@article{Ganghof2013,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen},
  title     = {Equality-based comparison how to justify democratic institutions in the Real World},
  series = {Politics},
  volume    = {33},
  journal   = {Politics},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
  address   = {Hoboken},
  issn      = {0263-3957},
  doi       = {10.1111/1467-9256.12002},
  pages     = {101 -- 111},
  year      = {2013},
  abstract  = {Political scientists regularly justify particular democratic institutions. This article explores two desiderata for such justifications. The first is a formal equality baseline which puts the burden of justification on those who favour more unequal institutions. This baseline is seen as an implication of the rule of law. The second desideratum, the comparison requirement, builds on the first: adequate justifications of particular institutions must compare them to the best alternative, and this comparison must consider the costs for political equality. The two desiderata are applied to political science debates about the proportionality of the electoral system and bicameral systems of legislative decision-making.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Ganghof2015,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen},
  title     = {Is the "Constitution of Equality' Parliamentary, Presidential or Hybrid?},
  series = {Political studies : the journal of the Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom},
  volume    = {63},
  journal   = {Political studies : the journal of the Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom},
  number    = {4},
  publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
  address   = {Hoboken},
  issn      = {0032-3217},
  doi       = {10.1111/1467-9248.12124},
  pages     = {814 -- 829},
  year      = {2015},
  abstract  = {What does the value of political equality imply for the institutional design of democracies? The existing normative literature highlights the importance of proportional representation and legislative majority rule, but neglects the choice of an executive format. This paper explores two potential egalitarian trade-offs in this choice. First, while presidential systems tend to achieve too little bundling of separable decision-making issues (within political parties), parliamentary systems often tend towards too much bundling (between political parties), thus establishing informal veto positions in the democratic process. This is a trade-off between the adversarial' and deliberative' aspects of equality. Second, there is a trade-off between horizontal' and vertical' equality. Neither pure presidentialism nor pure parliamentarism may be able to maximise both dimensions of equality simultaneously. The paper argues that certain hybrids between parliamentarism and presidentialism have the potential to mitigate both trade-offs. These hybrids establish power separation between the executive and legislature without allowing for popular executive elections. The argument also has potential implications for the democratisation of the European Union.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Ganghof2023,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen},
  title     = {Justifying types of representative democracy},
  series = {Critical review of international social and political philosophy},
  journal   = {Critical review of international social and political philosophy},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  address   = {London},
  issn      = {1369-8230},
  doi       = {10.1080/13698230.2022.2159665},
  pages     = {1 -- 12},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {This article responds to critical reflections on my Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism by Sarah Birch, Kevin J. Elliott, Claudia Landwehr and James L. Wilson. It discusses how different types of representative democracy, especially different forms of government (presidential, parliamentary or hybrid), can be justified. It clarifies, among other things, the distinction between procedural and process equality, the strengths of semi-parliamentary government, the potential instability of constitutional designs, and the difference that theories can make in actual processes of constitutional reform.},
  language  = {en}
}