@article{LohmannFalkGeissleretal.2014, author = {Lohmann, Dirk and Falk, Thomas and Geissler, Katja and Blaum, Niels and Jeltsch, Florian}, title = {Determinants of semi-arid rangeland management in a land reform setting in Namibia}, series = {Journal of arid environments}, volume = {100}, journal = {Journal of arid environments}, publisher = {Elsevier}, address = {London}, issn = {0140-1963}, doi = {10.1016/j.jaridenv.2013.10.005}, pages = {23 -- 30}, year = {2014}, abstract = {To assess the ecological and economic implications of the redistributive land reform in semi-arid Namibia, we investigated to what extent land reform beneficiaries adjust herd size and herd composition according to environmental (rainfall, vegetation) and economic variables (herd size, financial assets, running costs). We performed model-based role-plays with Namibian land reform beneficiaries, simulating 10 years of rangeland management. Our study revealed that the farmers surveyed mainly manage their herds according to their economic situation (herd size and account balance) but do not take environmental variability (rainfall and vegetation) into account. Further, our results indicate that, due to financial pressure, farmers are not able to apply their desired management strategies, and that owners of small farms face a higher risk of economic failure. However, farmers apply rather conservative and constant stocking rates and will thus, given the current economic limitations, likely not contribute to semi-arid savanna degradation. We conclude that land reform beneficiaries need support to be able to apply straightforward and efficient management strategies. This could be achieved by facilitating cooperation between small farming businesses and by supporting initial investment in productive cattle herds at the time of redistribution of the land.}, language = {en} } @article{FalkLohmannAzebaze2016, author = {Falk, Thomas and Lohmann, Dirk and Azebaze, Nadege}, title = {Congruence of appropriation and provision in collective water provision in Central Namibia}, series = {International journal of the commons}, volume = {10}, journal = {International journal of the commons}, publisher = {Brill}, address = {Urtrecht}, issn = {1875-0281}, doi = {10.18352/ijc.583}, pages = {71 -- 118}, year = {2016}, abstract = {Achieving cooperation in natural resource management is always a challenge when incentives exist for an individual to maximise her short term benefits at the cost of a group. We study a public good social dilemma in water infrastructure provision on land reform farms in Namibia. In the context of the Namibian land reform, arbitrarily mixed groups of livestock farmers have to share the operation and maintenance of water infrastructure. Typically, water is mainly used for livestock production, and livestock numbers are subject to high fluctuations due to the given environmental conditions. Our paper assesses how alternative payment systems with differing congruence of provision and appropriation support the cooperation in the group given the ever-changing equilibria. In a first step, we conducted an exploratory overview of the social-ecological system of central Namibian land reform projects. The Social Ecological System (SES) Framework served as a guideline for this assessment (Ostrom 2009). Taking the complexity of the cooperation situation into account, in the second step we designed a role-play that is based on a social-ecological simulation model. The role-play simulates the real-life decision situations of land reform beneficiaries wherein equilibria are permanently changing. This approach helped us to not only better understand the cooperation challenges of Namibian land reform beneficiaries, but also supported stakeholders in their decision making and institution building. Our study provides evidence to support that land reform beneficiaries increase their contributions as they own more livestock and as other group members increase their payments. Nevertheless, only groups with relatively homogeneous livestock endowments manage to agree on payment rules. Interestingly, the dominant rule is an "equal payment per farmer" and not a "payment per head of livestock", though the latter would imply a higher congruence of provision and appropriation.}, language = {en} } @article{FalkKirkLohmannetal.2017, author = {Falk, Thomas and Kirk, Michael and Lohmann, Dirk and Kruger, Bertus and H{\"u}ttich, Christian and Kamukuenjandje, Richard}, title = {The profits of excludability and transferability in redistributive land reform in central Namibia}, series = {Development Southern Africa}, volume = {34}, journal = {Development Southern Africa}, publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group}, address = {Abingdon}, issn = {0376-835X}, doi = {10.1080/0376835X.2016.1269633}, pages = {314 -- 329}, year = {2017}, abstract = {Policies which redistribute property rights to land can improve the well-being of rural households and can have overall growth effects. In many cases, however, land reforms are driven mainly by politically justified objectives. Under such circumstances, little emphasis is placed on whether and, if so, how property rights can increase productivity. Following 18 years of land reform implementation in Namibia, we evaluated 65 beneficiaries in Namibia. We assess to which degree land rights affects their farm income. The study focuses on Namibia's two main commercial land reform instruments, namely the Farm Unit Resettlement Scheme and the Affirmative Action Loan Scheme. We find evidence that the majority of land reform projects are not profitable. Further, our study confirms the importance of the right to restrict land access compared with the right to transfer. The long-term leasehold contract seemingly provides sufficient incentives to make productive use of the land.}, language = {en} }