@article{KornherKalkuhl2019,
  author    = {Kornher, Lukas and Kalkuhl, Matthias},
  title     = {The gains of coordination - When does regional cooperation for food security make sense?},
  series = {Global Food Security - AGRICULTURE POLICY ECONOMICS AND ENVIRONMENT},
  volume    = {22},
  journal   = {Global Food Security - AGRICULTURE POLICY ECONOMICS AND ENVIRONMENT},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {Amsterdam},
  issn      = {2211-9124},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.gfs.2019.09.004},
  pages     = {37 -- 45},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {With the onset of the global food crisis, the discussion about the use and misuse of agricultural market interventions regained academic attention. As a result of economies of scale, centralized policy implementation at the regional level has the potential to reduce the budgetary costs of policies. Borrowing from the literature on international unions and international policy coordination, we develop a conceptual framework to analyze when regional policy implementation makes sense. This is the case whenever spill-overs from centralization are large and policy preferences, driven by country-specific characteristics, are homogeneous. Subsequently, we examine the advantageousness of centralized policy implementation for the West African region regarding the most common food security policies. We show that centralization of trade policies and emergency food reserves is beneficial, while buffer stocks, safety net policies, and producer support policies should be implemented at the national level.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{KozickaWeberKalkuhl2019,
  author    = {Kozicka, Marta and Weber, Regine and Kalkuhl, Matthias},
  title     = {Cash vs. in-kind transfers},
  series = {Food Security},
  volume    = {11},
  journal   = {Food Security},
  number    = {4},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {New York},
  issn      = {1876-4517},
  doi       = {10.1007/s12571-019-00942-x},
  pages     = {915 -- 927},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {Historically, India has relied on subsidizing staple food as a major instrument in improving food security. Recently, however, cash transfers have entered the debate as an alternative, as they are associated with lower market distortions, leakages and fiscal costs. This study contributes to this debate by analyzing India's Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS). Our main objective was to explain the under-purchase, or low take-up, from the TPDS, which is typically attributed to 'leakage', i.e. the diversion of food grains from eligible consumers. We provide an alternative solution based on self-targeting; while poorer households increase their consumption from the TPDS, wealthier households restrain from consuming subsidized commodities. Using a large household dataset, we estimated that such a voluntary opt-out system, based on income, would save a minimum of 6.5\% of grains released through the TPDS. Besides these demand-driven aspects, our analysis indicates that poor regions perform better at lowering the diversion of grains and that large targeting errors exist among female-led households. Finally, we find substantial regional price differences that would benefit the poor and rural population under a uniform cash-transfer system that does not correct for regional price levels.},
  language  = {en}
}