@article{BruttelGueth2018,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Gueth, Werner},
  title     = {Asymmetric voluntary cooperation},
  series = {International Journal of Game Theory},
  volume    = {47},
  journal   = {International Journal of Game Theory},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Heidelberg},
  issn      = {0020-7276},
  doi       = {10.1007/s00182-018-0633-y},
  pages     = {873 -- 891},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {This paper tests the robustness of voluntary cooperation in a sequential best shot game, a public good game in which the maximal contribution determines the level of public good provision. Thus, efficiency enhancing voluntary cooperation requires asymmetric behavior whose coordination is more difficult. Nevertheless, we find robust cooperation irrespective of treatment-specific institutional obstacles. To explain this finding, we distinguish three behavioral patterns aiming at both, voluntary cooperation and (immediate) payoff equality.},
  language  = {en}
}