@phdthesis{vonKaphengst2019,
  author    = {von Kaphengst, Dragana},
  title     = {Project's management quality in development cooperation},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-43099},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-430992},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {xvii, 237},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {In light of the debate on the consequences of competitive contracting out of traditionally public services, this research compares two mechanisms used to allocate funds in development cooperation—direct awarding and competitive contracting out—aiming to identify their potential advantages and disadvantages. The agency theory is applied within the framework of rational-choice institutionalism to study the institutional arrangements that surround two different money allocation mechanisms, identify the incentives they create for the behavior of individual actors in the field, and examine how these then transfer into measurable differences in managerial quality of development aid projects. In this work, project management quality is seen as an important determinant of the overall project success. For data-gathering purposes, the German development agency, the Gesellschaft f{\"u}r Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), is used due to its unique way of work. Whereas the majority of projects receive funds via direct-award mechanism, there is a commercial department, GIZ International Services (GIZ IS) that has to compete for project funds. The data concerning project management practices on the GIZ and GIZ IS projects was gathered via a web-based, self-administered survey of project team leaders. Principal component analysis was applied to reduce the dimensionality of the independent variable to total of five components of project management. Furthermore, multiple regression analysis identified the differences between the separate components on these two project types. Enriched by qualitative data gathered via interviews, this thesis offers insights into everyday managerial practices in development cooperation and identifies the advantages and disadvantages of the two allocation mechanisms. The thesis first reiterates the responsibility of donors and implementers for overall aid effectiveness. It shows that the mechanism of competitive contracting out leads to better oversight and control of implementers, fosters deeper cooperation between the implementers and beneficiaries, and has a potential to strengthen ownership of recipient countries. On the other hand, it shows that the evaluation quality does not tremendously benefit from the competitive allocation mechanism and that the quality of the component knowledge management and learning is better when direct-award mechanisms are used. This raises questions about the lacking possibilities of actors in the field to learn about past mistakes and incorporate the finings into the future interventions, which is one of the fundamental issues of aid effectiveness. Finally, the findings show immense deficiencies in regard to oversight and control of individual projects in German development cooperation.},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Schindler2021,
  author    = {Schindler, Eva Marie},
  title     = {"What we have done is just to put the people in form of a structure"},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {XIV, 288},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Participation has become an orthodoxy in the field of development, an essential element of projects and programmes. This book analyses participation in development interventions as an institutionalised expectation - a rationalized myth - and examines how organisations on different levels of government process it. At least two different objectives of participation are appropriate and legitimate for international organisations in the field: the empowerment of local beneficiaries and the achievement of programme goals. Both integrate participatory forums into the organisational logic of development interventions. Local administrations react to the institutionalised expectation with means-ends decoupling, where participatory forums are implemented superficially but de facto remain marginalised in local administrative processes and activities. The book furthermore provides a thick description of the organisationality of participation in development interventions. Participatory forums are shown to be a form of partial organisation. They establish an order in the relationship between administrations and citizens through the introduction of rules and the creation of a defined membership. At the same time, this order is found to be fragile and subject to criticism and negotiation.},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Ehrke2011,
  author    = {Ehrke, J{\"u}rgen},
  title     = {Zur Stabilisierung fragmentierter Staaten},
  publisher = {Universit{\"a}tsverlag Potsdam},
  address   = {Potsdam},
  isbn      = {978-3-86956-155-4},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-53975},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {366},
  year      = {2011},
  abstract  = {Die internationale Staatengemeinschaft steht Sezessionsbestrebungen zur Aufspaltung bestehender Staaten gew{\"o}hnlich ablehnend gegen{\"u}ber. Gleichzeitig wendet sie in vielen L{\"a}ndern Instrumente der Entwicklungspolitik an und greift so auch in den dortigen politischen Prozess ein. Untersucht wird, inwiefern Entwicklungspolitik so gestaltet werden kann, dass sie nicht, quasi als Nebenwirkung, einer Sezessionsbewegung zum Durchbruch verhilft. Betrachtet wird dabei neben der gezielten F{\"o}rderung wirtschaftlichen Wachstums auch das Instrument der Dezentralisierung, das oft als Mittel zur „Beruhigung" separatistischer Bestrebungen vorgeschlagen wird. Zuvor jedoch wird aufgewiesen, dass eine Politik, die Sezessionen verhindern will, zumindest in vielen F{\"a}llen auch moralphilosophisch schl{\"u}ssig begr{\"u}ndet werden kann. Den Abschluss der Arbeit bilden drei Fallstudien zu Sezessionen auf dem Gebiet der ehemaligen Sowjetunion.},
  language  = {de}
}
@phdthesis{Bombart2020,
  author    = {Bombart, Diane},
  title     = {The geometry of a complex institution},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-48872},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-488724},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {181},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {Organizations incorporate the institutional demands from their environment in order to be deemed legitimate and survive. Yet, complexifying societies promulgate multiple and sometimes inconsistent institutional prescriptions. When these prescriptions collide, organizations are said to face "institutional complexity". How does an organization then incorporate incompatible demands? What are the consequences of institutional complexity for an organization? The literature provides contradictory conceptual and empirical insights on the matter. A central assumption, however, remains that internal incompatibilities generate tensions that, under certain conditions, can escalate into intractable conflicts, resulting in dysfunctionality and loss of legitimacy. The present research is an inquiry into what happens inside an organization when it incorporates complex institutional demands. To answer this question, I focus on how individuals inside an organization interpret a complex institutional prescription. I examine how members of the French Development Agency interpret 'results-based management', a central but complex concept of organizing in the field of development aid. I use an inductive mixed methods design to systematically explore how different interpretations of results-based management relate to one another and to the organizational context in which they are embedded. The results reveal that results-based management is a contested concept in the French Development Agency. I find multiple interpretations of the concept, which are attached to partly incompatible rationales about "who we are" and "what we do as an organization". These rationales nevertheless coexist as balanced forces, without escalating into open conflict. The analysis points to four reasons for this peaceful coexistence of diverging rationales inside one and the same organization: 1) individuals' capacity to manipulate different interpretations of a complex institutional demand, 2) the nature of interpretations, which makes them more or less prone to conflict, 3) the balanced distribution of rationales across the organizational sub-contexts and 4) the shared rules of interpretation provided by the larger socio-cultural context. This research shows that an organization that incorporates institutional complexity comes to represent different, partly incompatible things to its members without being at war with itself. In doing so, it contributes to our knowledge of institutional complexity and organizational hybridity. It also advances our understanding of internal organizational legitimacy and of the translation of managerial concepts in organizations.},
  language  = {en}
}