@misc{Kumarasingham2013,
  author    = {Kumarasingham, Harshan},
  title     = {Semi-presidentialism and democracy},
  series = {Political studies review},
  volume    = {11},
  journal   = {Political studies review},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
  address   = {Hoboken},
  issn      = {1478-9299},
  doi       = {10.1111/1478-9302.12016_10},
  pages     = {263 -- 264},
  year      = {2013},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Kumarasingham2013,
  author    = {Kumarasingham, Harshan},
  title     = {Exporting executive accountability? - Westminster legacies of executive power},
  series = {Parliamentary affairs : a journal of representative politics},
  volume    = {66},
  journal   = {Parliamentary affairs : a journal of representative politics},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Oxford Univ. Press},
  address   = {Oxford},
  issn      = {0031-2290},
  doi       = {10.1093/pa/gss008},
  pages     = {579 -- 596},
  year      = {2013},
  abstract  = {The Westminster system places great power upon the Executive with minimal accountabilities. Despite the dissolution of the British Empire, so many countries maintained the Westminster system whether it was transplanted or implanted to their soil. The Westminster system provides various actors with a great potential of increasing power autonomy over others due to the high levels of flexibility and manoeuvrability. Political actors, especially following independence, were able to operate generally unencumbered by fixed and formal institutional expectations. This allowed the countries and their executive, particularly the Prime Minister, the ability to mould and establish constitutional traditions, which in turn shaped the nascent polity that surrounded the real and constitutional independence. This article examines the Westminster systems critical legacy to accountability and its impact on executive power.},
  language  = {en}
}