@article{BruttelGuethNithammeretal.2022,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and G{\"u}th, Werner and Nithammer, Juri and Orland, Andreas},
  title     = {Inefficient cooperation under stochastic and strategic uncertainty},
  series = {Conflict resolution},
  volume    = {66},
  journal   = {Conflict resolution},
  number    = {4-5},
  publisher = {Sage Publ.},
  address   = {Thousand Oaks},
  issn      = {0022-0027},
  doi       = {10.1177/00220027211066614},
  pages     = {755 -- 782},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {Stochastic uncertainty can cause coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can increase efficiency. To test this transfer mechanism, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeated Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not lead to an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two major reasons for this failure: first, stochastic uncertainty forces proposers intending to cooperate to accept high strategic uncertainty, which many proposers avoid; second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperatively, which hinders cooperation in future periods.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{TroendleLilliestamMarellietal.2020,
  author    = {Tr{\"o}ndle, Tim and Lilliestam, Johan and Marelli, Stefano and Pfenninger, Stefan},
  title     = {Trade-offs between geographic scale, cost, and infrastructure requirements for fully renewable electricity in Europe},
  series = {Joule},
  volume    = {4},
  journal   = {Joule},
  number    = {9},
  publisher = {Cell Press},
  address   = {Cambridge , Mass.},
  issn      = {2542-4351},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.joule.2020.07.018},
  pages     = {1929 -- 1948},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {The European potential for renewable electricity is sufficient to enable fully renewable supply on different scales, from self-sufficient, subnational regions to an interconnected continent. We not only show that a continental-scale system is the cheapest, but also that systems on the national scale and below are possible at cost penalties of 20\% or less. Transmission is key to low cost, but it is not necessary to vastly expand the transmission system. When electricity is transmitted only to balance fluctuations, the transmission grid size is comparable to today's, albeit with expanded cross-border capacities. The largest differences across scales concern land use and thus social acceptance: in the continental system, generation capacity is concentrated on the European periphery, where the best resources are. Regional systems, in contrast, have more dispersed generation. The key trade-off is therefore not between geographic scale and cost, but between scale and the spatial distribution of required generation and transmission infrastructure.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{HeuerOrland2019,
  author    = {Heuer, Leonie and Orland, Andreas},
  title     = {Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma},
  series = {Royal Society Open Science},
  volume    = {6},
  journal   = {Royal Society Open Science},
  publisher = {Royal Soc. Publ.},
  address   = {London},
  issn      = {2054-5703},
  doi       = {10.1098/rsos.182142},
  pages     = {9},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {Cooperation is — despite not being predicted by game theory — a widely documented aspect of human behaviour in Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) situations. This article presents a comparison between subjects restricted to playing pure strategies and subjects allowed to play mixed strategies in a one-shot symmetric PD laboratory experiment. Subjects interact with 10 other subjects and take their decisions all at once. Because subjects in the mixed-strategy treatment group are allowed to condition their level of cooperation more precisely on their beliefs about their counterparts' level of cooperation, we predicted the cooperation rate in the mixed-strategy treatment group to be higher than in the pure-strategy control group. The results of our experiment reject our prediction: even after controlling for beliefs about the other subjects' level of cooperation, we find that cooperation in the mixed-strategy group is lower than in the pure-strategy group. We also find, however, that subjects in the mixedstrategy group condition their cooperative behaviour more closely on their beliefs than in the pure-strategy group. In the mixed-strategy group, most subjects choose intermediate levels of cooperation.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Ette2018,
  author    = {Ette, Ottmar},
  title     = {Languages about Languages},
  series = {HiN : Alexander von Humboldt im Netz ; International Review for Humboldtian Studies},
  volume    = {XIX},
  journal   = {HiN : Alexander von Humboldt im Netz ; International Review for Humboldtian Studies},
  number    = {36},
  publisher = {Universit{\"a}tsverlag Potsdam},
  address   = {Potsdam},
  issn      = {1617-5239},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-419414},
  pages     = {47 -- 61},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {In the history of Humboldt research both brothers have been traditionally seen as representing the dichotomy between the humanities and the natural sciences. Today however, their similar approach to using and forming scientific language could be used as a starting point for conceiving a university, museum and even forum under one single Humboldtian science.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Franzmann2011,
  author    = {Franzmann, Simon T.},
  title     = {Competition, contest, and cooperation the analytic framework of the issue market},
  series = {Journal of theoretical politics},
  volume    = {23},
  journal   = {Journal of theoretical politics},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Sage Publ.},
  address   = {London},
  issn      = {0951-6298},
  doi       = {10.1177/0951629811411747},
  pages     = {317 -- 343},
  year      = {2011},
  abstract  = {Although party competition is widely regarded as an important part of a working democracy, it is rarely analysed in political science literature. This article discusses the basic properties of party competition, especially the patterns of interaction in contemporary party systems. Competition as a phenomenon at the macro level has to be carefully distinguished from contest and cooperation as the forms of interaction at the micro level. The article gives special attention to the creation of issue innovations. Contrary to existing approaches, I argue that not only responsiveness but also innovation are necessary to guarantee a workable democratic competition. Competition takes place on an issue market, where parties can discover voters' demands. Combined with the concept of institutional veto points, the article presents hypotheses on how institutions shape the possibility for programmatic innovations.},
  language  = {en}
}