@article{Haenel2020,
  author    = {H{\"a}nel, Hilkje Charlotte},
  title     = {Who's to Blame?},
  series = {Social Epistemology},
  volume    = {35},
  journal   = {Social Epistemology},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  address   = {London},
  doi       = {10.1080/02691728.2020.1839591},
  pages     = {173 -- 184},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {The main aim of this paper is to investigate how sexist ideology distorts our conceptions of sexual violence and the hermeneutical gaps such an ideology yields. I propose that we can understand the problematic issue of hermeneutical gaps about sexual violence with the help of Fricker's theory of hermeneutical injustice. By distinguishing between hermeneutical injustice and hermeneutical misfire, we can distinguish between the hermeneutical gap and its consequences for the victim of sexual violence and those of the perpetrator of such violence. I then argue that perpetrators are both morally responsible and accountable for their acts, even if they are the result of a hermeneutical misfire. Ultimately, I show that with regard to sexual violence, we should opt for accountability to change the behaviour of the perpetrator and the social structure. Content warning: The paper discusses sexual violence and difficulties conceptualising experiences of such violence.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{HaenelBratu2021,
  author    = {H{\"a}nel, Hilkje Charlotte and Bratu, Christine},
  title     = {Varieties of hermeneutical injustice},
  series = {Moral philosophy and politics},
  volume    = {8},
  journal   = {Moral philosophy and politics},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {de Gruyter},
  address   = {Berlin},
  issn      = {2194-5616},
  doi       = {10.1515/mopp-2020-0007},
  pages     = {331 -- 350},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {In this paper, we have two goals. First, we argue for a blueprint for hermeneutical injustice that allows us to schematize existing and discover new varieties of hermeneutical injustices. The underlying insight is that Fricker provides both a general concept of hermeneutical injustice and a specific conception thereof. By distinguishing between the general concept and its specific conceptions, we gain a fruitful tool to detect such injustices in our everyday lives. Second, we use this blueprint to provide a further example of hermeneutical injustice that draws our attention to yet another distinction: Some hermeneutical injustices result from a lack or distortion in the collective conceptual resource and some are due to problems in the application of existing concepts. We argue that to combat hermeneutical injustices, we have to make sure not only that individuals have accurate concepts at their disposal but that they have the capabilities to use these concepts adequately.},
  language  = {en}
}