@article{TeerlingBernholtAsseburgetal.2019, author = {Teerling, Annika and Bernholt, Andrea and Asseburg, Regine and Hasl, Andrea and Igler, Jennifer and Schlitter, Theresa and Ohle-Peters, Annika and McElvany, Nele and K{\"o}ller, Olaf}, title = {Affektiv-kognitive Auseinandersetzung mit einer Innovation im Implementationsprozess}, series = {Psychologie in Erziehung und Unterricht : Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Forschung und Praxis}, volume = {66}, journal = {Psychologie in Erziehung und Unterricht : Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Forschung und Praxis}, number = {1}, publisher = {Reinhardt}, address = {M{\"u}nchen}, issn = {0342-183X}, doi = {10.2378/peu2018.art21d}, pages = {33 -- 50}, year = {2019}, abstract = {Schulische und vor allem unterrichtliche Implementationsprozesse zielen zumeist auf die Professionalisierung der Lehrkr{\"a}fte ab. Die intendierte Ver{\"a}nderung des Unterrichts beginnt dabei mit einer gew{\"u}nschten Ver{\"a}nderung von Einstellungen und Verhaltensweisen der Lehrkr{\"a}fte, welche erst zu einer ver{\"a}nderten Handlungsroutine in der Arbeitspraxis f{\"u}hren kann. Das Modell der Stages of Concern von Hall und Hord (2006) stellt eine der wenigen M{\"o}glichkeiten dar, die individuelle Perspektive der Lehrkr{\"a}fte im Implementationsprozess modellbasiert und standardisiert zu untersuchen. Der vorliegende Beitrag betrachtet anhand dieses Modells die affektiv-kognitive Auseinandersetzung der Beteiligten im Implementationsprozess sowie deren Zusammenh{\"a}nge mit verschiedenen Aspekten der Kommunikation und der wahrgenommenen Entwicklung. Auf Basis einer Stichprobe von N = 66 Lehrkr{\"a}ften kann dabei gezeigt werden, dass insbesondere die Aspekte H{\"a}ufigkeit der Kooperation, Kommunikation im Kollegium und Erfahrungen im Team die affektiv-kognitive Auseinandersetzung vorhersagen. Diese Auseinandersetzung - insbesondere mit den Konsequenzen der Neuerung - bedingt wiederum die wahrgenommene Entwicklung im Implementationsprozess.}, language = {de} } @techreport{AndresBruttelFriedrichsen2020, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Andres, Maximilian and Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Friedrichsen, Jana}, title = {Choosing between explicit cartel formation and tacit collusion - An experiment}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {19}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-47388}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-473885}, pages = {55}, year = {2020}, abstract = {Numerous studies investigate which sanctioning institutions prevent cartel formation but little is known as to how these sanctions work. We contribute to understanding the inner workings of cartels by studying experimentally the effect of sanctioning institutions on firms' communication. Using machine learning to organize the chat communication into topics, we find that firms are significantly less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing when sanctioning institutions are present. At the same time, average prices are lower when communication is less explicit. A mediation analysis suggests that sanctions are effective in hindering cartel formation not only because they introduce a risk of being fined but also by reducing the prevalence of explicit price communication.}, language = {en} } @techreport{AndresBruttel2024, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Andres, Maximilian and Bruttel, Lisa}, title = {Communicating Cartel Intentions}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {77}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-63846}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-638469}, pages = {36}, year = {2024}, abstract = {While the economic harm of cartels is caused by their price-increasing effect, sanctioning by courts rather targets at the underlying process of firms reaching a price-fixing agreement. This paper provides experimental evidence on the question whether such sanctioning meets the economic target, i.e., whether evidence of a collusive meeting of the firms and of the content of their communication reliably predicts subsequent prices. We find that already the mere mutual agreement to meet predicts a strong increase in prices. Conversely, express distancing from communication completely nullifies its otherwise price-increasing effect. Using machine learning, we show that communication only increases prices if it is very explicit about how the cartel plans to behave.}, language = {en} } @techreport{BruttelPetrishcheva2024, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Petrishcheva, Vasilisa}, title = {Does communication increase the precision of beliefs?