@article{TroendleLilliestamMarellietal.2020, author = {Tr{\"o}ndle, Tim and Lilliestam, Johan and Marelli, Stefano and Pfenninger, Stefan}, title = {Trade-offs between geographic scale, cost, and infrastructure requirements for fully renewable electricity in Europe}, series = {Joule}, volume = {4}, journal = {Joule}, number = {9}, publisher = {Cell Press}, address = {Cambridge , Mass.}, issn = {2542-4351}, doi = {10.1016/j.joule.2020.07.018}, pages = {1929 -- 1948}, year = {2020}, abstract = {The European potential for renewable electricity is sufficient to enable fully renewable supply on different scales, from self-sufficient, subnational regions to an interconnected continent. We not only show that a continental-scale system is the cheapest, but also that systems on the national scale and below are possible at cost penalties of 20\% or less. Transmission is key to low cost, but it is not necessary to vastly expand the transmission system. When electricity is transmitted only to balance fluctuations, the transmission grid size is comparable to today's, albeit with expanded cross-border capacities. The largest differences across scales concern land use and thus social acceptance: in the continental system, generation capacity is concentrated on the European periphery, where the best resources are. Regional systems, in contrast, have more dispersed generation. The key trade-off is therefore not between geographic scale and cost, but between scale and the spatial distribution of required generation and transmission infrastructure.}, language = {en} } @article{Franzmann2011, author = {Franzmann, Simon T.}, title = {Competition, contest, and cooperation the analytic framework of the issue market}, series = {Journal of theoretical politics}, volume = {23}, journal = {Journal of theoretical politics}, number = {3}, publisher = {Sage Publ.}, address = {London}, issn = {0951-6298}, doi = {10.1177/0951629811411747}, pages = {317 -- 343}, year = {2011}, abstract = {Although party competition is widely regarded as an important part of a working democracy, it is rarely analysed in political science literature. This article discusses the basic properties of party competition, especially the patterns of interaction in contemporary party systems. Competition as a phenomenon at the macro level has to be carefully distinguished from contest and cooperation as the forms of interaction at the micro level. The article gives special attention to the creation of issue innovations. Contrary to existing approaches, I argue that not only responsiveness but also innovation are necessary to guarantee a workable democratic competition. Competition takes place on an issue market, where parties can discover voters' demands. Combined with the concept of institutional veto points, the article presents hypotheses on how institutions shape the possibility for programmatic innovations.}, language = {en} }