@article{BruttelZiemann2022,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Ziemann, Niklas},
  title     = {How do people discount over spatial distance?},
  series = {German economic review},
  volume    = {24},
  journal   = {German economic review},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {De Gruyter},
  address   = {Berlin},
  issn      = {1465-6485},
  doi       = {10.1515/ger-2021-0106},
  pages     = {33 -- 67},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {This paper studies how individuals discount the utility they derive from their provision of goods over spatial distance. In a controlled laboratory experiment in Germany, we elicit preferences for the provision of the same good at different locations. To isolate spatial preferences from any other direct value of the goods being close to the individual, we focus on goods with "existence value." We find that individuals put special weight on the provision of these goods in their immediate vicinity. This "vicinity bias" represents a spatial analogy to the "present bias" in the time dimension.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{BruttelGuethNithammeretal.2022,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and G{\"u}th, Werner and Nithammer, Juri and Orland, Andreas},
  title     = {Inefficient cooperation under stochastic and strategic uncertainty},
  series = {Conflict resolution},
  volume    = {66},
  journal   = {Conflict resolution},
  number    = {4-5},
  publisher = {Sage Publ.},
  address   = {Thousand Oaks},
  issn      = {0022-0027},
  doi       = {10.1177/00220027211066614},
  pages     = {755 -- 782},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {Stochastic uncertainty can cause coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can increase efficiency. To test this transfer mechanism, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeated Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not lead to an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two major reasons for this failure: first, stochastic uncertainty forces proposers intending to cooperate to accept high strategic uncertainty, which many proposers avoid; second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperatively, which hinders cooperation in future periods.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{BruttelStolley2020,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Stolley, Florian},
  title     = {Getting a yes},
  series = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics},
  volume    = {86},
  journal   = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {New York},
  issn      = {2214-8043},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.socec.2020.101550},
  pages     = {10},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {This paper studies how the request for a favor has to be devised in order to maximize its chance of success. We present results from a mini-dictator game, in which the recipient can send a free-form text message to the dictator before the latter decides. We find that putting effort into the message, writing in a humorous way and mentioning reasons why the money is needed pays off. Additionally, we find differences in the behavior of male and female dictators. Only men react positively to efficiency arguments, while only women react to messages that emphasize the dictators power and responsibility.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Bruttel2018,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena},
  title     = {The Limits of Buyer Power},
  series = {Review of Behavioral Economics},
  volume    = {5},
  journal   = {Review of Behavioral Economics},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Now Publishers inc.},
  address   = {Hannover},
  issn      = {2326-6198},
  doi       = {10.1561/105.00000082},
  pages     = {149 -- 167},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {This paper studies the behavior of buyers confronting an incumbent monopolist and a potential market entrant in a repeated trade situation. In the experiment, buyers have two possibilities to demand lower prices in future trade periods. First, they can withhold demand. Second, they can voluntarily pay a higher price to the entrant in order to encourage future re-entry. Both these forms of buyer behavior occur in the experiment. They are less frequent when the number of buyers is large as opposed to small. A control treatment tests to what extent such behavior can be attributed to strategic motives.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Bruttel2018,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena},
  title     = {The effects of recommended retail prices on consumer and retailer behaviour},
  series = {Economica},
  volume    = {85},
  journal   = {Economica},
  number    = {339},
  publisher = {Wiley},
  address   = {Hoboken},
  issn      = {0013-0427},
  doi       = {10.1111/ecca.12218},
  pages     = {649 -- 668},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {This paper presents results from an experiment on the effects of recommended retail prices on consumer and retailer behaviour. We present evidence that recommended retail prices, despite their non-binding nature, influence consumers' willingness to pay by setting a reference point. At a given price, consumers buy more the higher the recommended retail price is, and their demand drops at prices above the recommended retail price, even when it is entirely uninformative about the value of the product. Retailers in this study are subject to similar anchoring effects, but they do not anticipate consumers' behaviour well and are thus not able to exploit their behavioural biases.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{BruttelGueth2018,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Gueth, Werner},
  title     = {Asymmetric voluntary cooperation},
  series = {International Journal of Game Theory},
  volume    = {47},
  journal   = {International Journal of Game Theory},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Heidelberg},
  issn      = {0020-7276},
  doi       = {10.1007/s00182-018-0633-y},
  pages     = {873 -- 891},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {This paper tests the robustness of voluntary cooperation in a sequential best shot game, a public good game in which the maximal contribution determines the level of public good provision. Thus, efficiency enhancing voluntary cooperation requires asymmetric behavior whose coordination is more difficult. Nevertheless, we find robust cooperation irrespective of treatment-specific institutional obstacles. To explain this finding, we distinguish three behavioral patterns aiming at both, voluntary cooperation and (immediate) payoff equality.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Bruttel2018,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena},
  title     = {Is There a Loyalty-Enhancing Effect of Retroactive Price-Reduction Schemes?},
  series = {Review of industrial organization},
  volume    = {54},
  journal   = {Review of industrial organization},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Dordrecht},
  issn      = {0889-938X},
  doi       = {10.1007/s11151-018-9653-9},
  pages     = {575 -- 593},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {This paper presents an experiment on the effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes on buyers' repeated purchase decisions. Such schemes promise buyers a reduced price for all units that are bought in a certain time frame if the total quantity that is purchased passes a given threshold. This study finds a loyalty-enhancing effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes only if the buyers ex-ante expected that entering into the scheme would maximize their monetary gain, but later learn that they should leave the scheme. Furthermore, the effect crucially hinges on the framing of the price reduction.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{BruttelFriehe2015,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Friehe, Tim},
  title     = {A note on making humans randomize},
  series = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics},
  volume    = {58},
  journal   = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {New York},
  issn      = {2214-8043},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.socec.2015.06.008},
  pages     = {40 -- 45},
  year      = {2015},
  abstract  = {This note presents results from an experiment studying a two person 4 4 pure coordination game. We explore different strategy labels in an attempt to implement the mixed strategy equilibrium that selects all four strategies with equal probability. Such strategy labels must be free from salient properties that might be used by participants to coordinate. Testing 23 different sets of strategy labels, we identify two sets that produce a distribution of subjects' choices which approximate the uniform distribution quite well. Our results are relevant for studies intending to compare the behavior of subjects who play against a random mechanism with that of participants who play against human counterparts.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{BruttelFriehe2014,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Friehe, Tim},
  title     = {Can short-term incentives induce long-lasting cooperation? Results from a public-goods experiment},
  series = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics},
  volume    = {53},
  journal   = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {New York},
  issn      = {2214-8043},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.socec.2014.09.001},
  pages     = {120 -- 130},
  year      = {2014},
  abstract  = {This paper investigates whether providing strong cooperation incentives only at the outset of a group interaction spills over to later periods to ensure cooperation in the long run. We study a repeated linear public-good game with punishment opportunities and a parameter change after the first ten (of twenty) rounds. Our data shows that cooperation among subjects who had experienced a higher marginal return on public-good contributions or low punishment costs in rounds 1-10 rapidly deteriorated in rounds 11-20 once these incentives were removed, eventually trending below the level of cooperation in the control group. This suggests the possibility of temporary incentives backfiring in the long run. This paper ties in with the literature highlighting the potentially adverse effects of the use of incentives. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.},
  language  = {en}
}