@article{CaliendoCobbClarkHenneckeetal.2019, author = {Caliendo, Marco and Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. and Hennecke, Juliane and Uhlendorff, Arne}, title = {Locus of control and internal migration}, series = {Regional science and urban economics}, volume = {79}, journal = {Regional science and urban economics}, publisher = {Elsevier}, address = {Amsterdam}, issn = {0166-0462}, doi = {10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2019.103468}, pages = {19}, year = {2019}, abstract = {We model migration across domestic labor markets (internal migration) as the outcome of a job search process in which job seekers form subjective beliefs about the return search effort that are related to their locus of control. Job seekers with an internal locus of control are predicted to search across larger geographic areas and migrate more frequently as a result. We empirically test the relationship between locus of control and the propensity to migrate using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). We find that not only do individuals with an internal locus of control express more willingness to migrate, they do in fact also migrate more often.}, language = {en} } @article{CaliendoCobbClarkObstetal.2022, author = {Caliendo, Marco and Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. and Obst, Cosima and Seitz, Helke and Uhlendorff, Arne}, title = {Locus of control and investment in training}, series = {Journal of human resources}, volume = {57}, journal = {Journal of human resources}, number = {4}, publisher = {University of Wisconsin Press}, address = {Madison}, issn = {0022-166X}, doi = {10.3368/jhr.57.4.0318-9377R2}, pages = {1311 -- 1349}, year = {2022}, abstract = {We extend standard models of work-related training by explicitly incorporating workers' locus of control into the investment decision through the returns they expect. Our model predicts that higher internal control results in increased take-up of general, but not specific, training. This prediction is empirically validated using data from the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP). We provide empirical evidence that locus of control influences participation in training through its effect on workers' expectations about future wage increases rather than actual wage increases. Our results provide an important explanation for underinvestment in training and suggest that those with an external sense of control may require additional training support.}, language = {en} } @article{CaliendoCobbClarkObstetal.2022, author = {Caliendo, Marco and Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. and Obst, Cosima and Uhlendorff, Arne}, title = {Risk preferences and training investments}, series = {Journal of economic behavior \& organization}, volume = {205}, journal = {Journal of economic behavior \& organization}, publisher = {Elsevier}, address = {Amsterdam}, issn = {0167-2681}, doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2022.11.024}, pages = {668 -- 686}, year = {2022}, abstract = {We analyze workers' risk preferences and training investments. Our conceptual framework differentiates between the investment risk and insurance mechanisms underpinning training decisions. Investment risk leads risk-averse workers to train less; they undertake more training if it insures them against future losses. We use the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) to demonstrate that risk affinity is associated with more training, implying that, on average, investment risks dominate the insurance benefits of training. Crucially, this relationship is evident only for general training; there is no relationship between risk attitudes and specific training. Thus, consistent with our conceptual framework, risk preferences matter more when skills are transferable - and workers have a vested interest in training outcomes - than when they are not. Finally, we provide evidence that the insurance benefits of training are concentrated among workers with uncertain employment relationships or limited access to public insurance schemes.}, language = {en} } @techreport{CaliendoCobbClarkObstetal.2020, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Caliendo, Marco and Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. and Obst, Cosima and Uhlendorff, Arne}, title = {Risk Preferences and Training Investments}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {23}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-48092}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-480927}, pages = {35}, year = {2020}, abstract = {We analyze workers' risk preferences and training investments. Our conceptual framework differentiates between the investment risk and insurance mechanisms underpinning training decisions. Investment risk leads risk-averse workers to train less; they undertake more training if it insures them against future losses. We use the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) to demonstrate that risk affinity is associated with more training, implying that, on average, investment risks dominate the insurance benefits of training. Crucially, this relationship is evident only for general training; there is no relationship between risk attitudes and specific training. Thus, as expected, risk preferences matter more when skills are transferable - and workers have a vested interest in training outcomes - than when they are not. Finally, we provide evidence that the insurance benefits of training are concentrated among workers with uncertain employment relationships or limited access to public insurance schemes.}, language = {en} } @article{CaliendoCobbClarkPfeiferetal.2023, author = {Caliendo, Marco and Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. and Pfeifer, Harald and Uhlendorff, Arne and Wehner, Caroline}, title = {Managers' risk preferences and firm training investments}, series = {European economic review}, journal = {European economic review}, publisher = {Elsevier}, address = {Amsterdam}, issn = {0014-2921}, doi = {10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104616}, pages = {36}, year = {2023}, abstract = {This study analyses the impact of managers' risk preferences on their training allocation decisions. We begin by providing nationally representative evidence that managers' risk-aversion is negatively correlated with the likelihood that their firms engage in any worker training. Using a novel vignette study, we then demonstrate that risk-tolerant and risk-averse decision makers have significantly different training preferences. Risk aversion results in increased sensitivity to turnover risk. Managers who are risk-averse offer less general training and are more reluctant to train workers with a history of job mobility. Adopting a weighting approach to flexibly control for observed differences in the characteristics of risk-averse and risk-tolerant managers, we show that our findings cannot be explained by heterogeneity in either managers' observed characteristics or the type of firms where they work. All managers, irrespective of their risk preferences, are sensitive to the investment risk associated with training, avoiding training that is more costly or that targets those with less occupational expertise or nearing retirement. This provides suggestive evidence that the risks of training are primarily due to the risk that trained workers will leave the firm (turnover risk) rather than the risk that the benefits of training do not outweigh the costs (investment risk).