@misc{Spahn2017,
  author    = {Spahn, Hannah},
  title     = {Rezension zu: Helo, Ari, Thomas Jefferson's ethics and the politics of human progress: the morality of a slaveholder. - New York, NY: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014. - ISBN 978-1-107-04078-6},
  series = {Journal of the Early Republic},
  volume    = {37},
  journal   = {Journal of the Early Republic},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {University of Pennsylvania Press},
  address   = {Philadelphia},
  issn      = {0275-1275},
  doi       = {10.1353/jer.2017.0010},
  pages     = {170 -- 173},
  year      = {2017},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Raters2020,
  author    = {Raters, Marie-Luise},
  title     = {Ich tat doch nur meine Pflicht!},
  series = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Praktische Philosophie},
  volume    = {7},
  journal   = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Praktische Philosophie},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {Universit{\"a}t Salzburg},
  address   = {Salzburg},
  issn      = {2409-9961},
  doi       = {10.22613/zfpp/7.1.2},
  pages     = {43 -- 68},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {Menschen, die moralisch Herausragendes getan haben, sagen mit signifikanter H{\"a}ufigkeit, dass sie damit nur ‚ihre Pflicht' getan h{\"a}tten. So auch Staszek Jackowski, der im besetzten Polen 18 Monate lang 32 j{\"u}dische Menschen in einem Keller unter seinem Haus vor den Nazi-Verbrechern versteckt hatte. Der Essay diskutiert dieses irritierende Ph{\"a}nomen, das in der aktuellen angloamerikanischen Supererogationsforschung als ‚Heroismus-Paradox' bezeichnet wird. In einem ersten Schritt wird Jackowskis Handlungsweise als Supererogation (Ultraerogation) und damit als Nichtpflicht ausgewiesen. Anschließend werden verschiedene L{\"o}sungsvorschl{\"a}ge des Heroismus-Paradoxes diskutiert. Daraus wird ein alternativer L{\"o}sungsvorschlag entwickelt, demzufolge das Handeln von Supererogateuren in einer freiwilligen Selbstverpflichtung auf einen besonders anspruchsvollen Entwurf vom moralischen Selbst wurzelt. In zwei Ausblicken wird abschließend in grobem Umriss begr{\"u}ndet, warum Mitl{\"a}ufer unanst{\"a}ndig wirken und was unter Jackowskis Umst{\"a}nden tats{\"a}chlich moralische Pflicht gewesen w{\"a}re.},
  language  = {de}
}
@incollection{Raters2020,
  author    = {Raters, Marie-Luise},
  title     = {Die erweiterte Dilemma-Diskussion},
  series = {Philosophieren mit Dilemmata : Methoden im Philosophie- und Ethikunterricht},
  booktitle = {Philosophieren mit Dilemmata : Methoden im Philosophie- und Ethikunterricht},
  publisher = {Meiner},
  address   = {Hamburg},
  isbn      = {978-3-7873-3745-3},
  pages     = {27 -- 47},
  year      = {2020},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{Raters2020,
  author    = {Raters, Marie-Luise},
  title     = {Das tue ich nicht, weil es nicht Pflicht ist},
  series = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r philosophische Forschung},
  volume    = {74},
  journal   = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r philosophische Forschung},
  number    = {1},
  doi       = {10.3196/004433020828856890},
  pages     = {80 -- 104},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {Most arguments of Applied Ethics (e.g.slippery slope argument, argument of double effect) are well analyzed. An exception is the argument 'I do not do this because it is not my duty'. It makes sense to call the argument the 'argument of supererogation' (ASE): Since J. Urmson's essay Saints and Heroes of 1958, those actions are called 'supererogations' which (despite of their moral value) are not supposed to be duties. The argument is widely used not only in Applied Ethics, but also in ordinary moral everyday life. Nevertheless, there is a need of investigation because it has an indecency-problem. The argument is convincing if an actor does not want to risk his life. It seems indecent, however, if an actor refuses a simple favor or a service of friendship with the 'argument of super-erogation', although they both constitute no duties. This paper reconstructs the 'argument of supererogation' as a syllogism. It analyzes its formal structure by benefitting from current Anglo-American literature on supererogation. The overall aim of this paper is to solve the problem of indecency.},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{AlmeidaRanisch2022,
  author    = {Almeida, Mara and Ranisch, Robert},
  title     = {Beyond safety: mapping the ethical debate on heritable genome editing interventions},
  series = {Humanities and Social Sciences Communications},
  volume    = {9},
  journal   = {Humanities and Social Sciences Communications},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {Springer Nature},
  address   = {London},
  issn      = {2662-9992},
  doi       = {10.1057/s41599-022-01147-y},
  pages     = {14},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {Genetic engineering has provided humans the ability to transform organisms by direct manipulation of genomes within a broad range of applications including agriculture (e.g., GM crops), and the pharmaceutical industry (e.g., insulin production). Developments within the last 10 years have produced new tools for genome editing (e.g., CRISPR/Cas9) that can achieve much greater precision than previous forms of genetic engineering. Moreover, these tools could offer the potential for interventions on humans and for both clinical and non-clinical purposes, resulting in a broad scope of applicability. However, their promising abilities and potential uses (including their applicability in humans for either somatic or heritable genome editing interventions) greatly increase their potential societal impacts and, as such, have brought an urgency to ethical and regulatory discussions about the application of such technology in our society. In this article, we explore different arguments (pragmatic, sociopolitical and categorical) that have been made in support of or in opposition to the new technologies of genome editing and their impact on the debate of the permissibility or otherwise of human heritable genome editing interventions in the future. For this purpose, reference is made to discussions on genetic engineering that have taken place in the field of bioethics since the 1980s. Our analysis shows that the dominance of categorical arguments has been reversed in favour of pragmatic arguments such as safety concerns. However, when it comes to involving the public in ethical discourse, we consider it crucial widening the debate beyond such pragmatic considerations. In this article, we explore some of the key categorical as well sociopolitical considerations raised by the potential uses of heritable genome editing interventions, as these considerations underline many of the societal concerns and values crucial for public engagement. We also highlight how pragmatic considerations, despite their increasing importance in the work of recent authoritative sources, are unlikely to be the result of progress on outstanding categorical issues, but rather reflect the limited progress on these aspects and/or pressures in regulating the use of the technology.},
  language  = {en}
}