@misc{SchindlerWolff2015,
  author    = {Schindler, Sebastian and Wolff, Wanja},
  title     = {Cerebral correlates of automatic associations towards performance enhancing substances},
  series = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Humanwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  journal   = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Humanwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  number    = {421},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-406279},
  pages     = {9},
  year      = {2015},
  abstract  = {kein abstract vorh.},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{SchindlerWolffKissleretal.2015,
  author    = {Schindler, Sebastian and Wolff, Wanja and Kissler, Johanna M. and Brand, Ralf},
  title     = {Cerebral correlates of faking},
  series = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Humanwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  journal   = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Humanwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  number    = {419},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-406251},
  pages     = {13},
  year      = {2015},
  abstract  = {Direct assessment of attitudes toward socially sensitive topics can be affected by deception attempts. Reaction-time based indirect measures, such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT), are less susceptible to such biases. Neuroscientific evidence shows that deception can evoke characteristic ERP differences. However, the cerebral processes involved in faking an IAT are still unknown. We randomly assigned 20 university students (15 females, 24.65 +/- 3.50 years of age) to a counterbalanced repeated-measurements design, requesting them to complete a Brief-IAT (BIAT) on attitudes toward doping without deception instruction, and with the instruction to fake positive and negative doping attitudes. Cerebral activity during BIAT completion was assessed using high-density EEG. Event-related potentials during faking revealed enhanced frontal and reduced occipital negativity, starting around 150 ms after stimulus presentation. Further, a decrease in the P300 and LPP components was observed. Source analyses showed enhanced activity in the right inferior frontal gyrus between 150 and 200 ms during faking, thought to reflect the suppression of automatic responses. Further, more activity was found for faking in the bilateral middle occipital gyri and the bilateral temporoparietal junction. Results indicate that faking reaction-time based tests alter brain processes from early stages of processing and reveal the cortical sources of the effects. Analyzing the EEG helps to uncover response patterns in indirect attitude tests and broadens our understanding of the neural processes involved in such faking. This knowledge might be useful for uncovering faking in socially sensitive contexts, where attitudes are likely to be concealed.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{SchindlerWolffKissleretal.2015,
  author    = {Schindler, Sebastian and Wolff, Wanja and Kissler, Johanna M. and Brand, Ralf},
  title     = {Cerebral correlates of faking},
  series = {Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience},
  volume    = {9},
  journal   = {Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience},
  publisher = {Frontiers Research Foundation},
  address   = {Lausanne},
  issn      = {1662-5153},
  doi       = {10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00139},
  pages     = {1 -- 13},
  year      = {2015},
  abstract  = {Direct assessment of attitudes toward socially sensitive topics can be affected by deception attempts. Reaction-time based indirect measures, such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT), are less susceptible to such biases. Neuroscientific evidence shows that deception can evoke characteristic ERP differences. However, the cerebral processes involved in faking an IAT are still unknown. We randomly assigned 20 university students (15 females, 24.65 +/- 3.50 years of age) to a counterbalanced repeated-measurements design, requesting them to complete a Brief-IAT (BIAT) on attitudes toward doping without deception instruction, and with the instruction to fake positive and negative doping attitudes. Cerebral activity during BIAT completion was assessed using high-density EEG. Event-related potentials during faking revealed enhanced frontal and reduced occipital negativity, starting around 150 ms after stimulus presentation. Further, a decrease in the P300 and LPP components was observed. Source analyses showed enhanced activity in the right inferior frontal gyrus between 150 and 200 ms during faking, thought to reflect the suppression of automatic responses. Further, more activity was found for faking in the bilateral middle occipital gyri and the bilateral temporoparietal junction. Results indicate that faking reaction-time based tests alter brain processes from early stages of processing and reveal the cortical sources of the effects. Analyzing the EEG helps to uncover response patterns in indirect attitude tests and broadens our understanding of the neural processes involved in such faking. This knowledge might be useful for uncovering faking in socially sensitive contexts, where attitudes are likely to be concealed.},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{WolffSchindlerBrand2015,
  author    = {Wolff, Wanja and Schindler, Sebastian and Brand, Ralf},
  title     = {The effect of implicitly incentivized faking on explicit and implicit measures of doping attitude},
  series = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Humanwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  journal   = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Humanwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  number    = {524},
  issn      = {1866-8364},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-40985},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-409854},
  pages     = {10},
  year      = {2015},
  abstract  = {The Implicit Association Test (IAT) aims to measure participants' automatic evaluation of an attitude object and is useful especially for the measurement of attitudes related to socially sensitive subjects, e.g. doping in sports. Several studies indicate that IAT scores can be faked on instruction. But fully or semi-instructed research scenarios might not properly reflect what happens in more realistic situations, when participants secretly decide to try faking the test. The present study is the first to investigate IAT faking when there is only an implicit incentive to do so. Sixty-five athletes (22.83 years +/- 2.45; 25 women) were randomly assigned to an incentive-to-fake condition or a control condition. Participants in the incentive-to-fake condition were manipulated to believe that athletes with lenient doping attitudes would be referred to a tedious 45-minute anti-doping program. Attitudes were measured with the pictorial doping brief IAT (BIAT) and with the Performance Enhancement Attitude Scale (PEAS). A one-way MANOVA revealed significant differences between conditions after the manipulation in PEAS scores, but not in the doping BIAT. In the light of our hypothesis this suggests that participants successfully faked an exceedingly negative attitude to doping when completing the PEAS, but were unsuccessful in doing so on the reaction time-based test. This study assessed BIAT faking in a setting that aimed to resemble a situation in which participants want to hide their attempts to cheat. The two measures of attitude were differentially affected by the implicit incentive. Our findings provide evidence that the pictorial doping BIAT is relatively robust against spontaneous and naive faking attempts. (B) IATs might be less prone to faking than implied by previous studies.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{WolffSchindlerBrand2015,
