@article{AndresBruttelFriedrichsen2021,
  author    = {Andres, Maximilian and Bruttel, Lisa and Friedrichsen, Jana},
  title     = {The leniency rule revisited},
  series = {International journal of industrial organization},
  volume    = {76},
  journal   = {International journal of industrial organization},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {Amsterdam},
  issn      = {0167-7187},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102728},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {The experimental literature on antitrust enforcement provides robust evidence that communication plays an important role for the formation and stability of cartels. We extend these studies through a design that distinguishes between innocuous communication and communication about a cartel, sanctioning only the latter. To this aim, we introduce a participant in the role of the competition authority, who is properly incentivized to judge the communication content and price setting behavior of the firms. Using this novel design, we revisit the question whether a leniency rule successfully destabilizes cartels. In contrast to existing experimental studies, we find that a leniency rule does not affect cartelization. We discuss potential explanations for this contrasting result.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{AndresBruttelFriedrichsen2022,
  author    = {Andres, Maximilian and Bruttel, Lisa and Friedrichsen, Jana},
  title     = {How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion},
  series = {European economic review},
  volume    = {152},
  journal   = {European economic review},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address   = {Amsterdam},
  issn      = {0014-2921},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104331},
  pages     = {1 -- 18},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices.},
  language  = {en}
}
@techreport{AndresBruttel2024,
  type      = {Working Paper},
  author    = {Andres, Maximilian and Bruttel, Lisa},
  title     = {Communicating Cartel Intentions},
  series = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  journal   = {CEPA Discussion Papers},
  number    = {77},
  issn      = {2628-653X},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-63846},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-638469},
  pages     = {36},
  year      = {2024},
  abstract  = {While the economic harm of cartels is caused by their price-increasing effect, sanctioning by courts rather targets at the underlying process of firms reaching a price-fixing agreement. This paper provides experimental evidence on the question whether such sanctioning meets the economic target, i.e., whether evidence of a collusive meeting of the firms and of the content of their communication reliably predicts subsequent prices. We find that already the mere mutual agreement to meet predicts a strong increase in prices. Conversely, express distancing from communication completely nullifies its otherwise price-increasing effect. Using machine learning, we show that communication only increases prices if it is very explicit about how the cartel plans to behave.},
  language  = {en}
}