@article{Sanner2003,
  author    = {Sanner, Helge},
  title     = {Optimal unemployment insurance in a federation},
  isbn      = {3-540-44004-6},
  year      = {2003},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Sanner2003,
  author    = {Sanner, Helge},
  title     = {Self-financing unemployment insurance and bargaining structure},
  year      = {2003},
  abstract  = {This study examines how the size of trade unions relative to the labor force impacts on the desirability of different organizational forms of self- financing unemployment insurance (UI) for workers, firms, and with reference to an efficiency criterion. For this purpose, we respectively numerically compare the outcome of a model with a uniform payroll tax to a model where workers pay taxes according to their systematic risk of unemployment. Our results highlight the importance of the bargaining structure for the assessment of a particular UI scheme. Most importantly, it depends on the size of the unions whether effciency favors a uniform or a differentiated UI scheme.},
  language  = {en}
}