@article{vanBuuren2016,
  author    = {van Buuren, Jasper},
  title     = {critique of neuroscience},
  series = {Continental philosophy review},
  volume    = {49},
  journal   = {Continental philosophy review},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Dordrecht},
  issn      = {1387-2842},
  doi       = {10.1007/s11007-015-9318-4},
  pages     = {223 -- 241},
  year      = {2016},
  abstract  = {Bennett and Hacker criticize a number of neuroscientists and philosophers for attributing capacities which belong to the human being as a whole, like perceiving or deciding, to a "part" of the human being, viz. the brain. They call this type of mistake the "mereological fallacy". Interestingly, the authors say that these capacities cannot be ascribed to the mind either. They reject not only materialistic monism but also Cartesian dualism, arguing that many predicates describing human life do not refer to physical or mental properties, nor to the sum of such properties. I agree with this important principle and with the critique of the mereological fallacy which it underpins, but I have two objections to the authors' view. Firstly, I think that the brain is not literally a part of the human being, as suggested. Secondly, Bennett and Hacker do not offer an account of body and mind which explains in a systematic way how the domain of phenomena which transcends the mental and the physical relates to the mental and the physical. I first argue that Helmuth Plessner's philosophical anthropology provides the kind of account we need. Then, drawing on Plessner, I present an alternative view of the mereological relationships between brain and human being. My criticism does not undercut Bennett and Hacker's diagnosis of the mereological fallacy but rather gives it a more solid philosophical-anthropological foundation.},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{Schumann2019,
  type      = {Master Thesis},
  author    = {Schumann, Michael},
  title     = {Extraterrestrische Ex-zentriker},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-43420},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-434203},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {93},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {Seit ihrem Beginn ist die Raumfahrt Untersuchungsgegenstand verschiedenster Disziplinen. Auch die Philosophie hat seither eine kritische Perspektive auf diese Aktivit{\"a}t eingenommen. Und doch fehlt es bislang eines philosophisch-systematischen Zugangs, mit einem genuin ‚anthropologischen' Gesichtspunkt. Diese L{\"u}cke wird immer offensichtlicher, seitdem sich, nach Entdeckung der ersten Exoplaneten, neue ‚Astro-wissenschaften' (z.B. Astrobiologe, Astrokognition, Astrosoziologie) gebildet haben, die explizit Menschen als Raumfahrer voraussetzen bzw. menschliche Eigenschaften auf ihre ‚Abl{\"o}sbarkeit' hin diskutieren. Mit vorliegender Masterarbeit soll der Versuch gemacht werden, die notwendigen Pr{\"a}suppositionen, f{\"u}r das Verst{\"a}ndnis von Menschen als ‚raumfahrende Lebewesen', aufzudecken, ohne naturalistische oder kulturalistische Verk{\"u}rzungen zu betreiben. Zu diesem Zweck wird der systematische Rahmen von Helmuth Plessners Philosophischer Anthropologie gew{\"a}hlt, da dieser eine umfassende ‚spezies-neutrale' (d.h. es erlaubt {\"u}ber Menschen, Tiere und Extraterrestriker gleichermaßen nachzudenken, ohne ‚anthropozentrische' oder ‚speziesistische' Vorurteile zu machen) Untersuchung des infrage stehenden Sachverhaltes bietet. Um diesen Rahmen zu exemplifizieren, und w{\"a}hrenddessen den philosophisch-systematischen Ansatz zur Raumfahrt zu elaborieren, der raumfahrende Extraterrestriker ohne Anthropomorphisierung konzeptualisieren, wie auch den Umgang mit Extraterrestrikern in ethischer und politischer Hinsicht ber{\"u}cksichtigen kann, werden die Themenkreise der Astrobiologie, Astroethik und Astropolitik in einzelnen Kapiteln besprochen. Abschließend ist, entgegen aller Erwartung, der gew{\"a}hlte Ansatz als ‚kritisch-posthumanistische' Option zu verteidigen.},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{Krueger2019,
  author    = {Kr{\"u}ger, Hans-Peter},
  title     = {How is the Human Life-Form of Mind Really Possible in Nature?},
  series = {Human studies},
  volume    = {42},
  journal   = {Human studies},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Dordrecht},
  issn      = {0163-8548},
  doi       = {10.1007/s10746-017-9429-5},
  pages     = {47 -- 64},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {J. Dewey and H. Plessner both and independently of one another treated the central question of what new task philosophy must set itself if the assumption is correct that the life-form of mind, i.e., the mental life-form of humans, arose in nature and must also sustain itself in the future within nature. If nature has to reconceived so as to make the irreducible qualities of life and mind truly possible, then it can no longer be restricted to the role of physical material. Conversely humans cannot no longer take on the role of God outside and independent of nature. Instead these philosophers distinguish between three plateaus (Dewey) or stages (Plessner), between physical (inorganic) nature, psycho-physical (living) nature and the nature that is mental life. This distinction is drawn such that a connection between the plateaus is truly possible. The third level, that of the mental form of life, answers mentally within conduct to the break with the first two levels. Hence it depends in the future as well on the continuously renewed difference (between the precarious and the stable for Dewey, between immediacy and mediation for Plessner) in our experience of nature. Within this difference nature as a whole remains an open unknown, which is why we can credit Dewey with a philosophy of diversified and negative holism, Plessner with a differential philosophy of the negativity of the absolute.},
  language  = {en}
}