@phdthesis{Kutter2022,
  author    = {Kutter, Denny},
  title     = {Three essays on misconduct and reporting outcomes},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-55933},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-559333},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam},
  pages     = {II, 186},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {This cumulative doctoral thesis consists of three empirical studies that examine the role of top-level executives in shaping adverse financial reporting outcomes and other forms of corporate misconduct. The first study examines CEO effects on a wide range of offenses. Using data from enforcement actions by more than 50 U.S. federal agencies, regression re-sults show CEO effects on the likelihood, frequency, and severity of corporate misconduct. The findings hold for financial, labor-related, and environmental offenses; however, CEO effects are more pronounced for non-financial misconduct. Further results show a positive relation between CEO ability and non-financial misconduct, but no relation with financial misconduct, suggesting that higher CEO ability can have adverse consequences for employee welfare and society and public health. The second study focuses on CEO and CFO effects on financial misreporting. Using data on restatements and public enforcement actions, regression results show that the incremental effect of CFOs is economically larger than that of CEOs. This greater economic impact of CFOs is particularly pronounced for fraudulent misreporting. The findings remain consistent across different samples, methods, misreporting measures, and specification choices for the underlying conceptual mechanism, highlighting the important role of the CFO as a key player in the beyond-GAAP setting. The third study reexamines the relation between equity incentives and different reporting outcomes. The literature review reveals large variation in the empirical measures for firm size as standard control variable, equity incentives as key explanatory variables, and the reporting outcome of interest. Regres-sion results show that these design choices have a direct bearing on empirical results, with changes in t-statistics that often exceed typical thresholds for statistical significance. The find-ings hold for aggressive accrual management, earnings management through discretionary accruals, and material misstatements, suggesting that common design choices can have a large impact on whether equity incentives effects are considered significant or not.},
  language  = {en}
}