@article{DijkstraDebreHeinkelmannWild2023, author = {Dijkstra, Hylke and Debre, Maria Josepha and Heinkelmann-Wild, Tim}, title = {Governance abhors a vacuum}, series = {The British journal of politics \& international relations}, journal = {The British journal of politics \& international relations}, publisher = {Sage}, address = {London}, issn = {1369-1481}, doi = {10.1177/13691481231202642}, pages = {20}, year = {2023}, abstract = {International organisations have become increasingly contested resulting in worries about their decline and termination. While international organisation termination is indeed a regular event in international relations, this article shows that other institutions carry the legacy of terminated international organisations. We develop the novel concept of international organisation afterlife and suggest indicators to systematically assess it. Our analysis of 26 major terminated international organisations reveals legal-institutional and asset continuity in 21 cases. To further illustrate this point, the article zooms in on the afterlife of the International Institute of Agriculture in the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Refugee Organization in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the Western European Union in the European Union. In these three cases, international organisation afterlife inspired and structured the design of their successor institutions. While specific international organisations might be terminated, international cooperation therefore often lives on in other institutions.}, language = {en} } @article{Heinzel2022, author = {Heinzel, Mirko Noa}, title = {Mediating power?}, series = {The British journal of politics \& international relations : BJPIR}, volume = {24}, journal = {The British journal of politics \& international relations : BJPIR}, number = {1}, publisher = {Sage}, address = {London}, issn = {1467-856X}, doi = {10.1177/1369148121992761}, pages = {153 -- 170}, year = {2022}, abstract = {The selection of the executive heads of international organisations represents a key decision in the politics of international organisations. However, we know little about what dynamics influence this selection. The article focuses on the nationality of selected executive heads. It argues that institutional design impacts the factors that influence leadership selection by shaping the costs and benefits of attaining the position for member states' nationals. The argument is tested with novel data on the nationality of individuals in charge of 69 international organisation bureaucracies between 1970 and 2017. Two findings stand out: first, powerful countries are more able to secure positions in international organisations in which executive heads are voted in by majority voting. Second, less consistent evidence implies that powerful countries secure more positions when bureaucracies are authoritative. The findings have implications for debates on international cooperation by illustrating how power and institutions interact in the selection of international organisation executive heads.}, language = {en} } @article{BuschHeinzelKempkenetal.2020, author = {Busch, Per-Olof and Heinzel, Mirko Noa and Kempken, Mathies and Liese, Andrea}, title = {Mind the gap?}, series = {Journal of comparative policy analysis : research and practice}, volume = {24}, journal = {Journal of comparative policy analysis : research and practice}, number = {3}, publisher = {Taylor \& Francis}, address = {London}, issn = {1387-6988}, doi = {10.1080/13876988.2020.1820866}, pages = {230 -- 253}, year = {2020}, abstract = {Many authors have argued that International Public Administration can influence policy-making through their expert authority. The article compares de jure and de facto expert authority of IPAs to evaluate their conformity. It comparatively assesses the two kinds of authority for five important IPAs (BIS, FAO, IMF, OECD and World Bank) active in agriculture or financial policy. It shows that, on average, de jure and de facto authority seem to conform. At the same time, it demonstrates that gaps between de jure and de facto authority exist at the level of the IPAs, the policy areas and the IPAs' addressees}, language = {en} } @article{GehringDorschDoerfler2019, author = {Gehring, Thomas and Dorsch, Christian and D{\"o}rfler, Thomas}, title = {Precedent and doctrine in organisational decision-making}, series = {Journal of international relations and development}, volume = {22}, journal = {Journal of international relations and development}, number = {1}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, address = {Basingstoke}, issn = {1581-1980}, doi = {10.1057/s41268-017-0101-5}, pages = {107 -- 135}, year = {2019}, abstract = {We examine how and under what conditions informal institutional constraints, such as precedent and doctrine, are likely to affect collective choice within international organisations even in the absence of powerful bureaucratic agents. With a particular focus on the United Nations Security Council, we first develop a theoretical account of why such informal constraints might affect collective decisions even of powerful and strategically behaving actors. We show that precedents provide focal points that allow adopting collective decisions in coordination situations despite diverging preferences. Reliance on previous cases creates tacitly evolving doctrine that may develop incrementally. Council decision-making is also likely to be facilitated by an institutional logic of escalation driven by institutional constraints following from the typically staged response to crisis situations. We explore the usefulness of our theoretical argument with evidence from the Council doctrine on terrorism that has evolved since 1985. The key decisions studied include the 1992 sanctions resolution against Libya and the 2001 Council response to the 9/11 attacks. We conclude that, even within intergovernmentally structured international organisations, member states do not operate on a clean slate, but in a highly institutionalised environment that shapes their opportunities for action.}, language = {en} }