@phdthesis{Yos2016, author = {Yos, Roman}, title = {Der junge Habermas}, series = {Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft ; 2278}, journal = {Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft ; 2278}, publisher = {Suhrkamp}, address = {Berlin}, isbn = {978-3-518-29878-7}, pages = {521}, year = {2016}, abstract = {Roman Yos' Untersuchung {\"u}ber die Urspr{\"u}nge eines der einflussreichsten Werke der j{\"u}ngeren Geistesgeschichte zeigt auf originelle Weise, wie J{\"u}rgen Habermas seine bereits in jungen Jahren ausgepr{\"a}gten philosophisch-politischen Denkmotive allm{\"a}hlich in die Bahnen eines tragf{\"a}higen Systems {\"u}berf{\"u}hrte. Diese Entwicklung l{\"a}sst sich als ein Lernprozess begreifen, in dessen Verlauf kontr{\"a}re intellektuelle Einfl{\"u}sse aufeinandertrafen und der aufw{\"a}ndigen Vermittlung bedurften. Yos rekonstruiert die spannungsreiche Entstehung von Habermas' Denken aus dem Zusammenhang fr{\"u}hester Schriften und gibt zugleich einen Einblick in deren zeit- und ideengeschichtliche Hintergr{\"u}nde.}, language = {de} } @article{vanBuuren2016, author = {van Buuren, Jasper}, title = {The Difference between Moral Sources and Hypergoods}, series = {International philosophical quarterly}, volume = {56}, journal = {International philosophical quarterly}, publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center}, address = {Charlottesville}, issn = {0019-0365}, doi = {10.5840/ipq201641259}, pages = {171 -- 186}, year = {2016}, abstract = {In Sources of the Self Charles Taylor makes clear that both hypergoods and moral sources are essential to the moral life. Although hypergoods and moral sources are not the same thing, Taylor's descriptions of these concepts are quite similar, and so their distinction requires interpretation. I propose that we interpret the difference on the basis of another distinction that is central to Taylor's thinking: that between immanence and transcendence. Whereas a moral source transcends us, a hypergood is the value of our immanent way of relating to that moral source. This interpretation requires that we first differentiate between a narrow and a wide sense of "moral source."}, language = {en} } @article{vanBuuren2016, author = {van Buuren, Jasper}, title = {critique of neuroscience}, series = {Continental philosophy review}, volume = {49}, journal = {Continental philosophy review}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Dordrecht}, issn = {1387-2842}, doi = {10.1007/s11007-015-9318-4}, pages = {223 -- 241}, year = {2016}, abstract = {Bennett and Hacker criticize a number of neuroscientists and philosophers for attributing capacities which belong to the human being as a whole, like perceiving or deciding, to a "part" of the human being, viz. the brain. They call this type of mistake the "mereological fallacy". Interestingly, the authors say that these capacities cannot be ascribed to the mind either. They reject not only materialistic monism but also Cartesian dualism, arguing that many predicates describing human life do not refer to physical or mental properties, nor to the sum of such properties. I agree with this important principle and with the critique of the mereological fallacy which it underpins, but I have two objections to the authors' view. Firstly, I think that the brain is not literally a part of the human being, as suggested. Secondly, Bennett and Hacker do not offer an account of body and mind which explains in a systematic way how the domain of phenomena which transcends the mental and the physical relates to the mental and the physical. I first argue that Helmuth Plessner's philosophical anthropology provides the kind of account we need. Then, drawing on Plessner, I present an alternative view of the mereological relationships between brain and human being. My criticism does not undercut Bennett and Hacker's diagnosis of the mereological fallacy but rather gives it a more solid philosophical-anthropological foundation.}, language = {en} } @phdthesis{Schoellner2016, author = {Schoellner, Karsten}, title = {Towards a Wittgensteinian metaethics}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-409288}, school = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {309}, year = {2016}, abstract = {This doctoral thesis seeks to elaborate how Wittgenstein's very sparse writings on ethics and ethical thought, together with his later work on the more general problem of normativity and his approach to philosophical problems as a whole, can be applied to contemporary meta-ethical debates about the nature of moral thought and language and the sources of moral obligation. I begin with a discussion of Wittgenstein's early "Lecture on Ethics", distinguishing the thesis of a strict fact/value dichotomy that Wittgenstein defends there from the related thesis that all ethical discourse is essentially and intentionally nonsensical, an attempt to go beyond the limits of sense. The first chapter discusses and defends Wittgenstein's argument that moral valuation always goes beyond any ascertaining of fact; the second chapter seeks to draw out the valuable insights from Wittgenstein's (early) insistence that value discourse is nonsensical while also arguing that this thesis is ultimately untenable and also incompatible with later Wittgensteinian understanding of language. On the basis of this discussion I then take up the writings of the American philosopher Cora Diamond, who has worked out an ethical approach in a very closely Wittgensteinian spirit, and show how this approach shares many of the valuable insights of the moral expressivism and constructivism of contemporary authors such as Blackburn and Korsgaard while suggesting a way to avoid some of the problems and limitations of their approaches. Subsequently I turn to a criticism of the attempts by Lovibond and McDowell to enlist Wittgenstein in the support for a non-naturalist moral realism. A concluding chapter treats the ways that a broadly Wittgensteinian conception expands the subject of metaethics itself by questioning the primacy of discursive argument in moral thought and of moral propositions as the basic units of moral belief.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Proeve2016, author = {Pr{\"o}ve, Ralf}, title = {Grenzen best{\"a}tigen und Grenzen {\"u}berwinden}, series = {Grenzen im Fokus der Wissenschaften}, booktitle = {Grenzen im Fokus der Wissenschaften}, publisher = {Trafo}, address = {Berlin}, publisher = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {153 -- 170}, year = {2016}, language = {de} } @incollection{Petsche2016, author = {Petsche, Hans-Joachim}, title = {Einf{\"u}hrung}, series = {Grenzen im Fokus der Wissenschaften}, booktitle = {Grenzen im Fokus der Wissenschaften}, publisher = {Trafo}, address = {Berlin}, publisher = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {9 -- 21}, year = {2016}, language = {de} } @incollection{Petsche2016, author = {Petsche, Hans-Joachim}, title = {Grenzen als philosophisches Problem}, series = {Grenzen im Fokus der Wissenschaften}, booktitle = {Grenzen im Fokus der Wissenschaften}, publisher = {Trafo}, address = {Berlin}, publisher = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {23 -- 67}, year = {2016}, language = {de} } @misc{Omerbasic2016, author = {Omerbasic, Alina}, title = {The Non-Identity Problem and the Ethics of Future People}, series = {Ethical theory and moral practice}, volume = {19}, journal = {Ethical theory and moral practice}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Dordrecht}, issn = {1386-2820}, doi = {10.1007/s10677-015-9614-4}, pages = {273 -- 275}, year = {2016}, language = {en} } @incollection{Mackert2016, author = {Mackert, J{\"u}rgen}, title = {Zur Bedeutung und Analyse von Grenzen in der Soziologie}, series = {Grenzen im Fokus der Wissenschaften}, booktitle = {Grenzen im Fokus der Wissenschaften}, publisher = {Trafo}, address = {Berlin}, publisher = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {171 -- 196}, year = {2016}, language = {de} } @incollection{Kunow2016, author = {Kunow, R{\"u}diger}, title = {Spiel ohne Grenzen}, series = {Grenzen im Fokus der Wissenschaften}, booktitle = {Grenzen im Fokus der Wissenschaften}, publisher = {Trafo}, address = {Berlin}, publisher = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {69 -- 83}, year = {2016}, language = {de} }