@article{CaliendoCobbClarkObstetal.2022, author = {Caliendo, Marco and Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. and Obst, Cosima and Seitz, Helke and Uhlendorff, Arne}, title = {Locus of control and investment in training}, series = {Journal of human resources}, volume = {57}, journal = {Journal of human resources}, number = {4}, publisher = {University of Wisconsin Press}, address = {Madison}, issn = {0022-166X}, doi = {10.3368/jhr.57.4.0318-9377R2}, pages = {1311 -- 1349}, year = {2022}, abstract = {We extend standard models of work-related training by explicitly incorporating workers' locus of control into the investment decision through the returns they expect. Our model predicts that higher internal control results in increased take-up of general, but not specific, training. This prediction is empirically validated using data from the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP). We provide empirical evidence that locus of control influences participation in training through its effect on workers' expectations about future wage increases rather than actual wage increases. Our results provide an important explanation for underinvestment in training and suggest that those with an external sense of control may require additional training support.}, language = {en} } @article{CaliendoCobbClarkObstetal.2022, author = {Caliendo, Marco and Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. and Obst, Cosima and Uhlendorff, Arne}, title = {Risk preferences and training investments}, series = {Journal of economic behavior \& organization}, volume = {205}, journal = {Journal of economic behavior \& organization}, publisher = {Elsevier}, address = {Amsterdam}, issn = {0167-2681}, doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2022.11.024}, pages = {668 -- 686}, year = {2022}, abstract = {We analyze workers' risk preferences and training investments. Our conceptual framework differentiates between the investment risk and insurance mechanisms underpinning training decisions. Investment risk leads risk-averse workers to train less; they undertake more training if it insures them against future losses. We use the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) to demonstrate that risk affinity is associated with more training, implying that, on average, investment risks dominate the insurance benefits of training. Crucially, this relationship is evident only for general training; there is no relationship between risk attitudes and specific training. Thus, consistent with our conceptual framework, risk preferences matter more when skills are transferable - and workers have a vested interest in training outcomes - than when they are not. Finally, we provide evidence that the insurance benefits of training are concentrated among workers with uncertain employment relationships or limited access to public insurance schemes.}, language = {en} } @article{BurauelCaliendoGrabkaetal.2020, author = {Burauel, Patrick F. and Caliendo, Marco and Grabka, Markus M. and Obst, Cosima and Preuss, Malte and Schr{\"o}der, Carsten and Shupe, Cortnie}, title = {The impact of the German minimum wage on individual wages and monthly warnings}, series = {Jahrb{\"u}cher f{\"u}r National{\"o}konomie und Statistik = Journal of economics and statistics}, volume = {240}, journal = {Jahrb{\"u}cher f{\"u}r National{\"o}konomie und Statistik = Journal of economics and statistics}, number = {2-3}, publisher = {De Gruyter}, address = {Berlin}, issn = {0021-4027}, doi = {10.1515/jbnst-2018-0077}, pages = {201 -- 231}, year = {2020}, abstract = {This paper evaluates the short-run impact of the introduction of a statutory minimum wage in Germany on the hourly wages and monthly earnings of workers targeted by the reform. We first provide detailed descriptive evidence of changes to the wage structure in particular at the bottom of the distribution and distinguish between trends for regularly employed and marginally employed workers. In the causal analysis, we then employ a differential trend adjusted difference-in-differences (DTADD) strategy to identify the extent to which these changes in wages and earnings can be attributed to the minimum wage introduction. We find that the minimum wage introduction can account for hourly wage growth in the order of roughly 6.5 \% or (sic)0.45/hour and an increase in monthly earnings of 6.6 \% or (sic)53/month. Despite finding wage growth at the bottom of the distribution, the paper documents widespread non-compliance with the mandated wage floor of (sic)8.50/hour.}, language = {en} }