@article{Bruttel2018, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena}, title = {Is There a Loyalty-Enhancing Effect of Retroactive Price-Reduction Schemes?}, series = {Review of industrial organization}, volume = {54}, journal = {Review of industrial organization}, number = {3}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Dordrecht}, issn = {0889-938X}, doi = {10.1007/s11151-018-9653-9}, pages = {575 -- 593}, year = {2018}, abstract = {This paper presents an experiment on the effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes on buyers' repeated purchase decisions. Such schemes promise buyers a reduced price for all units that are bought in a certain time frame if the total quantity that is purchased passes a given threshold. This study finds a loyalty-enhancing effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes only if the buyers ex-ante expected that entering into the scheme would maximize their monetary gain, but later learn that they should leave the scheme. Furthermore, the effect crucially hinges on the framing of the price reduction.}, language = {en} } @article{Bruttel2018, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena}, title = {The Limits of Buyer Power}, series = {Review of Behavioral Economics}, volume = {5}, journal = {Review of Behavioral Economics}, number = {2}, publisher = {Now Publishers inc.}, address = {Hannover}, issn = {2326-6198}, doi = {10.1561/105.00000082}, pages = {149 -- 167}, year = {2018}, abstract = {This paper studies the behavior of buyers confronting an incumbent monopolist and a potential market entrant in a repeated trade situation. In the experiment, buyers have two possibilities to demand lower prices in future trade periods. First, they can withhold demand. Second, they can voluntarily pay a higher price to the entrant in order to encourage future re-entry. Both these forms of buyer behavior occur in the experiment. They are less frequent when the number of buyers is large as opposed to small. A control treatment tests to what extent such behavior can be attributed to strategic motives.}, language = {en} } @article{BruttelFriehe2014, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Friehe, Tim}, title = {Can short-term incentives induce long-lasting cooperation? Results from a public-goods experiment}, series = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics}, volume = {53}, journal = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics}, publisher = {Elsevier}, address = {New York}, issn = {2214-8043}, doi = {10.1016/j.socec.2014.09.001}, pages = {120 -- 130}, year = {2014}, abstract = {This paper investigates whether providing strong cooperation incentives only at the outset of a group interaction spills over to later periods to ensure cooperation in the long run. We study a repeated linear public-good game with punishment opportunities and a parameter change after the first ten (of twenty) rounds. Our data shows that cooperation among subjects who had experienced a higher marginal return on public-good contributions or low punishment costs in rounds 1-10 rapidly deteriorated in rounds 11-20 once these incentives were removed, eventually trending below the level of cooperation in the control group. This suggests the possibility of temporary incentives backfiring in the long run. This paper ties in with the literature highlighting the potentially adverse effects of the use of incentives. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.}, language = {en} } @article{BruttelFriehe2015, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Friehe, Tim}, title = {A note on making humans randomize}, series = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics}, volume = {58}, journal = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics}, publisher = {Elsevier}, address = {New York}, issn = {2214-8043}, doi = {10.1016/j.socec.2015.06.008}, pages = {40 -- 45}, year = {2015}, abstract = {This note presents results from an experiment studying a two person 4 4 pure coordination game. We explore different strategy labels in an attempt to implement the mixed strategy equilibrium that selects all four strategies with equal probability. Such strategy labels must be free from salient properties that might be used by participants to coordinate. Testing 23 different sets of strategy labels, we identify two sets that produce a distribution of subjects' choices which approximate the uniform distribution quite well. Our results are relevant for studies intending to compare the behavior of subjects who play against a random mechanism with that of participants who play against human counterparts.}, language = {en} } @article{BruttelGueth2018, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Gueth, Werner}, title = {Asymmetric voluntary cooperation}, series = {International Journal of Game Theory}, volume = {47}, journal = {International Journal of Game Theory}, number = {3}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Heidelberg}, issn = {0020-7276}, doi = {10.1007/s00182-018-0633-y}, pages = {873 -- 891}, year = {2018}, abstract = {This paper tests the robustness of voluntary cooperation in a sequential best shot game, a public good game in which the maximal contribution determines the level of public good provision. Thus, efficiency enhancing voluntary cooperation requires asymmetric behavior whose coordination is more difficult. Nevertheless, we find robust cooperation irrespective of treatment-specific institutional obstacles. To explain this finding, we distinguish three behavioral patterns aiming at both, voluntary cooperation and (immediate) payoff equality.}, language = {en} } @article{HalbrueggeBanerjiMeerholz2022, author = {Halbr{\"u}gge, Lena and Banerji, Amitabh and Meerholz, Klaus}, title = {Hallo Zukunft!