  author    = {Wolff, Wanja and Schindler, Sebastian and Brand, Ralf},
  title     = {The Effect of Implicitly Incentivized Faking on Explicit and Implicit Measures of Doping Attitude: When Athletes Want to Pretend an Even More Negative Attitude to Doping},
  series = {PLoS one},
  volume    = {10},
  journal   = {PLoS one},
  number    = {4},
  publisher = {PLoS},
  address   = {San Fransisco},
  issn      = {1932-6203},
  doi       = {10.1371/journal.pone.0118507},
  pages     = {10},
  year      = {2015},
  abstract  = {The Implicit Association Test (IAT) aims to measure participants' automatic evaluation of an attitude object and is useful especially for the measurement of attitudes related to socially sensitive subjects, e.g. doping in sports. Several studies indicate that IAT scores can be faked on instruction. But fully or semi-instructed research scenarios might not properly reflect what happens in more realistic situations, when participants secretly decide to try faking the test. The present study is the first to investigate IAT faking when there is only an implicit incentive to do so. Sixty-five athletes (22.83 years +/- 2.45; 25 women) were randomly assigned to an incentive-to-fake condition or a control condition. Participants in the incentive-to-fake condition were manipulated to believe that athletes with lenient doping attitudes would be referred to a tedious 45-minute anti-doping program. Attitudes were measured with the pictorial doping brief IAT (BIAT) and with the Performance Enhancement Attitude Scale (PEAS). A one-way MANOVA revealed significant differences between conditions after the manipulation in PEAS scores, but not in the doping BIAT. In the light of our hypothesis this suggests that participants successfully faked an exceedingly negative attitude to doping when completing the PEAS, but were unsuccessful in doing so on the reaction time-based test. This study assessed BIAT faking in a setting that aimed to resemble a situation in which participants want to hide their attempts to cheat. The two measures of attitude were differentially affected by the implicit incentive. Our findings provide evidence that the pictorial doping BIAT is relatively robust against spontaneous and naive faking attempts. (B) IATs might be less prone to faking than implied by previous studies.},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{WolffSchindlerEnglertetal.2016,
  author    = {Wolff, Wanja and Schindler, Sebastian and Englert, Christoph and Brand, Ralf and Kissler, Johanna},
  title     = {Uninstructed BIAT faking when ego depleted or in normal state},
  series = {BMC neuroscience},
  journal   = {BMC neuroscience},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-407342},
  pages     = {12},
  year      = {2016},
  abstract  = {Background: Deception can distort psychological tests on socially sensitive topics. Understanding the cerebral processes that are involved in such faking can be useful in detection and prevention of deception. Previous research shows that faking a brief implicit association test (BIAT ) evokes a characteristic ERP response. It is not yet known whether temporarily available self-control resources moderate this response. We randomly assigned 22 participants (15 females, 24.23 ± 2.91 years old) to a counterbalanced repeated-measurements design. Participants first com- pleted a Brief-IAT (BIAT ) on doping attitudes as a baseline measure and were then instructed to fake a negative dop - ing attitude both when self-control resources were depleted and non-depleted. Cerebral activity during BIAT perfor - mance was assessed using high-density EEG. Results: Compared to the baseline BIAT, event-related potentials showed a first interaction at the parietal P1, while significant post hoc differences were found only at the later occurring late positive potential. Here, signifi- cantly decreased amplitudes were recorded for 'normal' faking, but not in the depletion condition. In source space, enhanced activity was found for 'normal' faking in the bilateral temporoparietal junction. Behaviorally, participants were successful in faking the BIAT successfully in both conditions. Conclusions: Results indicate that temporarily available self-control resources do not affect overt faking success on a BIAT. However, differences were found on an electrophysiological level. This indicates that while on a phenotypical level self-control resources play a negligible role in deliberate test faking the underlying cerebral processes are markedly different.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{WolffSchindlerEnglertetal.2016,
  author    = {Wolff, Wanja and Schindler, Sebastian and Englert, Christoph and Brand, Ralf and Kissler, Johanna},
  title     = {Uninstructed BIAT faking when ego depleted or in normal state: differential effect on brain and behavior},
  series = {BMC neuroscience},
  volume    = {17},
  journal   = {BMC neuroscience},
  publisher = {BioMed Central},
  address   = {London},
  issn      = {1471-2202},
  doi       = {10.1186/s12868-016-0249-8},
  pages     = {12},
  year      = {2016},
  abstract  = {Background: Deception can distort psychological tests on socially sensitive topics. Understanding the cerebral processes that are involved in such faking can be useful in detection and prevention of deception. Previous research shows that faking a brief implicit association test (BIAT) evokes a characteristic ERP response. It is not yet known whether temporarily available self-control resources moderate this response. We randomly assigned 22 participants (15 females, 24.23 +/- 2.91 years old) to a counterbalanced repeated-measurements design. Participants first completed a Brief-IAT (BIAT) on doping attitudes as a baseline measure and were then instructed to fake a negative doping attitude both when self-control resources were depleted and non-depleted. Cerebral activity during BIAT performance was assessed using high-density EEG. Conclusions: Results indicate that temporarily available self-control resources do not affect overt faking success on a BIAT. However, differences were found on an electrophysiological level. This indicates that while on a phenotypical level self-control resources play a negligible role in deliberate test faking the underlying cerebral processes are markedly different.},
  language  = {en}
}