}, language = {en} } @techreport{CaliendoCobbClarkPfeiferetal.2022, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Caliendo, Marco and Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. and Pfeifer, Harald and Uhlendorff, Arne and Wehner, Caroline}, title = {Managers' Risk Preferences and Firm Training Investments}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {44}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-53843}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-538439}, pages = {45}, year = {2022}, abstract = {We provide the first estimates of the impact of managers' risk preferences on their training allocation decisions. Our conceptual framework links managers' risk preferences to firms' training decisions through the bonuses they expect to receive. Risk-averse managers are expected to select workers with low turnover risk and invest in specific rather than general training. Empirical evidence supporting these predictions is provided using a novel vignette study embedded in a nationally representative survey of firm managers. Risk-tolerant and risk-averse decision makers have significantly different training preferences. Risk aversion results in increased sensitivity to turnover risk. Managers who are risk-averse offer significantly less general training and, in some cases, are more reluctant to train workers with a history of job mobility. All managers, irrespective of their risk preferences, are sensitive to the investment risk associated with training, avoiding training that is more costly or targets those with less occupational expertise or nearing retirement. This suggests the risks of training are primarily due to the risk that trained workers will leave the firm (turnover risk) rather than the risk that the benefits of training do not outweigh the costs (investment risk).}, language = {en} } @techreport{CaliendoCobbClarkSilvaGoncalvesetal.2023, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Caliendo, Marco and Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. and Silva-Goncalves, Juliana and Uhlendorff, Arne}, title = {Locus of control and the preference for agency}, series = {IZA discussion paper}, volume = {No. 16061}, journal = {IZA discussion paper}, publisher = {Elsevier}, address = {Amsterdam}, issn = {2365-9793}, doi = {10.2139/ssrn.4416820}, pages = {49}, year = {2023}, abstract = {We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how locus of control operates through people's preferences and beliefs to influence their decisions. Using the principal-agent setting of the delegation game, we test four key channels that conceptually link locus of control to decision-making: (i) preference for agency; (ii) optimism and (iii) confidence regarding the return to effort; and (iv) illusion of control. Knowing the return and cost of stated effort, principals either retain or delegate the right to make an investment decision that generates payoffs for themselves and their agents. Extending the game to the context in which the return to stated effort is unknown allows us to explicitly study the relationship between locus of control and beliefs about the return to effort. We find that internal locus of control is linked to the preference for agency, an effect that is driven by women. We find no evidence that locus of control influences optimism and confidence about the return to stated effort, or that it operates through an illusion of control.}, language = {en} } @article{CaliendoCobbClarkUhlendorff2015, author = {Caliendo, Marco and Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. and Uhlendorff, Arne}, title = {Locus of control and job search strategies}, series = {The review of economics and statistics}, volume = {97}, journal = {The review of economics and statistics}, number = {1}, publisher = {MIT Press}, address = {Cambridge}, issn = {0034-6535}, doi = {10.1162/REST_a_00459}, pages = {88 -- 103}, year = {2015}, abstract = {Standard job search theory assumes that unemployed individuals have perfect information about the effect of their search effort on the job offer arrival rate. We present an alternative model that assumes that each individual has a subjective belief about the impact of her search effort on the job arrival. These beliefs depend in part on an individual's locus of control. We estimate the impact of locus of control on job search behavior using a data set of newly unemployed individuals in Germany. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, we find evidence that individuals with an internal locus of control search more and that individuals who believe that their future outcomes are determined by external factors have lower reservation wages.}, language = {en} } @article{CaliendoKuennUhlendorff2016, author = {Caliendo, Marco and K{\"u}nn, Steffen and Uhlendorff, Arne}, title = {Earnings exemptions for unemployed workers: The relationship between marginal employment, unemployment duration and job quality}, series = {Labour economics : an international journal}, volume = {42}, journal = {Labour economics : an international journal}, publisher = {Elsevier}, address = {Amsterdam}, issn = {0927-5371}, doi = {10.1016/j.labeco.2016.07.003}, pages = {177 -- 193}, year = {2016}, abstract = {In some countries including Germany unemployed workers can increase their income by working a few hours per week. The intention is to keep unemployed job seekers attached to the labour market and to increase their job-finding probabilities. To analyze the unemployment dynamics of job seekers with and without marginal employment, we consider an inflow sample into unemployment and estimate multivariate duration models. While we do not find any significant impact on the job finding probability in a model with homogeneous effects, models allowing for time-varying coefficients indicate a decreased job finding probability of marginal employment at the beginning of the unemployment spell and an increased job finding probability for the long-term unemployed. Our results suggest that job seekers with marginal employment find more stable post-unemployment jobs, and we find some evidence that the relationship between marginal employment and wages and employment stability varies with respect to skill levels, sector and labor market tightness. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.}, language = {en} } @article{CaliendoTatsiramosUhlendorff2013, author = {Caliendo, Marco and Tatsiramos, Konstantinos and Uhlendorff, Arne}, title = {Benefit duration, unemployment duration and job match quality aregression-discontinuity approach}, series = {Journal of applied econometrics}, volume = {28}, journal = {Journal of applied econometrics}, number = {4}, publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell}, address = {Hoboken}, issn = {0883-7252}, doi = {10.1002/jae.2293}, pages = {604 -- 627}, year = {2013}, abstract = {We use a sharp discontinuity in the maximum duration of benefit entitlement to identify the effect of extended benefit duration on unemployment duration and post-unemployment outcomes (employment stability and re-employment wages). We address dynamic selection, which may arise even under an initially random assignment to treatment, estimating a bivariate discrete-time hazard model jointly with a wage equation and correlated unobservables. Owing to the non-stationarity of job search behavior, we find heterogeneous effects of extended benefit duration on the re-employment hazard and on job match quality. Our results suggest that the unemployed who find a job close to and after benefit exhaustion experience less stable employment patterns and receive lower re-employment wages compared to their counterparts who receive extended benefits and exit unemployment in the same period. These results are found to be significant for men but not for women.}, language = {en} }