@article{TsebelisThiesCheibubetal.2023,
  author    = {Tsebelis, George and Thies, Michael and Cheibub, Jos{\´e} Antonio and Dixon, Rosalind and Bog{\´e}a, Daniel and Ganghof, Steffen},
  title     = {Review symposium},
  series = {European political science},
  journal   = {European political science},
  publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan},
  address   = {Basingstoke},
  issn      = {1680-4333},
  doi       = {10.1057/s41304-023-00426-9},
  pages     = {20},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {Steffen Ganghof's Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: Democratic Design and the Separation of Powers (Oxford University Press, 2021) posits that "in a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not" (Ganghof, 2021). To consider, examine and theorise about this, Ganghof urges engagement with semi-parliamentarism. As explained by Ganghof, legislative power is shared between two democratically legitimate sections of parliament in a semi-parliamentary system, but only one of those sections selects the government and can remove it in a no-confidence vote. Consequently, power is dispersed and not concentrated in the hands of any one person, which, Ganghof argues, can lead to an enhanced form of parliamentary democracy. In this book review symposium, George Tsebelis, Michael Thies, Jos{\´e} Antonio Cheibub, Rosalind Dixon and Daniel Bog{\´e}a review Steffen Ganghof's book and engage with the author about aspects of research design, case selection and theoretical argument. This symposium arose from an engaging and constructive discussion of the book at a seminar hosted by Texas A\&M University in 2022. We thank Prof Jos{\´e} Cheibub (Texas A\&M) for organising that seminar and Dr Anna Fruhstorfer (University of Potsdam) for initiating this book review symposium.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{FruhstorferHudson2022,
  author    = {Fruhstorfer, Anna and Hudson, Alexander},
  title     = {Costs and benefits of accepting presidential term limits},
  series = {Democratization},
  volume    = {29},
  journal   = {Democratization},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group},
  address   = {Abingdon},
  issn      = {1351-0347},
  doi       = {10.1080/13510347.2021.1960314},
  pages     = {93 -- 112},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {As presidents approach the end of their constitutionally defined term in office, they face a number of difficulties, most importantly the deprivation of sources of power, personal enrichment, and protection from prosecution. This leads many of them to attempt to circumvent their term limits. Recent studies explain both the reasons for the extension or full abolition of term limits, and failed attempts to do so. Key explanations include electoral competition and the post-term fate of previous post holders. What we do not know yet is how compliance with term limits may be tied to the current president's expectations for their post-term fate. In particular, we do not know whether leaders who attempt to remove term limits and fail to do so jeopardize their post-term career as a result, and conversely, whether leaders who comply will have better outcomes in terms of security, prestige, and economic gain. Hence, we ask how the decision of a leader to comply or not comply with term limits is conditioned by the expectation of their post-term fate. To address this question, this article introduces new data on the career trajectories of term-limited presidents and its systematic effect on term limit compliance.},
  language  = {en}
}