@article{vonKalckreuth2020,
  author    = {von Kalckreuth, Moritz},
  title     = {Allt{\"a}gliche Lebenswirklichkeit und ontologische Theorie},
  series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung},
  volume    = {68},
  journal   = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {De Gruyter},
  address   = {Berlin},
  issn      = {0012-1045},
  doi       = {10.1515/dzph-2020-0017},
  pages     = {275 -- 287},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {The aim of this paper is to discuss the relation between our experience in everyday life and ontological reflection. While many accounts in contemporary ontology still defend the idea that the world consists only of material objects, some new views on everyday metaphysics or social ontology which try to articulate the specific properties of the objects used and found in ordinary life have been established during the last years. In the critical ontology of Nicolai Hartmann, the social and cultural dimension of our life is situated in the sphere of spiritual being [Geistiges Sein]. By investigating the methodical relation of phenomenology and critical ontology as well as specific entities (objective spirit, cultural objects), it is established that Hartmann offers a wide and methodologically reflected view which could be able to satisfy the practical significance of these entities.},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{GodessRiccitelli2017,
  author    = {Godess-Riccitelli, Moran},
  title     = {The final end of imagination},
  series = {Filosofia unisinos},
  volume    = {18},
  journal   = {Filosofia unisinos},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos},
  address   = {S{\~a}o Leopoldo},
  issn      = {1519-5023},
  doi       = {10.4013/fsu.2017.182.05},
  pages     = {107 -- 115},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {One main quandary that emerges in the context of Immanuel Kant's moral ideal, The Highest Good, is that on the one hand Kant sets it as a moral demand, that is, as a principle that must be comprehended as an attainable end for man in practice while, on the other hand, it is set as a moral ideal, i.e. as something that cannot be concretized and realized within the empirical world. The main goal of this paper is to argue for the realizability of the moral ideal by means of the principle of reflective judgment as a form of judgment that in fact clarifies human limitation. I assert that the very recognition of this limitation constitutes the possibility for hope in that ideal, or for striving towards it, and that this striving is the only way that the moral ideal can be concretized. I examine man's recognition of self-limitation as a response to the moral demand to realize the moral ideal and the necessity of the power of imagination for this, used reflectively.},
  language  = {en}
}