@article{SchweringSommerUeppingetal.2022,
  author    = {Schwering, Anja and Sommer, Friedrich and Uepping, Florian and Winkelmann, Sandra},
  title     = {The social-psychological perspective on executive compensation},
  series = {Journal of Business Economics},
  volume    = {92},
  journal   = {Journal of Business Economics},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Berlin},
  doi       = {10.1007/s11573-021-01066-5},
  pages     = {309 -- 345},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {This paper investigates whether and how social-psychological mechanisms, namely reciprocity, demographic similarity, and similar experiences, affect CEO compensation packages with respect to the levels of total, fixed, and short- and mid-term compensation and the variable proportion of the compensation package. We use evidence from Germany as it is considered a prototype of a two-tier board system. Given the primary roles of both the CEO and the chair of the supervisory board, we especially highlight social-psychological mechanisms in the process leading to the final compensation package. Using a hand-collected sample of non-financial constituents of the German HDAX, we find that reciprocity can lead to a compensation package that is more favorable for the CEO. Results on similarity are ambivalent such that the effects of similarity on CEO compensation—both positive and negative—may depend on the dimension of similarity. Finally, the chair's CEO experience, both inside and outside the focal company, also plays an essential role in shaping CEO compensation. More specifically, CEO experience in general is associated with more favorable compensation. However, having a chair that has been CEO at the focal company correlates with less favorable compensation packages except for when the CEO has also been recruited internally.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{EweltKnauerSchweringWinkelmann2022,
  author    = {Ewelt-Knauer, Corinna and Schwering, Anja and Winkelmann, Sandra},
  title     = {Doing good by doing bad},
  series = {Journal of business ethics},
  volume    = {175},
  journal   = {Journal of business ethics},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Dordrecht},
  issn      = {0167-4544},
  doi       = {10.1007/s10551-020-04647-6},
  pages     = {609 -- 624},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {This study investigates how tone at the top, implemented by top management, and tone at the bottom, in an employee's immediate work environment, determine noncompliance. We focus on the disallowed actions of employees that improve their own and, in turn, the company's performance, referred to as performance-improving noncompliant behavior (PINC behavior). We conduct a survey of German sales employees to investigate specifically how, on the one hand, (1) corporate rules and (2) performance pressure, both implemented by top management, and, on the other hand, (3) others' PINC expectations and (4) others' PINC behavior, both arising from the employee's immediate work environment, influence PINC behavior. When considered in isolation, we find that corporate rules, as top management's main instrument to guide employee behavior, decrease employee PINC behavior. However, this effect is negatively influenced by the employees' immediate work environment when employees are expected to engage in PINC or when others engage in PINC. In contrast, even though top management places great performance pressure on employees, that by itself does not increase PINC behavior. Overall, our study informs practitioners and researchers about whether and how the four determinants increase or decrease employees' PINC behavior, which is important to comprehend triggers and to counteract such misconduct.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{EweltKnauerSchweringWinkelmann2021,
  author    = {Ewelt-Knauer, Corinna and Schwering, Anja and Winkelmann, Sandra},
  title     = {Wirksamkeit der Kontrollen im Corporate-Governance-System der Sparkassen},
  series = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Gemeinwirtschaft und Gemeinwohl},
  volume    = {44},
  journal   = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Gemeinwirtschaft und Gemeinwohl},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Nomos},
  address   = {Baden-Baden},
  issn      = {2701-4193},
  doi       = {10.5771/2701-4193-2021-2-280},
  pages     = {280 -- 300},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Da Sparkassen einen {\"o}ffentlichen Auftrag erf{\"u}llen m{\"u}ssen, der ihr Bestehen gesetzlich legitimiert, zeichnet sich ihr Corporate-Governance-System durch Besonderheiten aus. Diese Besonderheiten wirken sich nicht nur auf die Vorstandst{\"a}tigkeit, sondern auch auf die T{\"a}tigkeit der Kontrollorgane aus, welche eine nachhaltige Erf{\"u}llung des {\"o}ffentlichen Auftrags pr{\"u}fen und gew{\"a}hrleisten sollen. Nach einer Vorstellung des Corporate-Governance-Systems besch{\"a}ftigt sich der Beitrag daher mit der Frage, ob und wie allgemeine Herausforderungen, die durch das System bedingt sind, sowie besondere Herausforderungen, die sich aus der langanhaltenden Niedrigzinspolitik ergeben, die Effektivit{\"a}t der Kontrollen beeinflussen.},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{EweltKnauerSchweringWinkelmann2021,
  author    = {Ewelt-Knauer, Corinna and Schwering, Anja and Winkelmann, Sandra},
  title     = {Probabilistic audits and misreporting},
  series = {European accounting review},
  volume    = {30},
  journal   = {European accounting review},
  number    = {5},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  address   = {London},
  issn      = {1468-4497},
  doi       = {10.1080/09638180.2021.1899014},
  pages     = {989 -- 1012},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {We investigate how the design of audit processes influences employees' reporting decisions. We focus specifically on detective employee audits for which several employees are randomly selected after a defined period to audit their ex-post behavior. We investigate two design features of the audit process, namely, employee anonymity and process transparency, and analyze their impact on misreporting. Overall, we find that both components influence the extent of individuals' misreporting. A nonanonymous audit decreases performance misreporting more than an audit in which the employee remains anonymous. Furthermore, the high incidence of performance misreporting in the case of anonymous audits can be decreased when the process transparency is low. Thus, our study informs accountants about how the two design features of employee anonymity and transparency of the audit process can be used to constrain performance misreporting to increase the efficiency of audits},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{KnauerHermannsSchweringetal.2020,
  author    = {Knauer, Thorsten and Hermanns, Martin and Schwering, Anja and Winkelmann, Sandra},
  title     = {Stand und Entwicklung nichtfinanzieller Kennzahlen im Rahmen der Unternehmenssteuerung und ihre Rolle im Steuerungssystem der Vorstandsverg{\"u}tung},
  series = {Controlling - Zeitschrift f{\"u}r erfolgsorientierte Unternehmensf{\"u}hrung},
  volume    = {32},
  journal   = {Controlling - Zeitschrift f{\"u}r erfolgsorientierte Unternehmensf{\"u}hrung},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Beck},
  address   = {M{\"u}nchen},
  issn      = {0935-0381},
  doi       = {10.15358/0935-0381-2020-3-59},
  pages     = {59 -- 65},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {Durch den Deutschen Rechnungslegungs Standard 20 und die sog. CorporateSocial Responsibility-Richtlinie sind nichtfinanzielle Kennzahlen im Rahmen der Unternehmenssteuerung zunehmend in den Fokus ger{\"u}ckt. Trotz dieser regulatorischen Signale etabliert sich deren Nutzung in der Praxis nur langsam. Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird daher ein {\"U}berblick {\"u}ber die Bedeutung, die Hintergr{\"u}ndeund den Stand der Implementierung nicht finanzieller Kennzahlen in der Unternehmenssteuerung im Allgemeinen und insbesondere im Hinblick auf das Steuerungssystem der Vorstandsverg{\"u}tung gegeben.},
  language  = {de}
}