@article{WeidenfeldOberauerHornig2005, author = {Weidenfeld, Andrea and Oberauer, Klaus and Hornig, R}, title = {Causal and noncausal conditionals : an integrated model of interpretation and reasoning}, year = {2005}, abstract = {We present an integrated model for the understanding of and the reasoning from conditional statements. Central assumptions from several approaches are integrated into a causal path model. According to the model, the cognitive availability of exceptions to a conditional reduces the subjective conditional probability of the consequent, given the antecedent. This conditional probability determines people's degree of belief in the conditional, which in turn affects their willingness to accept logically valid inferences. In addition to this indirect pathway, the model contains a direct pathway: Availability of exceptional situations directly reduces the endorsement of valid inferences. We tested the integrated model with three experiments using conditional statements embedded in pseudonaturalistic cover stories. An explicitly mentioned causal link between antecedent and consequent was either present (causal conditionals) or absent (arbitrary conditionals). The model was supported for the causal but not for the arbitrary conditional statements}, language = {en} } @phdthesis{Weidenfeld2003, author = {Weidenfeld, Andrea}, title = {Interpretation of and reasoning with conditionals : probabilities, mental models, and causality}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-5207}, school = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, year = {2003}, abstract = {In everyday conversation \"if\" is one of the most frequently used conjunctions. This dissertation investigates what meaning an everyday conditional transmits and what inferences it licenses. It is suggested that the nature of the relation between the two propositions in a conditional might play a major role for both questions. Thus, in the experiments reported here conditional statements that describe a causal relationship (e.g., \"If you touch that wire, you will receive an electric shock\") were compared to arbitrary conditional statements in which there is no meaningful relation between the antecedent and the consequent proposition (e.g., \"If Napoleon is dead, then Bristol is in England\"). Initially, central assumptions from several approaches to the meaning and the reasoning from causal conditionals will be integrated into a common model. In the model the availability of exceptional situations that have the power to generate exceptions to the rule described in the conditional (e.g., the electricity is turned off), reduces the subjective conditional probability of the consequent, given the antecedent (e.g., the probability of receiving an electric shock when touching the wire). This conditional probability determines people's degree of belief in the conditional, which in turn affects their willingness to accept valid inferences (e.g., \"Peter touches the wire, therefore he receives an electric shock\") in a reasoning task. Additionally to this indirect pathway, the model contains a direct pathway: Cognitive availability of exceptional situations directly reduces the readiness to accept valid conclusions. The first experimental series tested the integrated model for conditional statements embedded in pseudo-natural cover stories that either established a causal relation between the antecedent and the consequent event (causal conditionals) or did not connect the propositions in a meaningful way (arbitrary conditionals). The model was supported for the causal, but not for the arbitrary conditional statements. Furthermore, participants assigned lower degrees of belief to arbitrary than to causal conditionals. Is this effect due to the presence versus absence of a semantic link between antecedent and consequent in the conditionals? This question was one of the starting points for the second experimental series. Here, the credibility of the conditionals was manipulated by adding explicit frequency information about possible combinations of presence or absence of antecedent and consequent events to the problems (i.e., frequencies of cases of 1. true antecedent with true consequent, 2. true antecedent with false consequent, 3. false antecedent with true consequent, 4. false antecedent with false consequent). This paradigm allows testing different approaches to the meaning of conditionals (Experiment 4) as well as theories of conditional reasoning against each other (Experiment 5). The results of Experiment 4 supported mainly the conditional probability approach to the meaning of conditionals (Edgington, 1995) according to which the degree of belief a listener has in a conditional statement equals the conditional probability that the consequent is true given the antecedent (e.g., the probability of receiving an electric shock when touching the wire). Participants again assigned lower degrees of belief to the arbitrary than the causal conditionals, although the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent was held constant within every condition of explicit frequency information. This supports the hypothesis that the mere presence of a causal link enhances the believability of a conditional statement. In Experiment 5 participants solved conditional reasoning tasks from problems that contained explicit frequency information about possible relevant cases. The data favored the probabilistic approach to conditional reasoning advanced by Oaksford, Chater, and Larkin (2000). The two experimental series reported in this dissertation provide strong support for recent probabilistic theories: for the conditional probability approach to the meaning of conditionals by Edgington (1995) and the probabilistic approach to conditional reasoning by Oaksford et al. (2000). In the domain of conditional reasoning, there was additionally support for the modified mental model approaches by Markovits and Barrouillet (2002) and Schroyens and Schaeken (2003). Probabilistic and mental model approaches could be reconciled within a dual-process-model as suggested by Verschueren, Schaeken, and d\&\#39;Ydewalle (2003).