fairly limited; to the extent that it existed, it follows a pattern that cannot be explained on the basis of the standard spatial model with policy-seeking parties.}, language = {en} } @article{Ganghof2019, author = {Ganghof, Steffen}, title = {Designing Democratic Constitutions}, series = {Politics and Governance}, volume = {7}, journal = {Politics and Governance}, number = {4}, publisher = {Cogitatio Press}, address = {Lisbon}, issn = {2183-2463}, doi = {10.17645/pag.v7i4.2239}, pages = {243 -- 253}, year = {2019}, abstract = {This article analyses salient trade-offs in the design of democracy. It grounds this analysis in a distinction between two basic models of democracy: simple and complex majoritarianism. These models differ not only in their electoral and party systems, but also in the style of coalition-building. Simple majoritarianism concentrates executive power in a single majority party; complex majoritarianism envisions the formation of shifting, issue-specific coalitions among multiple parties whose programs differ across multiple conflict dimensions. The latter pattern of coalition formation is very difficult to create and sustain under pure parliamentary government. A separation of powers between executive and legislature can facilitate such a pattern, while also achieving central goals of simple majoritarianism: identifiable cabinet alternatives before the election and stable cabinets afterward. The separation of powers can thus balance simple and complex majoritarianism in ways that are unavailable under parliamentarism. The article also compares the presidential and semi-parliamentary versions of the separation of powers. It argues that the latter has important advantages, e.g., when it comes to resolving inter-branch deadlock, as it avoids the concentration of executive power in a single human being.}, language = {en} }