@unpublished{HippLeumannSchober2024,
  author    = {Hipp, Lena and Leumann, Sandra and Schober, Pia S.},
  title     = {Partnership penalties for working in gender-atypical occupations?},
  doi       = {10.31235/osf.io/ydurp},
  pages     = {35},
  year      = {2024},
  abstract  = {Does working in a gender-atypical occupation reduce individuals' likelihood of finding a different-sex romantic partner, and do such occupational partnership penalties contribute to occupational gender segregation? To answer this question, we theorized partnership penalties for working in gender-atypical occupations by drawing on insights from evolutionary psychology, social constructivism, and rational choice theory and exploited the stability of occupational pathways in Germany. In Study 1, we analyzed observational data from a national probability sample (N= 1,634,944) to assess whether individuals in gender-atypical occupations were less likely to be partnered than individuals who worked in gender typical occupations. To assess whether the observed partnership gaps found in Study 1 were causally related to the gender typicality of men's and women's occupations, we conducted a field experiment on a dating app (N = 6,778). Because the findings from Study 2 suggested that young women and men indeed experienced penalties for working in a gender-atypical occupation (at least when they were not highly attractive), we employed a choice-experimental design in Study 3 (N = 1,250) to assess whether women and men were aware of occupational partnership penalties and showed that anticipating occupational partnership penalties may keep young and highly educated women from working in gender-atypical occupations. Our main conclusion therefore is that that observed penalties and their anticipation seem to be driven by unconscious rather than conscious processes.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{BruttelGuethNithammeretal.2022,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and G{\"u}th, Werner and Nithammer, Juri and Orland, Andreas},
  title     = {Inefficient cooperation under stochastic and strategic uncertainty},
  series = {Conflict resolution},
  volume    = {66},
  journal   = {Conflict resolution},
  number    = {4-5},
  publisher = {Sage Publ.},
  address   = {Thousand Oaks},
  issn      = {0022-0027},
  doi       = {10.1177/00220027211066614},
  pages     = {755 -- 782},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {Stochastic uncertainty can cause coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can increase efficiency. To test this transfer mechanism, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeated Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not lead to an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two major reasons for this failure: first, stochastic uncertainty forces proposers intending to cooperate to accept high strategic uncertainty, which many proposers avoid; second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperatively, which hinders cooperation in future periods.},
  language  = {en}
}