TY  - CHAP
A1  - Tanneberg, Dag
T1  - Toward a theory of political repression
T2  - The politics of repression under authoritarian rule : how steadfast is the Iron Throne?
N2  - To ensure political survival, autocrats must prevent popular rebellion, and political repression is a means to that end. However, autocrats face threats from both the inside and the outside of the center of power. They must avoid popular rebellion and at the same time share power with strategic actors who enjoy incentive to challenge established power-sharing arrangements whenever repression is ordered. Can autocrats turn repression in a way that allows trading one threat off against the other? This chapter first argues that prior research offers scant insight on that question because it relies on umbrella concepts and questionable measurements of repression. Next, the chapter disaggregates repression into restrictions and violence and reflects on their drawbacks. Citizens adapt to the restriction of political civil liberties, and violence backfires against its originators. Hence, restrictions require enforcement, and violence requires moderation. When interpreted as complements, it becomes clear that restrictions and violence have the potential to compensate for their respective weaknesses. The complementarity between violence and restrictions turns political repression into a valuable addition to the authoritarian toolkit. The chapter concludes with an application of these ideas to the twin problems of authoritarian control and power-sharing.
Y1  - 2020
UR  - https://publishup.uni-potsdam.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/57325
SN  - 978-3-030-35477-0
SN  - 978-3-030-35476-3
SN  - 2198-7289
SP  - 9
EP  - 41
PB  - Springer
CY  - Cham
ER  -