}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {74}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-62936}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-629367}, pages = {1 -- 33}, year = {2024}, abstract = {In this paper, we study one channel through which communication may facilitate cooperative behavior - belief precision. In a prisoner's dilemma experiment, we show that communication not only makes individuals more optimistic that their partner will cooperate but also increases the precision of this belief, thereby reducing strategic uncertainty. To disentangle the shift in mean beliefs from the increase in precision, we elicit beliefs and precision in a two-stage procedure and in three situations: without communication, before communication, and after communication. We find that the precision of beliefs increases during communication.}, language = {en} } @techreport{Andres2024, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Andres, Maximilian}, title = {Equilibrium selection in infinitely repeated games with communication}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {75}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-63180}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-631800}, pages = {38}, year = {2024}, abstract = {The present paper proposes a novel approach for equilibrium selection in the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma where players can communicate before choosing their strategies. This approach yields a critical discount factor that makes different predictions for cooperation than the usually considered sub-game perfect or risk dominance critical discount factors. In laboratory experiments, we find that our factor is useful for predicting cooperation. For payoff changes where the usually considered factors and our factor make different predictions, the observed cooperation is consistent with the predictions based on our factor.}, language = {en} } @book{Wipper2011, author = {Wipper, Alexander}, title = {Flugverkehr und Risikodiskurs}, publisher = {Universit{\"a}tsverlag Potsdam}, address = {Potsdam}, isbn = {978-3-86956-136-3}, issn = {0934-716X}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-49533}, publisher = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {58}, year = {2011}, abstract = {F{\"u}r den Flugverkehr als Teil eines regional und global verdichteten Infrastruktursystems sind Naturgefahren wie Vulkanausbr{\"u}che gleichbedeutend mit Risiken. Die Kommunikation von Risiken verl{\"a}uft im Spannungsfeld von wirtschaftlichen und staatlichen Akteuren einerseits und Medien und Zivilgesellschaft andererseits. Demgegen{\"u}ber stehen Modelle diskursiver Risikoregulierung als Instrumente {\"o}ffentlicher Aushandlungsprozesse. Diskutiert werden Einflussfaktoren auf Entscheidungen im Kontext von Risikodiskursen. Dabei wird insbesondere die Funktionslogik der Medien untersucht. Am Beispiel der Aschewolke des Eyjafjallaj{\"o}kull 2010 wird die Ph{\"a}nomenkonstellation von Akteuren und Diskurspositionen illustriert und der Verlauf einer medialen Risikoentwicklung nachgezeichnet.}, language = {de} } @phdthesis{Stolley2018, author = {Stolley, Florian}, title = {Four essays on altruism and compliance}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-42801}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-428013}, school = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {ix, 129}, year = {2018}, abstract = {There are numerous situations in which people ask for something or make a request, e.g. asking a favor, asking for help or requesting compliance with specific norms. For this reason, how to ask for something in order to increase people's willingness to fulfill such requests is one of the most important question for many people working in various different fields of responsibility such as charitable giving, marketing, management or policy making. This dissertation consists of four chapters that deal with the effects of small changes in the decision-making environment on altruistic decision-making and compliance behavior. Most notably, written communication as an influencing factor is the focus of the first three chapters. The starting point was the question how to devise a request in order to maximize its chance of success (Chapter 1). The results of the first chapter originate the ideas for the second and third chapter. Chapter 2 analyzes how communication by a neutral third-party, i.e. a text from the experimenters that either reminds potential benefactors of their responsibility or highlights their freedom of choice, affects altruistic decision-making. Chapter 3 elaborates on the effect of thanking people in advance when asking them for help. While being not as closely related to the other chapters as the three first ones are, the fourth chapter deals as well with the question how compliance (here: compliance with norms and rules) is affected by subtle manipulations of the environment in which decisions are made. This chapter analyzes the effect of default settings in a tax return on tax compliance. In order to study the research questions outlined above, controlled experiments were conducted. Chapter 1, which analyzes the effect of text messages on the decision to give something to another person, employs a mini-dictator game. The recipient sends a