@article{Becker2022,
  author    = {Becker, Julius Lucas},
  title     = {'To grab, when the grabbing begins'},
  series = {The international history review},
  volume    = {44},
  journal   = {The international history review},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group},
  address   = {New York, NY [u.a.]},
  issn      = {0707-5332},
  doi       = {10.1080/07075332.2021.1909101},
  pages     = {1 -- 20},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {The Sino-Japanese War of 1894/95 is usually only briefly mentioned in studies on diplomatic history. Especially the war's impact on Wilhelmine foreign and world policy (Weltpolitik) has been largely neglected. However, the events in East Asia had a profound influence on the political leadership in Berlin. The Wilhelmstrasse's attitude towards the conflict changed rapidly when the course of the war in Northeast Asia made a collapse of the Qing Empire increasingly likely. Afraid of the prospect of being left empty handed in an upcoming scramble for China, German diplomacy got active in early 1895. Driven by a hectic activism which soon should become a dominant feature of Weltpolitik, Berlin concluded an ad-hoc alliance with St. Petersburg and Paris. In April 1895, this unlikely coalition intervened against Tokyo. While the Triple Intervention served primarily Russia's interest to maintain the status quo on the Chinese mainland, Germany aimed at the acquisition of a military and commercial base in Northeast Asia. Driven by public opinion, the naval leadership and the Emperor Wilhelm II., the formerly neutral and reserved German diplomacy changed towards an aggressive and unstable imperialist policy, which ultimately resulted in the acquisition of Qingdao in November 1897.},
  language  = {en}
}