@article{Ganghof2013,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen},
  title     = {Equality-based comparison how to justify democratic institutions in the Real World},
  series = {Politics},
  volume    = {33},
  journal   = {Politics},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
  address   = {Hoboken},
  issn      = {0263-3957},
  doi       = {10.1111/1467-9256.12002},
  pages     = {101 -- 111},
  year      = {2013},
  abstract  = {Political scientists regularly justify particular democratic institutions. This article explores two desiderata for such justifications. The first is a formal equality baseline which puts the burden of justification on those who favour more unequal institutions. This baseline is seen as an implication of the rule of law. The second desideratum, the comparison requirement, builds on the first: adequate justifications of particular institutions must compare them to the best alternative, and this comparison must consider the costs for political equality. The two desiderata are applied to political science debates about the proportionality of the electoral system and bicameral systems of legislative decision-making.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Ganghof2013,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen},
  title     = {Does public reason require super-majoritarian democracy? Liberty, equality, and history in the justification of political institutions},
  series = {Politics, philosophy \& economics},
  volume    = {12},
  journal   = {Politics, philosophy \& economics},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Sage Publ.},
  address   = {Thousand Oaks},
  issn      = {1470-594X},
  doi       = {10.1177/1470594X12447786},
  pages     = {179 -- 196},
  year      = {2013},
  abstract  = {The project of public-reason liberalism faces a basic problem: publicly justified principles are typically too abstract and vague to be directly applied to practical political disputes, whereas applicable specifications of these principles are not uniquely publicly justified. One solution could be a legislative procedure that selects one member from the eligible set of inconclusively justified proposals. Yet if liberal principles are too vague to select sufficiently specific legislative proposals, can they, nevertheless, select specific legislative procedures? Based on the work of Gerald Gaus, this article argues that the only candidate for a conclusively justified decision procedure is a majoritarian or otherwise 'neutral' democracy. If the justification of democracy requires an equality baseline in the design of political regimes and if justifications for departure from this baseline are subject to reasonable disagreement, a majoritarian design is justified by default. Gaus's own preference for super-majoritarian procedures is based on disputable specifications of justified liberal principles. These procedures can only be defended as a sectarian preference if the equality baseline is rejected, but then it is not clear how the set of justifiable political regimes can be restricted to full democracies.},
  language  = {en}
}