@phdthesis{Lange2018,
  author    = {Lange, Anne},
  title     = {On a small scale},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {337},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {This study argues that micro relations matter in peacekeeping. Asking what makes the implementation of peacekeeping interventions complex and how complexity is resolved, I find that formal, contractual mechanisms only rarely effectively reduce complexity - and that micro relations fill this gap. Micro relations are personal relationships resulting from frequent face-to-face interaction in professional and - equally importantly - social contexts. This study offers an explanation as to why micro relations are important for coping with complexity, in the form of a causal mechanism. For this purpose, I bring together theoretical and empirical knowledge: I draw upon the current debate on 'institutional complexity' (Greenwood et al. 2011) in organizational institutionalism as well as original empirical evidence from a within-case study of the peacekeeping intervention in Haiti, gained in ten weeks of field research. In this study, scholarship on institutional complexity serves to identify theoretical causal channels which guide empirical analysis. An additional, secondary aim is pursued with this mechanism-centered approach: testing the utility of Beach and Pedersen's (2013) theory-testing process tracing. Regarding the first research question - what makes the implementation of peacekeeping interventions complex -, the central finding is that complexity manifests itself in the dual role of organizations as cooperation partners and competitors for (scarce) resources, turf and influence. UN organizations, donor agencies and international NGOs implementing peacekeeping activities in post-conflict environments have chronic difficulty mastering both roles because they entail contradictory demands: effective cooperation requires information exchange, resource and responsibility-sharing as well as external scrutiny, whereas prevailing over competitors demands that organizations conceal information, guard resources, increase relative turf and influence, as well as shield themselves from scrutiny. Competition fuels organizational distrust and friction - and impedes cooperation. How is this complexity resolved? The answer to this second research question is that deep-seated organizational competition is routinely mediated - and cooperation motivated - in micro relations and micro interaction. Regular, frequent face-to-face interaction between individual organizational members generates social resources that help to transcend organizational distrust and conflict, most importantly familiarity with each other, personal trust and belief in reciprocity. Furthermore, informal conflict mediation and control mechanisms - namely, open discussion, mutual monitoring in direct interaction and social exclusion - enhance solidarity and mutual support.},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Bombart2020,
  author    = {Bombart, Diane},
  title     = {The geometry of a complex institution},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-48872},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-488724},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {181},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {Organizations incorporate the institutional demands from their environment in order to be deemed legitimate and survive. Yet, complexifying societies promulgate multiple and sometimes inconsistent institutional prescriptions. When these prescriptions collide, organizations are said to face "institutional complexity". How does an organization then incorporate incompatible demands? What are the consequences of institutional complexity for an organization? The literature provides contradictory conceptual and empirical insights on the matter. A central assumption, however, remains that internal incompatibilities generate tensions that, under certain conditions, can escalate into intractable conflicts, resulting in dysfunctionality and loss of legitimacy. The present research is an inquiry into what happens inside an organization when it incorporates complex institutional demands. To answer this question, I focus on how individuals inside an organization interpret a complex institutional prescription. I examine how members of the French Development Agency interpret 'results-based management', a central but complex concept of organizing in the field of development aid. I use an inductive mixed methods design to systematically explore how different interpretations of results-based management relate to one another and to the organizational context in which they are embedded. The results reveal that results-based management is a contested concept in the French Development Agency. I find multiple interpretations of the concept, which are attached to partly incompatible rationales about "who we are" and "what we do as an organization". These rationales nevertheless coexist as balanced forces, without escalating into open conflict. The analysis points to four reasons for this peaceful coexistence of diverging rationales inside one and the same organization: 1) individuals' capacity to manipulate different interpretations of a complex institutional demand, 2) the nature of interpretations, which makes them more or less prone to conflict, 3) the balanced distribution of rationales across the organizational sub-contexts and 4) the shared rules of interpretation provided by the larger socio-cultural context. This research shows that an organization that incorporates institutional complexity comes to represent different, partly incompatible things to its members without being at war with itself. In doing so, it contributes to our knowledge of institutional complexity and organizational hybridity. It also advances our understanding of internal organizational legitimacy and of the translation of managerial concepts in organizations.},
  language  = {en}
}