free-form text message to the dictator before the latter makes a binary decision whether or not to give part of her or his endowment to the recipient. We find that putting effort into the message by writing a long note without spelling mistakes increases dictators' willingness to give. Moreover, writing in a humorous way and mentioning reasons why the money is needed pays off. Furthermore, men and women seem to react differently to some message categories. Only men react positively to efficiency arguments, while only women react to messages that emphasize the dictator's power and responsibility. Building on this last result, Chapter 2 attempts to disentangle the effect of reminding potential benefactors of their responsibility for the potential beneficiary and the effect of highlighting their decision power and freedom of choice on altruistic decision-making by studying the effects of two different texts on giving in a dictator game. We find that only men react positively to a text that stresses their responsibility for the recipient by giving more to her or him, whereas only women seem to react positively to a text that emphasizes their decision power and freedom of choice. Chapter 3 focuses on the compliance with a request. In the experiment, participants are asked to provide a detailed answer to an open question. Compliance is measured by the effort participants spend on answering the question. The treatment variable is whether or not they see the text "thanks in advance." We find that participants react negatively by putting less effort into complying with the request in response to the phrase "thanks in advance." Chapter 4 studies the effect of prefilled tax returns with mostly inaccurate default values on tax compliance. In a laboratory experiment, participants earn income by performing a real-effort task and must subsequently file a tax return for three consecutive rounds. In the main treatment, the tax return is prefilled with a default value, resulting from participants' own performance in previous rounds, which varies in its relative size. The results suggest that there is no lasting effect of a default value on tax honesty, neither for relatively low nor relatively high defaults. However, participants who face a default that is lower than their true income in the first round evade significantly and substantially more taxes in this round than participants in the control treatment without a default.}, language = {en} } @article{BruttelStolley2020, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Stolley, Florian}, title = {Getting a yes}, series = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics}, volume = {86}, journal = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics}, publisher = {Elsevier}, address = {New York}, issn = {2214-8043}, doi = {10.1016/j.socec.2020.101550}, pages = {10}, year = {2020}, abstract = {This paper studies how the request for a favor has to be devised in order to maximize its chance of success. We present results from a mini-dictator game, in which the recipient can send a free-form text message to the dictator before the latter decides. We find that putting effort into the message, writing in a humorous way and mentioning reasons why the money is needed pays off. Additionally, we find differences in the behavior of male and female dictators. Only men react positively to efficiency arguments, while only women react to messages that emphasize the dictators power and responsibility.}, language = {en} } @techreport{BruttelStolleyUtikal2019, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Stolley, Florian and Utikal, Verena}, title = {Getting a Yes}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {2}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-42763}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-427638}, year = {2019}, abstract = {This paper studies how the request for a favor has to be devised in order to maximize its chance of success. We present results from a mini-dictator game, in which the recipient can send a free-form text message to the dictator before the latter decides. We find that putting effort into the message, writing in a humorous way and mentioning reasons why the money is needed pays off. Additionally, we find differences in the behavior of male and female dictators. Only men react positively to efficiency arguments, while only women react to messages that emphasize the dictator's power and responsibility.}, language = {en} } @article{AndresBruttelFriedrichsen2022, author = {Andres, Maximilian and Bruttel, Lisa and Friedrichsen, Jana}, title = {How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion}, series = {European economic review}, volume = {152}, journal = {European economic review}, publisher = {Elsevier}, address = {Amsterdam}, issn = {0014-2921}, doi = {10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104331}, pages = {1 -- 18}, year = {2022}, abstract = {This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices.}, language = {en} }