TY  - JOUR
A1  - Wallage, Martijn
T1  - Dotting the “I think”
T2  - Reading Rödl : On Self-Consciousness and Objectivity
N2  - This chapter discusses a central problem in Sebastian Rödl’s Self-Consciousness and Objectivity and in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. In a statement of the form “I think p”, the words “I think” do not contribute to the content, and yet they are not redundant. In other words, a thinking subject is not something and yet not nothing. But then in what sense is a thinking subject a part of the world? The problem is intractable on a merely negative understanding of “I think”, like Anscombe’s merely negative thesis, endorsed by Rödl, that “I” is not a referring expression. In search of a positive understanding, this chapter proposes to understand “I think” by comparison to “hello”. A speaking subject is the expression of mutual presence in conversation – in that sense a limit of the world. Such expression may be compared to facial expression, with the crucial difference that a verbal expression can be taken up – i.e., repeated – in the third person. A speaking subject, then, is potentially absent from conversation, and in that sense a part of the world.
Y1  - 2023
UR  - https://publishup.uni-potsdam.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/61157
SN  - 978-1-03-234951-0
SN  - 978-1-00-095669-6
SP  - 316
EP  - 333
PB  - Taylor & Francis Group
CY  - Milton
ER  -