@article{Andree2013,
  author    = {Andree, Kai},
  title     = {A note on merger in mixed duopoly - Bertrand versus Cournot},
  series = {Journal of economics},
  volume    = {108},
  journal   = {Journal of economics},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Wien},
  issn      = {0931-8658},
  doi       = {10.1007/s00712-012-0280-x},
  pages     = {291 -- 298},
  year      = {2013},
  abstract  = {In this note we analyze the incentives to merge in a mixed duopoly if firms compete in prices or quantities. Our model framework mainly follows Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (J Econ 80:27-42, 2003) who set up the model with quantity competition. We extend their analysis by analyzing the case of competition in prices. Further we compare the incentives to merge with Bertrand and Cournot competition. Comparing quantity with price competition we can show that a merger is more likely with Cournot competition than with Bertrand competition.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{AndreeHeywoodSchwanetal.2018,
  author    = {Andree, Kai and Heywood, John S. and Schwan, Mike and Wang, Zheng},
  title     = {A spatial model of cartel stability},
  series = {Bulletin of economic research},
  volume    = {70},
  journal   = {Bulletin of economic research},
  number    = {3},
  publisher = {Wiley},
  address   = {Hoboken},
  issn      = {0307-3378},
  doi       = {10.1111/boer.12149},
  pages     = {298 -- 311},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {We uniquely introduce convex production costs into a cartel model involving spatial price discrimination. We demonstrate that greater convexity improves cartel stability and that for sufficient convexity first best locations will be adopted. We show that allowing locations to vary over the game reduces cartel stability but that greater convexity continues to improve that stability. Moreover, when the degree of convexity does not support the first best collusive locations, other collusive locations exist that require less stability and these may either increase or decrease social welfare relative to competition. Critically, these locations that require less stability are more dispersed in sharp contrast to the known result assuming linear production costs.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{AbelerCalakiAndreeetal.2010,
  author    = {Abeler, Johannes and Calaki, Juljana and Andree, Kai and Basek, Christoph},
  title     = {The power of apology},
  issn      = {0165-1765},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.econlet.2010.01.033},
  year      = {2010},
  abstract  = {How should firms react to customer complaints after an unsatisfactory purchase? In a field experiment, we test the effect of different reactions and find that a cheap-talk apology yields significantly better outcomes for the firm than offering a monetary compensation.},
  language  = {en}
}