@article{BersalliTroendleHeckmannetal.2024, author = {Bersalli, Germ{\´a}n and Tr{\"o}ndle, Tim and Heckmann, Leon and Lilliestam, Johan}, title = {Economic crises as critical junctures for policy and structural changes towards decarbonization}, series = {Climate policy}, volume = {24}, journal = {Climate policy}, number = {3}, publisher = {Taylor \& Francis}, address = {London}, issn = {1469-3062}, doi = {10.1080/14693062.2024.2301750}, pages = {410 -- 427}, year = {2024}, abstract = {Crises may act as tipping points for decarbonization pathways by triggering structural economic change or offering windows of opportunity for policy change. We investigate both types of effects of the global financial and COVID-19 crises on decarbonization in Spain and Germany through a quantitative Kaya-decomposition analysis of CO2 emissions and through a qualitative review of climate and energy policy changes. We show that the global financial crisis resulted in a critical juncture for Spanish CO2 emissions due to the combined effects of the deep economic recession and crisis-induced structural change, resulting in reductions in carbon and energy intensities and shifts in the economic structure. However, the crisis also resulted in a rollback of renewable energy policy, halting progress in the transition to green electricity. The impacts were less pronounced in Germany, where pre-existing decarbonization and policy trends continued after the crisis. Recovery packages had modest effects, primarily due to their temporary nature and the limited share of climate-related spending. The direct short-term impacts of the COVID-19 crisis on CO2 emissions were more substantial in Spain than in Germany. The policy responses in both countries sought to align short-term economic recovery with the long-term climate change goals of decarbonization, but it is too soon to observe their lasting effects. Our findings show that crises can affect structural change and support decarbonization but suggest that such effects depend on pre-existing trends, the severity of the crisis and political manoeuvring during the crisis.}, language = {en} } @article{ThonigDelRioKieferetal.2020, author = {Thonig, Richard and Del Rio, Pablo and Kiefer, Christoph and Lazaro Touza, Lara and Escribano, Gonzalo and Lechon, Yolanda and Spaeth, Leonhard and Wolf, Ingo and Lilliestam, Johan}, title = {Does ideology influence the ambition level of climate and renewable energy policy?}, series = {Energy sources, part B: economics, planning, and policy}, volume = {16}, journal = {Energy sources, part B: economics, planning, and policy}, number = {1}, publisher = {Taylor \& Francis Group}, address = {Philadelphia}, issn = {1556-7249}, doi = {10.1080/15567249.2020.1811806}, pages = {4 -- 22}, year = {2020}, abstract = {We investigate whether political ideology has an observable effect on decarbonization ambition, renewable power aims, and preferences for power system balancing technologies in four European countries. Based on the Energy Logics framework, we identify ideologically different transition strategies (state-centered, market-centered, grassroots-centered) contained in government policies and opposition party programs valid in 2019. We compare these policies and programs with citizen poll data. We find that ideology has a small effect: governments and political parties across the spectrum have similar, and relatively ambitious, decarbonization and renewables targets. This mirrors citizens' strong support for ambitious action regardless of their ideological self-description. However, whereas political positions on phasing out fossil fuel power are clear across the policy space, positions on phasing in new flexibility options to balance intermittent renewables are vague or non-existent. As parties and citizens agree on strong climate and renewable power aims, the policy ambition is likely to remain high, even if governments change.}, language = {en} }