}, series = {Chemie konkret : CHEMKON ; Forum f{\"u}r Unterricht und Didaktik}, volume = {29}, journal = {Chemie konkret : CHEMKON ; Forum f{\"u}r Unterricht und Didaktik}, number = {51}, publisher = {Wiley-VCH}, address = {Weinheim}, issn = {0944-5846}, doi = {10.1002/ckon.202200030}, pages = {355 -- 361}, year = {2022}, abstract = {Gedruckte Elektronik ist nicht nur ein aufstrebendes Forschungsfeld, sie wird in naher Zukunft auch eine wesentliche Rolle in unserem Alltag spielen. Gedruckte, elektronische Bauteile k{\"o}nnen sehr d{\"u}nn und flexibel sein und somit vielf{\"a}ltig eingesetzt werden. F{\"u}r die Implementation in der (Hoch-)Schule haben die Autoren eine flexible, lichtemittierende Folie entwickelt, die mit einfachen Materialien und Methoden manuell gedruckt werden kann.}, language = {de} } @phdthesis{Hebisch2021, author = {Hebisch, Benjamin}, title = {Power in supply chain negotiations: a two-stage approach}, series = {Schriftenreihe zum Verhandlungsmanagement ; Band 15}, journal = {Schriftenreihe zum Verhandlungsmanagement ; Band 15}, publisher = {Kovac}, address = {Hamburg}, isbn = {978-3-339-12400-5}, school = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {XXX,106}, year = {2021}, abstract = {Negotiations between buyers and suppliers directly influence a company's costs, revenue, and consequently its profits. The outcome of these negotiations relies heavily on the companies' as well as the negotiators' power position. Across three empirical articles the author demonstrates how the own power position can first be identified as well as improved and subsequently used to maximize profits in negotiations between sellers and buyers. In the first paper the sources underlying buyer and supplier power are identified and weighted. The results of the first paper show the impact of each single sources on the buyer and supplier power. The number of suppliers available for one product is by far the most important source of power for both sides. The results indicate that a higher number of suppliers leads to a better power position of the buyer and simultaneously to an inferior power position of a single supplier. The second paper aims to examine the impact of the number of suppliers on the outcome of buyer-seller-negotiations thereby considering the innovation level of the products purchased. The results of the second study which are based on real negotiation data from a German car manufacturer indicate that the number of available suppliers has a stronger impact on the negotiation outcome for innovative than for functional, less innovative products. The third paper analyzes how the ability to take the counterpart's perspective (perspective taking ability) influences the negotiation outcome. This relationship is examined for different power positions. The results indicate that a negotiator's high perspective taking ability leads to a more unfavorable negotiation outcome compared to low perspective taking ability. Simultaneously, high perspective taking ability causes a more positive perception of the conducted negotiation than low perspective taking ability. This contradictory effect of perspective taking ability bears the risk for buyers and suppliers to assess an unfavorable outcome as positive. Finally, the results of the papers are summarized and discussed. The dissertation concludes with implications for practice, limitations of the work, and approaches for future research.}, language = {en} } @article{KritikosTan2016, author = {Kritikos, Alexander and Tan, Jonathan H. W.}, title = {Influence in the face of impunity}, series = {Economics letters}, volume = {141}, journal = {Economics letters}, publisher = {Elsevier}, address = {Lausanne}, issn = {0165-1765}, doi = {10.1016/j.econlet.2016.02.020}, pages = {119 -- 121}, year = {2016}, abstract = {We compare dictator and impunity games. In impunity games, responders can reject offers but to no payoff consequence to proposers. Because proposers act under impunity, we should expect the same behavior across games, but experimentally observed behavior varies. Responders indeed exercise the rejection option. This threat psychologically influences proposers. Some proposers avoid rejection by offering nothing. Others raise offers, but only when they receive feedback from responders. Responders lose this influence in the absence of feedback. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.}, language = {en} } @article{OrlandRostamAfschar2021, author = {Orland, Andreas and Rostam-Afschar, Davud}, title = {Flexible work arrangements and precautionary behavior}, series = {Journal of economic behavior \& organization}, volume = {191}, journal = {Journal of economic behavior \& organization}, publisher = {Elsevier}, address = {Amsterdam}, issn = {0167-2681}, doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2021.09.015}, pages = {442 -- 481}, year = {2021}, abstract = {In the past years, work-time in many industries has become more flexible, opening up a new channel for intertemporal substitution: workers might, instead of saving, adjust their work-time to smooth consumption. To study this channel, we set up a two-period consumption/saving model with wage uncertainty. This extends the standard saving model by also allowing a worker to allocate a fixed time budget between two work-shifts. To test the comparative statics implied by these two different channels, we conduct a laboratory experiment. A novel feature of our experiments is that we tie income to a real-effort style task. In four treatments, we turn on and off the two channels for consumption smoothing: saving and time allocation. Our main finding is that savings are strictly positive for at least 85 percent of subjects. We find that a majority of subjects also uses time allocation to smooth consumption and use saving and time shifting as substitutes, though not perfect substitutes. Part of the observed heterogeneity of precautionary behavior can be explained by risk preferences and motivations different from expected utility maximization. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.}, language = {en} }