}, subject = {Konditional}, language = {en} } @article{OberauerWeidenfeldHoernig2006, author = {Oberauer, Klaus and Weidenfeld, Andrea and H{\"o}rnig, Robin}, title = {Working memory capacity and the construction of spatial mental models in comprehension and deductive reasoning}, doi = {10.1080/17470210500151717}, year = {2006}, abstract = {We asked 149 high-school students who were pretested for their working memory capacity (WMC) to read spatial descriptions relating to five objects and to evaluate conclusions asserting an unmentioned relationship between two of the objects. Unambiguous descriptions were compatible with a single spatial arrangement, whereas ambiguous descriptions permitted two arrangements; a subset of the ambiguous descriptions still determined the relation asserted in the conclusion, whereas another subset did not. Two groups of participants received different instructions: The deduction group should accept conclusions only if they followed with logical necessity from the description, whereas the comprehension group should accept a conclusion if it agreed with their representation of the arrangement. Self-paced reading times increased on sentences that introduced an ambiguity, replicating previous findings in deductive reasoning experiments. This effect was also found in the comprehension group, casting doubt on the interpretation that people consider multiple possible arrangements online. Responses to conclusions could be modelled by a multinomial processing model with four parameters: the probability of constructing a correct mental model, the probability of detecting an ambiguity, and two guessing parameters. Participants with high and with low WMC differed mainly in the probability of successfully constructing a mental model}, language = {en} } @article{OberauerWeidenfeldHornig2004, author = {Oberauer, Klaus and Weidenfeld, Andrea and Hornig, R.}, title = {Logical reasoning and probabilities: A comprehensive test of Oaksford and Chater (2001)}, issn = {1069-9384}, year = {2004}, abstract = {We report two experiments testing a central prediction of the probabilistic account of reasoning provided by Oaksford and Chater (2001): Acceptance of standard conditional inferences, card choices in the Wason selection task, and quantifiers chosen for conclusions from syllogisms should vary as a function of the frequency of the concepts involved. Frequency was manipulated by a probability-learning phase preceding the reasoning tasks to simulate natural sampling. The effects predicted by Oaksford and Chater (2001) were not obtained with any of the three paradigms}, language = {en} } @article{OberauerHornigWeidenfeldetal.2005, author = {Oberauer, Klaus and Hornig, R. and Weidenfeld, Andrea and Wilhelm, Oliver}, title = {Effects of directionality in deductive reasoning : II. Premise integration and conclusion evaluation}, issn = {0272-4987}, year = {2005}, abstract = {Previous research (Oberauer \& Wilhelm, 2000) has shown an inherent directionality between the two terms linked in premises of typical deductive reasoning tasks. With three experiments we investigated the effect of inherent directionality on the time to integrate two premises and for the derivation of a conclusion. We varied figure (i.e., order of terms in the premises) and direction of inference (i.e., order of terms in the conclusion) in deduction tasks from various domains (propositional reasoning, syllogisms, spatial, temporal, and linear order reasoning). Effects of figure on premise reading times varied with the directionality of the relations. Effects of direction of inference reflected the same directionality for a subset of relations. We propose that two factors are jointly responsible for a large part of observed directionality effects in premise integration: the inherent directionality of relational statements and a general advantage for a given-new order of terms in the second premise. Difficulty of deriving a conclusion is affected by the directionality or relations if and only if the relation is semantically asymmetric, so that the directionality must be preserved in the integrated mental model}, language = {en} } @article{HornigOberauerWeidenfeld2005, author = {Hornig, R. and Oberauer, Klaus and Weidenfeld, Andrea}, title = {Two principles of premise integration in spatial reasoning}, year = {2005}, abstract = {We propose two principles that facilitate integration of two relational premises in spatial reasoning. Integration is easier if the anaphor in the second premise, P2, bears the role of the relatum (relatum = given). Moreover, integration is easier if, in P2, the anaphor is mentioned before the new element (given-new). In premises with canonical word order (grammatical subjects mentioned first), these principles always conflict with one another. In topicalized statements mentioning the prepositional phrase first, the two principles work in tandem. By varying word order, we tested the two principles by measuring P2 comprehension times. Comprehension times indicated that integration was easiest when P2 obeyed both principles and most difficult when both principles were violated. Canonical premises were of intermediate difficulty. This pattern emerged regardless of whether the anaphor was a definite description or a pronoun}, language = {en} } @article{HoernigOberauerWeidenfeld2006, author = {Hoernig, Robin and Oberauer, Klaus and Weidenfeld, Andrea}, title = {Between reasoning}, series = {The quarterly journal of experimental psychology}, volume = {59}, journal = {The quarterly journal of experimental psychology}, number = {10}, publisher = {SAGE Publishing}, address = {Thousand Oaks, CA}, issn = {1747-0218}, doi = {10.1080/17470210500416151}, pages = {1805 -- 1825}, year = {2006}, abstract = {In two experiments we investigated three-term reasoning with spatial relational assertions using the preposition between as compared to projective prepositions (such as to the left of). For each kind of assertion we distinguish the referent expression (i.e., the grammatical subject) from the relatum expression (i.e., the internal argument of the preposition; e.g., [The hedgehog](referent)_(expression) is to the left of [the frog](relatum)_(expression); [the snake](referent)_(expression) is between [the donkey and the deer](relatum)_(expression)). Previous research has shown that integrating premises with projective prepositions is easier (a) when the relatum expression of the second premise denotes an element already given by the first premise (relatum = given), and (b) when the term denoting a given element precedes the term denoting a new element (given - new). Experiment 1 extended this finding to second premises with the preposition between. In Experiment 2, between figured in the first premise. In this case, participants built an initial preferred model already from the first premise, although such a premise is indeterminate with respect to the array that it describes. Since there is no need left for integrating the second premise, this premise is instead used to verify the initial model and to modify it when necessary. A further investigation of conclusion evaluation times showed that conclusions were evaluated faster when they first mentioned the element that was included most recently into the mental model of the premises. The use of premises with between permitted the separation of recency of model inclusion from recency of appearance of an element in a premise.}, language = {en} }