@article{BuschLiese2016,
  author    = {Busch, Per-Olof and Liese, Andrea},
  title     = {The authority of international public administrations},
  series = {International Bureaucracy: Challenges and Lessons for Public Administration Research},
  journal   = {International Bureaucracy: Challenges and Lessons for Public Administration Research},
  publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan, London},
  address   = {Basingstoke},
  isbn      = {978-1-349-94977-9},
  doi       = {10.1057/978-1-349-94977-9_5},
  pages     = {97 -- 122},
  year      = {2016},
  abstract  = {This chapter takes stock with the research on the authority of international organizations (IOs) and international public administrations (IPAs) in the fields of International Relations (IR) and Public Administration (PA). It combines arguments from conceptual and theoretical debates with empirical findings to explore under which conditions IPAs are likely to enjoy authority. Based on a review of the literature and on conceptual clarifications, we define authority as a social relationship between holders and granters of authority. We distinguish two types of authority, namely, political and expert authority, and two forms of recognition, namely, in practice (de facto) and by formal delegation (de jure). Given that the de facto expert authority of IPAs has received least attention in the literature, while the PA literature reminds us that knowledge lies at the heart of bureaucratic power, we develop propositions on how de facto expert authority could be measured and how the anticipated variation of expert authority among IPAs could be explained. We illustrate our argument with reference to empirical findings in the IR and PA literature. We conclude by highlighting the implications of our discussion for future research on the authority of national and IPAs.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{HeinzelRichterBuschetal.2020,
  author    = {Heinzel, Mirko Noa and Richter, Jonas and Busch, Per-Olof and Feil, Hauke and Herold, Jana and Liese, Andrea},
  title     = {Birds of a feather?},
  series = {Review of international political economy},
  volume    = {28},
  journal   = {Review of international political economy},
  number    = {5},
  publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group},
  address   = {Abingdon},
  issn      = {0969-2290},
  doi       = {10.1080/09692290.2020.1749711},
  pages     = {1249 -- 1273},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank ascribe to impartiality in their mandates. At the same time, scholarship indicates that their decisions are disproportionately influenced by powerful member states. Impartiality is seen as crucial in determining International Organizations' (IOs) effectiveness and legitimacy in the literature. However, we know little about whether key interlocutors in national governments perceive the International Financial Institutions as biased actors who do the bidding for powerful member states or as impartial executors of policy. In order to better understand these perceptions, we surveyed high-level civil servants who are chiefly responsible for four policy areas from more than 100 countries. We found substantial variations in impartiality perceptions. What explains these variations? By developing an argument of selective awareness, we extend rationalist and ideational perspectives on IO impartiality to explain domestic perceptions. Using novel survey data, we test whether staffing underrepresentation, voting underrepresentation, alignment to the major shareholders and overlapping economic policy paradigms are associated with impartiality perceptions. We find substantial evidence that shared economic policy paradigms influence impartiality perceptions. The findings imply that by diversifying their ideational culture, IOs can increase the likelihood that domestic stakeholders view them as impartial.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{BuschHeinzelKempkenetal.2020,
  author    = {Busch, Per-Olof and Heinzel, Mirko Noa and Kempken, Mathies and Liese, Andrea},
  title     = {Mind the gap?},
  series = {Journal of comparative policy analysis : research and practice},
  volume    = {24},
  journal   = {Journal of comparative policy analysis : research and practice},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Taylor \& Francis},
  address   = {London},
  issn      = {1387-6988},
  doi       = {10.1080/13876988.2020.1820866},
  pages     = {230 -- 253},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {Many authors have argued that International Public Administration can influence policy-making through their expert authority. The article compares de jure and de facto expert authority of IPAs to evaluate their conformity. It comparatively assesses the two kinds of authority for five important IPAs (BIS, FAO, IMF, OECD and World Bank) active in agriculture or financial policy. It shows that, on average, de jure and de facto authority seem to conform. At the same time, it demonstrates that gaps between de jure and de facto authority exist at the level of the IPAs, the policy areas and the IPAs' addressees},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{BuschFeilHeinzeletal.2021,
  author    = {Busch, Per-Olof and Feil, Hauke and Heinzel, Mirko Noa and Herold, Jana and Kempken, Mathies and Liese, Andrea},
  title     = {Policy recommendations of international bureaucracies},
  series = {International review of administrative sciences : an international journal of comparative public administration},
  volume    = {87},
  journal   = {International review of administrative sciences : an international journal of comparative public administration},
  number    = {4},
  publisher = {Sage Publ.},
  address   = {Los Angeles, Calif.},
  issn      = {0020-8523},
  doi       = {10.1177/00208523211013385},
  pages     = {775 -- 793},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Many international bureaucracies give policy advice to national administrative units. Why is the advice given by some international bureaucracies more influential than the recommendations of others? We argue that targeting advice to member states through national embeddedness and country-tailored research increases the influence of policy advice. Subsequently, we test how these characteristics shape the relative influence of 15 international bureaucracies' advice in four financial policy areas through a global survey of national administrations from more than 80 countries. Our findings support arguments that global blueprints need to be adapted and translated to become meaningful for country-level work. <br /> Points for practitioners <br /> National administrations are advised by an increasing number of international bureaucracies, and they cannot listen to all of this advice. Whereas some international bureaucracies give 'one-size-fits-all' recommendations to rather diverse countries, others cater their recommendations to the national audience. Investigating financial policy recommendations, we find that national embeddedness and country-tailored advice render international bureaucracies more influential.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{LieseHeroldFeiletal.2021,
  author    = {Liese, Andrea and Herold, Jana and Feil, Hauke and Busch, Per-Olof},
  title     = {The heart of bureaucratic power},
  series = {Review of international studies : RIS},
  volume    = {47},
  journal   = {Review of international studies : RIS},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Cambridge Univ. Press},
  address   = {Cambridge},
  issn      = {0260-2105},
  doi       = {10.1017/S026021052100005X},
  pages     = {353 -- 376},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Expert authority is regarded as the heart of international bureaucracies' power. To measure whether international bureaucracies' expert authority is indeed recognised and deferred to, we draw on novel data from a survey of a key audience: officials in the policy units of national ministries in 121 countries. Respondents were asked to what extent they recognised the expert authority of nine international bureaucracies in various thematic areas of agricultural and financial policy. The results show wide variance. To explain this variation, we test well-established assumptions on the sources of de facto expert authority. Specifically, we look at ministry officials' perceptions of these sources and, thus, focus on a less-studied aspect of the authority relationship. We examine the role of international bureaucracies' perceived impartiality, objectivity, global impact, and the role of knowledge asymmetries. Contrary to common assumptions, we find that de facto expert authority does not rest on impartiality perceptions, and that perceived objectivity plays the smallest role of all factors considered. We find some indications that knowledge asymmetries are associated with more expert authority. Still, and robust to various alternative specifications, the perception that international bureaucracies are effectively addressing global challenges is the most important factor.},
  language  = {en}
}