TY  - JOUR
A1  - Brück, Christian
A1  - Knauer, Thorsten
A1  - Meier, Harald
A1  - Schwering, Anja
T1  - Self-set salaries and creativity
T2  - Journal of Business Economics
N2  - Organizations frequently try to incentivize employees to develop highly creative solutions. In this study, we examine self-set salaries as a specific type of incentive design. We investigate whether self-set salaries affect employees’ motivation and overall (creative) performance. Moreover, because self-set salaries potentially risk opportunistic employee behavior, we consider the effect of the observability of peer performance on employees’ level of self-set salaries. Using a laboratory experiment, we hold the average employee compensation constant and demonstrate that, in comparison with fixed-pay contracts, self-set salaries increase the quantitative performance in creative tasks without affecting the average creativity. However, we do not find significant differences between the amount of individuals’ self-set salaries with observability of peer performance and the amount for individuals without the chance to observe peer performance. Our findings are important for firms that rely on the development of creative ideas but are unsure about the effects of the introduction of self-set salaries
Y1  - 2020
UR  - https://publishup.uni-potsdam.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/55678
SN  - 1861-8928
SN  - 0171-9130
VL  - 91
IS  - 1
SP  - 91
EP  - 121
PB  - Springer
CY  - Berlin
ER  -